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This dissertation examines how Zambia’s international relations, particularly with 
China, affected its political and economic development in the first decade after 
independence. Zambian development issues in the 1960s were directly tied to the volatile 
situation in Southern Africa, and its methods of negotiating this situation were deeply 
influenced by the Cold War. Regional issues placed land-locked Zambia in a difficult 
situation politically, economically, and socially. Yet, despite major hurdles to peace and 
stability, Zambia was an anomaly among newly independent Africa nations. Postcolonial 
African history is riddled with violent decolonization struggles, civil war, and oppressive 
dictatorship. The history of these newly independent nations was dramatic and bloody 
and has garnered much attention from scholars of Africa, identifying causes ranging from 
inept colonial governance to neo-colonialism, global resource competition, and poor 
leadership. More recently, scholars have begun to include the Cold War in this 
postcolonial narrative; however, they have almost exclusively focused on instances of 
resistance.  
 x 
It is true that violent conflict unfortunately represents a majority of decolonization 
struggles, not just in Africa, but in Asia as well. It is also true that these narratives are 
more dramatic than their peaceful counterparts. It is not true however, that decolonization 
struggles influenced by the Cold War only manifested in bloodshed. Relatively speaking, 
the Zambian independence process was deliberate and peaceful. Yet Zambia’s political 
and economic development following independence was directly influenced by the bi-
polar political situation of the Cold War. The Zambian government’s most important 
communist ally was the People’s Republic of China. The reaction of the West to this 
“mutually beneficial friendship” between Zambia and China was, unsurprisingly, not a 
positive one. Yet Zambia’s staunch commitment to non-alignment was both a reaction to 
its political and economic situation, as well as the best way of ensuring development. 
Through trade agreements, pledges of aid, and, most importantly, the negotiation of the 
TAZARA railway, the Zambian government showed deft political skills at negotiating 
between the West and China for its continued economic development.  
 xi 
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High on the top floor of the library at the University of Zambia are the African 
history books. Tucked away in on a middle shelf amongst the stacks is a book entitled 
The Soviet Bloc China and Africa, published by the Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, in 1964. The University’s collections are old, often worn, and not extensive. In 
fact, there are only three books amongst the history books that address Zambia’s 
relationship with China. Yet while the book is beginning to become unbound and its 
interpretations long outdated, what is most fascinating about this book lies in the front 
pages left intentionally blank by the publisher.  
Here in a handwritten note from a student, who only signs their name “NB,” is a 
quiet proclamation: “This book is filled with capitalist ideas intended to discredit the 
good intentions of Comrade Mao and his Allies- He struggle[s] against Imperialism.” 
Written below NB’s support of the Chinese is an equally passionate response: “NB. 
Fucking shit the Chinese are trying to recolonize us. Do not be blinded by blaming 
everything on capitalism. Boy you may find yourself in a ditch. Watch every foreigner, 
w[h]ether Chinese or West[ern] critically. Never be prejudiced with a belief that 
everything socialist is honey.”  
These two very conflicting views represent the puzzle that has been, and is, 
Zambia’s relations with China and the West. For the past decade, China has 
exponentially increased its presence throughout Africa in a variety of different capacities. 
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However, China’s relationship with all of Africa, including Zambia, dates back further 







“Good economics follow good politics; the reverse is not always true.” 
 
- F. M. Mulikita, Zambian Ambassador to the United Nations1 
 
 
The Associated Press quickly pointed out that the offer was from “red China, 
communist China.” The British Broadcasting Corporation also raised concerns that 
Chinese experts would clash with the British and Canadian survey team. The People’s 
Daily, unsurprisingly, heralded the offer as being a landmark gesture in China’s 
declaration of non-alignment and friendship with the third world.2 It was 1965 and the 
international press was fixated on the negotiations to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway 
(TAZARA). For the two years of the TAZARA railway negotiations, Kenneth Kaunda, 
the first President of independent Zambia, was forced to negotiate a tenuous Cold War 
public image at the same time he worked to develop the country. As he argued, “Zambia 
was not attempting to play off East against West by approaching a number of countries 
for assistance with the project.”3 Yet it is clear from his negotiations with China and the 
                                                 
1 NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible 
Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Zambia to the United Nations,” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966. 
2 UNIP 7/22/8, “President's Press Conference,” Press Releases, September 23, 1965. 
3 Kenneth Kaunda, “Opinion-Editorial,” Times of Zambia, June 29, 1967. 
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British that it is exactly what he was doing. And what he was doing quite well. By 1967, 
however, it was beginning to become difficult to appease both sides. 
Argument 
 
In July of 1967 the Republic of Zambia had not yet been an independent nation 
for three years. However, the young President, Kenneth Kaunda had already negotiated 
much more than a peaceful independence process. Negotiating economic development 
for an underdeveloped postcolonial nation was in itself a monumental task. Yet for 
landlocked Zambia, development was influenced by much more than a colonial legacy. 
The primary research question of this dissertation is how did the Cold War affect 
Zambian political and economic development at independence? And, why did it the 
geopolitical situation of the Cold War matter? 
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the precarious 
position in which newly independent Zambia found itself, and how this new nation dealt 
with powerful external forces when negotiating its political and economic development. 
Obviously, there is a great deal to be said about domestic politics and leadership in this 
examination. This has been the concern of several other scholars, of whom this study is 
indebted to for providing balance and context.4 However, while these factors are not 
                                                 
4 See, B. J. Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: from Colonial Rule to the Third 
Republic, 1890-2001 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006); Phiri, Colonial Legacy 
and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991 
(Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1993); Timothy Shaw, Dependence and 
Underdevelopment: the Development of Foreign Policies of Zambia (Athens, OH: Ohio 
 5 
ignored, they are not the major interest of this work. Rather, this study asks specifically 
how Zambian international relations affected its political and economic development in 
the first decade of independence.  
Zambian development issues were directly tied to the volatile situation in 
Southern Africa, and its methods of negotiating this situation were deeply influenced by 
the global Cold War. Regional issues—specifically Rhodesian U.D.I., but also 
Portuguese control of Mozambique and Angola; secession and international competition 
in the Congo; South African apartheid and control of South-West Africa; and poverty and 
dictatorship in Malawi—placed land-locked Zambia in a difficult situation politically, 
economically, and socially. Bordered on almost all sides by violence, the Zambian 
government was thrown into the position of conflict mediator fighting for the 
maintenance of peace and stability at its borders and with other nations. Economically, its 
stability was threatened by limited transport routes for imports and exports and decreased 
direct trading opportunities with its neighbors. Finally, the social order in Zambia, not 
just along its borders, but even in the far interior of the country, was endangered by a 
flood of freedom fighters and refugees. 
                                                                                                                                                 
University, Center for International Studies, Africa Program, 1976); Douglas George 
Anglin and Timothy Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and 
Dependence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); and David C. Mulford, Zambia: the 
Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).  
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The Zambian government’s most important communist ally was the People’s 
Republic of China.5 By 1958 China had been a nation for ten years, and Northern 
Rhodesia was still several years away from being an independent Zambia. Consequently, 
by the time Zambian leaders began to develop foreign policy, China had already 
undergone many changes in its policy towards Africa. Chinese relations with African 
nations today are directly influenced by independence era relations; however, its 
motivations are very different. Today, economic motivations influence China, namely 
searching for developing markets for its products and actively and unashamedly 
participating in resource grabbing all over the continent. Conversely, in the 1950s and 
1960s, China was far more influenced by political motivations, particularly diplomatic 
recognition. 
Post-revolution China faced massive domestic and global political problems. As a 
Communist nation in the post-World War II era, China was immediately placed in the 
Eastern camp in the eyes of the international community. However, China fought hard to 
place itself in the third world establishment, using the geo-political strategy of strategic 
self-depreciation. The most important aspect of China’s international recognition was its 
re-admittance to the United Nations (UN), and particularly, the United Nations Security 
Council. The UN provided the first truly global governance platform, and the policy of 
“one nation, one vote” was crucial to China’s UN status. Gaining the diplomatic 
                                                 
5 Throughout this volume, China will refer to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and 
the Republic of China will be referred to as Taiwan. This is less a political statement than 
it is an issue of clarity and common usage. 
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recognition of newly independent African nations was a key part of China’s geo-political 
strategy, and many countries, including Zambia, proved instrumental. 
The reaction of the West to this mutually beneficial friendship between Zambia 
and China was, unsurprisingly, not a positive one. Yet Zambian leaders’ staunch 
commitment to non-alignment was both a reaction to its political and economic situation, 
as well as the best way of ensuring development. Through trade agreements, pledges of 
aid, and, most importantly, the negotiation of the TAZARA railway, the Zambian 
government showed deft political skills at negotiating between the West and China for its 
continued economic development.  
 
Sources and Methodology 
 
The study of the political and economic development of Zambia’s First Republic 
has been accomplished solely within Zambia’s borders by both political scientists and 
historians focusing exclusively on domestic archives. These studies are valuable, and 
there is little doubt that the best sources for understanding Zambia are Zambian. It is with 
this in mind that this project is at the outset concerned with its contribution to the 
historiography of Zambia. The major recent focus on Zambian political and economic 
history has been solely domestic. Excellent work on the political history of Zambia has 
been done by B. J. Phiri, specifically his 2006 monograph A Political History of Zambia: 
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from Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001.6 Earlier work focused on foreign 
relations, including Douglas George Anglin and Timothy Shaw’s Zambia’s Foreign 
Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence, published in 1979. However, newly 
available sources allowing for historical interpretation make updating necessary.  
The only recent work on bi-lateral relations has been undertaken by Andrew 
DeRoche on the history of Zambian relations with the United States. In his contribution 
to the edited volume The Cold War in Southern Africa, “Non-Alignment and the Racial 
Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968,” DeRoche argues that examining the 
relationship between Zambia and the United States from bilaterally “provides valuable 
insights into their often very different perspectives in the midst of the Cold War.”7 And it 
is true that the insights that can be gleaned from the Johnson administration and Kenneth 
Kaunda are useful not only in understanding the relationship between Zambia and the 
United States, but also Southern Africa and its relationship to the Cold War more 
generally. Yet this project is just one in a historiography that is wide open in terms of 
understanding Zambian foreign policy and foreign relations in the 1960s. 
The historiography of Zambian economic development is also wide open when 
considering the First Republic. After the creation of the one-party state in Zambia on 
                                                 
6 B. J. Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: from Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 
1890-2001 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006). See also Phiri, Colonial Legacy and 
the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991 
(Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1993).  
7 Andy DeRoche, “Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-
1968,” in Cold War in Southern Africa: white power, black liberation (London: 
Routeledge, 2009), 130.  
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December 17, 1972, many industries were nationalized and the economy became more 
socialist in nature in the new constitution adopted in August of 1973. This has been the 
focus of the literature regarding economic development, as well as an increasing 
literature on the Third Republic, which began after the re-institution of multi-party 
democracy in 1991. Most of this work has been done by social scientists, including 
political scientists and anthropologists.8 There is still room for historical analysis, 
particularly concerning the First Republic, to which this study contributes. 
Secondly, and more broadly, this study contributes to the historiography of 
African decolonization. The project of African history was directly linked with the 
process of African decolonization. As colonies within Africa gained their independence, 
beginning with Ghana in 1957 and continuing through the 1960s, scholarship turned its 
attention towards the history of these new nations. The consequences of colonization, the 
process of decolonization, and the political and economic crises in so many new nations 
have been explored to great lengths and in many contexts throughout the continent. 
                                                 
8 On the Second Republic, see, for instance, Jan Pettman, “Zambia’s Second Republic: 
The Establishment of a One-Party State,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
12, No. 2 (June 1974):231-244; Cherry J. Gertzel, Carolyn L. Baylies, and Morris Szeftel, 
The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester 
University Press, 1984). See also Kaunda’s manuscript Zambia's Economic Revolution; 
Address (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1968) and the Second National 
Development Plan of Zambia. On the Third Republic see Julius Ihonvbere, Economic 
Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia (Trenton, N.J.: Africa 
World Press, 1996); Catherine Hill and Malcolm F. McPherson, Promoting and 
Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 2004); and Jeremy Gould, Left Behind: Rural Zambia 
in the Third Republic (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2010). 
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However, there is still the need for new and updated interpretations of post-colonial 
history, particularly as we begin to understand Africa in the wider context of global 
politics.  
In line with the contribution to African historiography, this project also 
contributes to the study of the Cold War internationally. While Cold War history is not 
new, the post-Cold War era openness of archives makes the international study of 
decolonization and the Cold War not only possible, but necessary. One of the greatest 
examples of this new literature, and the one to which this study is the most indebted, is 
Matthew Connelly’s 2002 A Diplomatic Revolution. Connelly puts together sources from 
France, the United States, Great Britain, and Algeria to create a clear understanding of a 
very international independence process. Examining the role of the non-alignment 
movement in Algeria’s independence process, he argues that non-alignment “posed the 
most direct challenge to the East-West structure of international politics,” and that 
Algeria’s role as an inspiration to the movement went directly against the bi-polar 
political order of the Cold War world.9 
There are a growing number of other examples, including Lorenz Luthi’s The 
Sino-Soviet Split, Sergey Radchenko’s Two Suns in the Heavens, and several edited 
volumes.10 Both Luthi and Radchenko are good examples of not just the 
                                                 
9 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the 
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 
10 See, for instance, Joseph M. Gilbert and Daniela Spenser, eds., In from the Cold: Latin 
America's New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
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internationalization of Cold War history, but also the use of newly available sources from 
formerly, and currently, communist nations. In one of the first truly international 
examples of Cold War diplomatic history, Luthi researched the Sino-Soviet split on three 
continents, including in China, Russia, Poland, the former East Germany, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, and the United States. Wide-ranging research, 
coupled with the linguistic skills necessary to undertake that research, allow Luthi to 
provide a global perspective on the split, in turn assisting in answering the question of 
how the Cold War became global. 
In line with this new work, this study relies heavily on Zambian sources, from 
both the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) and the United National Independence 
Party Archives (UNIP), as well as archives from the People’s Republic of China Foreign 
Ministry Archives (FMAPRC), Great Britain’s National Archives (PRO), the United 
States Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJ), and the United Nations Archives 
(UNARMS).  
Use of the United National Independence Archives, hereafter referred to as 
“UNIP” in the notes, is necessary to provide supplementation to the National Archives of 
Zambia (“NAZ”). After the dissolution of Zambia’s Second Republic and the one-party 
state in Zambia in 1994, the UNIP archives became separate from the National Archives 
of Zambia. While much of the UNIP archive focuses on the party’s internal documents, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1991) and Sue Onslow, ed., Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation 
(New York: Routeledge, 2009). 
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there are also many documents related to Zambian affairs more generally. Therefore, 
while the National Archives of Zambia are well organized and accessible, they are not 
comprehensive. As this study is Zambian focused, these two archives represent the bulk 
of the primary sources in the analysis. 
Secondary is the use of the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People’s Republic of 
China. Recently opened for research, these archives are scholars first glimpse into the 
inner foreign policy workings of China during the Cold War period. However, they do 
not come without their difficulties. In particular, it is clear that what has been released 
comes with an agenda, and, despite their proclaimed accessibility, actual availability is 
limited. All translations from the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People’s Republic of 
China, hereafter referred to as “FMAPRC” in the notes, are my own. 
Archives from the western side include the Public Record’s Office, now National 
Archives, of the United Kingdom. These archives are fully accessible and incredibly 
comprehensive on all former British colonies, including Zambia. They have been my 
primary western source of information on pre and postcolonial Zambia, as well as 
western reactions to Zambia’s relations with China. However, I also used archives from 
the United Nations, which I argue stem from the western perspective on history during 
this period. These archives were particularly useful in examining China’s re-
establishment to the United Nations. 
Finally, this study also includes documents from the United States. While the role 
of the United States is tertiary in this examination, documents from the Lyndon B. 
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Johnson Presidential Archives, hereafter referred to as “LBJ” in the notes, they did 
provide the original impetus for this study. It was through research on the role of the 
United States in the Congo crisis that I first came across documents referring to 
“Chicoms” in the eastern DRC, sparking my interest in further research along these lines. 
Therefore, following in the line of scholars of international diplomatic history, 
this dissertation examines all sides of Zambian international relations, but particularly in 
terms of its relations with China. This, however, is not just to be studied bilaterally, but 
rather, internationally, in order to provide a clearer picture on just what these relations 
were, how they were viewed, and their implications.  
While China’s relations with African nations is a growing field of scholarly 
literature, literally expanding by the day, there is little that examines the historical role of 
China in Africa, and in particular with Zambia. During the 1960s and 1970s, the focus 
was on works by political scientists and economists much like the literature produced on 
China and Africa today. A good example of this is the 1971 publication, China and 
Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China, by Bruce D. 
Larkin. However, Larkin’s study focuses on China’s policies towards Africa, with little 
analysis of Africa’s policies towards China. China loomed much larger than Africa in the 
eyes of western scholars, who produced much of the work on the subject, and their take 
on the relationship greatly reflects their Eurocentrism. This weighting towards China 
remains a problem, but it is less apparent in more contemporary publications, as scholars 
work to internationalize their projects and create more balanced studies.  
 14 
The viewpoint largely missing from the Cold War literature on the subject is that 
of any African scholars, or even western scholars approaching the subject from an 
African viewpoint. While African scholars are playing a key role in the production of 
recent literature on the subject, it is very difficult to find Afrocentric accounts of the 
historical relationship.
11
 One valuable exception to this is the 1974 publication, China’s 
Policy in Africa, 1958-71, by Alaba Ogunsanwo. Although the book is ultimately a study 
of China’s policy in Africa, it manages to keep the objectives and views of the African 
states in mind. Unlike western accounts of the relationship, which viewed Chinese 
influence in Africa as being very negative, Ogunsanwo states in his conclusion, “From 




Despite the new opportunities for historical study of China and Africa, it remains 
a topic largely ignored by historians. Only one historical monograph has been published 
in the past twenty years on the relationship between Africa and China during the Cold 
War. Africa’s Freedom Railway, by Jamie Monson, was published in 2009 and provides 
                                                 
11
 There are several examples, however, of Sino-centric accounts of this relationship. See, 
for example, Philip Snow, The Star Raft : China's Encounter with Africa (New York: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).; Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1976); John K. Cooley, East Wind over Africa; Red China's 
African Offensive (New York: Walker, 1965).; Emmanuel John Hevi, The Dragon's 
Embrace; the Chinese Communists and Africa (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967).; Harold 
C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (New York: Macmillan, 1970).; Devendra Kaushik, 
China and the Third World (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975). 
12
 Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), 266. 
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an excellent example of African political, economic, and cultural relations with China 
following the Cultural Revolution—the building of the TAZARA railway.
13
 While this 
dissertation does focus in part on the building of the TAZARA railway line (specifically, 
Chapter 5), there are several important differences between Monson’s study and my own. 
Specifically, Monson focuses on social history, using diplomacy as a background to the 
actual focus: the people along the rail. 
Conversely, this study is, at its heart, an international history, but it is not a 
history of the United Nations, Great Britain, or even China. Rather, it is study of how 
interaction with these international actors influenced, both positively and negatively, 
Zambian political and economic development in the first decade of independence. 
Therefore, while I am indebted to the work of scholars of the international diplomatic 
history of the Cold War, as well as to previous scholars of the historical relations between 
Africa and China, I am in reality telling a much different story. Despite major hurdles to 
peace and stability, Zambia was an anomaly among newly independent Africa nations. 
Postcolonial African history is riddled with violent decolonization struggles, civil war, 
coups, and oppressive dictatorship.  
The history of these newly independent nations was dramatic and bloody and has 
garnered much attention from scholars of Africa—identifying causes ranging from inept 
colonial governance to neo-colonialism, global resource competition, and poor 
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 Jamie Monson, Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project 
Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009). 
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leadership. More recently, scholars have begun to include the Cold War in this 
postcolonial narrative, influenced by scholars such as Orne Arne Westad and his book, 
The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. 
Westad’s argument is broad: that the Cold War had effects on the developing the third 
world and the third world also had effects on the Cold War. This is true, he argues, for 
Latin American, Asian, and African nations, as the Cold War gave the fuel for continued 
third world resistance against foreign domination.  
Westad and other scholars of Africa and the Cold War have almost exclusively 
focused on these instances of “resistance.”14 It is true that violent conflict unfortunately 
represents a majority of decolonization struggles, not just in Africa, but in Asia as well. It 
is also true that these narratives are more dramatic than their peaceful counterparts. It is 
not true however, that decolonization struggles influenced by the Cold War only 
manifested in bloodshed. Relatively speaking, the Zambian independence process was 
deliberate and peaceful.15 Therefore, Zambia has spent much of its postcolonial history 
                                                 
14 A notable exception to this is the edited volume The Cold War in Southern Africa, 
edited by Sue Onslow, which includes a chapter on “Non-alignment on the racial frontier: 
Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968” by Andy Deroche. 
15 This is not to discount the efforts of Zambian freedom fighters, who were also sent to 
jail and injured. See, Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, eds., One 
Zambia, Many Histories: towards a Post-Colonial History of Zambia (Leiden, Boston, 
MA: Brill, 2008); Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: a Biography 
of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York, NY: Palgrace Macmillan, 2010); and B. S. 
Krishnamurthy, Cha, Cha, Cha: Zambia's Struggle for Independence (Lusaka: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). 
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under the radar. Yet Zambian political and economic development following 
independence was directly influenced by the bi-polar political situation of the Cold War.  
Therefore, rather than writing a solely diplomatic history, I have also set out to 
also write a story of economic development. In this I am indebted to a whole other set of 
literature on post-colonial development in Africa. Beginning with Walter Rodney’s 
seminal How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, there have been a number of studies 
focusing on how African economic development was stunted by a number of factors. Yet 
this literature has not been fully contextualized into the period about which it studies. 
Domestic economic development in post-independence African nations did not develop 
independently of the international geo-political situation in which they found themselves. 
As a newly independent, and peaceful, nation, Zambia dedicated itself to economic 
development. The story of this development is interwoven in this dissertation with the 
story of the Cold War in Zambia—in reality the same narrative, but too often separated in 
the literature. While the methodologies of examining development and diplomacy are 
different, the intersections within the Zambian story are too frequent, and too important, 




 This dissertation is divided into five chapters, with the first two chapters focusing 
on the historical and ideological background of Zambia, as well as the People’s Republic 
of China and the West. Chapters 3 lays out the specific context and issues Zambia faced 
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directly after independence, focusing on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
made by Southern Rhodesia. Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the Zambian 
reaction to this international and regional context, in terms of both planning for economic 
development, as well as negotiating diplomatically in the context of the Cold War. While 
not solely chronological, the dual purposes of this study, examining economic 
development and international relations, are integrated throughout the narrative.  
Chapter 1, “A Deliberate Independence,” focuses on the development of the 
United National Independence Party, logistically and ideologically, and the deliberate 
nature of the Zambian independence process. Before choosing between the competing 
forces of communism and capitalism, an ideological distinction that was paramount in the 
political development of decolonizing nations, the future leaders of Zambia first had to 
negotiate for independence. While the path to independence for Northern Rhodesia was 
not as violence-ridden as many other African nations, it did hold the undertones of the 
regional and international conflicts and development struggles to come. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on the demise of the Central African Federation, 
the major reason behind Zambia’s economic development issues after independence. The 
close ties developed between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, with the major economic 
and business benefit being towards the mini metropole in Salisbury, were impossible to 
simply discard after Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
1965. Yet the independence process went on without the future in mind, as Great 
Britain’s economic situation caused it to move towards decolonization throughout the 
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continent. Several years of negotiations in Zambia were not without violence and 
conflict, but overall the deconstruction of the Central African Federation and the creation 
of the new state of Zambia went smoothly. 
The United National Independence Party (UNIP), clearly set to win the majority 
at independence, began to develop its ideological foundation. However, as in many other 
nationalist movements in Africa, the focus had only been on the ideology of anti-
colonialism and majority rule, with little attention paid to the development of the political 
and economic policies to be instituted after independence had been won. UNIP had two 
choices, a western development ideology or a communist one. However, what developed 
was a middle-way, through the personal philosophies of the first president, Kenneth 
Kaunda, known as “humanism.” Humanism influenced not only Zambia’s domestic 
economic development agenda, but also its foreign policy, focusing on non-alignment 
through the eradication of all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Chapter 2, “Developing Diplomacy,” examines the development of international 
relations for both Zambia and China. Zambian leaders began to develop foreign policy in 
very practical terms several years prior to the granting of independence, on October 24, 
1964. Non-alignment stood out in this early policy, as Kaunda and UNIP did not just 
develop relations with Great Britain and the West, but also with the controversial 
communist nation of the People’s Republic of China. China’s leaders in the 1950s also 
developed a foreign policy that reflected its ideological foundation. This policy, rather 
than being based on economics, as seen in contemporary relations, centered on politics.  
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In particular, China developed a foreign policy methodology that focused on 
strategic self-depreciation in order to align itself with the third world. China through its 
participation in conferences such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, and in the creation 
of organizations such as the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.), 
demonstrated determination to become a leader of the third world and as a member of the 
Non-Alignment Movement. Throughout this development motivations were clear: China 
sought international diplomatic recognition, specifically in the United Nations. 
Whether at Bandung or through the A.A.P.S.O, China focused on the issue of 
Taiwan and the recognition of Peking over Taipei. The same was true in individual 
interactions with specific nations, including Zambia, beginning in 1962. From the very 
first visit of a Chinese delegate to Zambia, over two years prior to independence, the 
emphasis was on the recognition of the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of 
China. For the Zambian government, in 1962, the focus was on the independence 
process. However, during a return visit of the Chinese delegate in 1964, the focus shifted 
more towards economic development. Both Zambian and Chinese leaders had distinct 
goals in mind for relations, which manifested in the years after independence. 
It is necessary to look at regional issues in order to better understand the unique 
context in which Zambian leaders found themselves in the years following independence. 
Chapter 3 examines the importance of regional issues, and specifically Rhodesian U.D.I., 
for Zambian development, “The Rhodesian Situation.” While Zambian foreign relations 
covered the scope of the globe, regional relations truly had the most profound impact on 
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Zambia, politically, economically, and socially. As a landlocked nation surrounded on 
almost all sides by conflict, the new Zambian government was forced to continually 
negotiate for and with its neighbors. Violence spilled over from the Congo. Routes for 
imports and exports were blocked by the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola. 
Refugees and freedom fighters sought refuge throughout Zambia. And the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia majorly impacted all aspects of Zambian 
government and Zambian life. 
The most important colonial legacy for Zambia was not, in fact, truly colonial. 
The Central African Federation ensured the close linkages, politically, economically, and 
socially, between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The colonial history of Southern 
Rhodesia, which was tied more closely to the British South Africa Company and settler 
rule rather than British colonial administration, ensured that calls for autonomy were 
replaced by calls for independence from the white minority population. Although the 
immediate reaction of the British towards U.D.I. was rejection, the Zambian reaction was 
much more complex, due to its many ties with its southern neighbor. 
Socially, Zambia shared ethnic groups and families with Rhodesia. As in the case 
of all borders in Africa, their innate artificiality created fluidity with little regard for the 
need for passports or diplomacy to transport medical patients. Politically, the Zambian 
government attempted to maintain peaceful relations with the Southern Rhodesian 
government, and in particular the volatile President, Ian Smith, although their support of 
Zimbabwean freedom fighters made this peace difficult to maintain in the years after 
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1965. Most important, however, were the economic ties that bound the two former 
members of the Central African Federation. In terms of both imports and exports, Zambia 
relied on trade with Southern Rhodesia, as well as Rhodesia Railways as its route out to 
the sea.  
While economic independence was a goal it was not yet a reality for the newly 
independent nation. Consequently, economic sanctions quickly became a major 
international political issue, as calls from Great Britain, and then from the United 
Nations, threatened to put Zambia in a very precarious position. Contingency planning 
with the British only proved to be mildly helpful, and it was clear that different measures, 
both politically and economically, would have to be taken by Zambian leaders. The 
situation in Rhodesia was to continue on throughout the 1960s, and it was up to leaders to 
determine the best course of action to ensure its economic development. 
In Chapter 4, “Trade, Aid, and Non-Alignment,” I examine how the dual policy of 
seeking and promoting trade and aid was influenced by the Zambian government’s policy 
of non-alignment, as well as the politics of the Cold War. The regional situation, 
particularly in Southern Rhodesia, also played an important role in the decisions the 
Zambian government would make about its economic policy. The Transitional and First 
National Development Plans laid out the course of action, with a primary concern being 
import and export control to mitigate the damage caused by U.D.I. Humanism was the 
guiding ideological premise behind the development plans, drawing ideas from both 
western and communist philosophies regarding development.  
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Turning paper-based plans into reality was a different matter. Trade and aid 
during the Cold War was heavily weighted on political alignment. Yet the nations in the 
position with the most power to be of assistance required much more than those that 
identified as non-aligned. Zambian leaders, therefore, turned to the international 
community for assistance. As a non-aligned nation in the heart of the Cold War, Zambia 
was forced to be interested not only in its own political struggle, but also that of nations 
throughout Africa and throughout the world. However, participation in international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity, and the 
Non-Alignment Movement, was not just limited to negotiations surrounding political 
liberation. International organizations also focused on economic development, seen 
specifically in Zambia’s hosting of the 1967 Copper Conference and the creation of the 
Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). 
Great Britain, the United States, the World Bank, and other smaller nations, such 
as Japan and the Scandinavian countries, played a role in Zambia’s economic 
development through aid and technical assistance. Trade remained unbalanced, however, 
and therefore the Zambian government equally sought to develop trade relations with 
nations outside the western bloc. As well as pursuing opportunities close to home through 
the Eastern African Economic Community, the government also developed close 
economic ties through both trade and aid with communist nations, including the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and China. Aid from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia focused on 
technical assistance and cultural diplomacy. This aid, much like that from the West, 
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focused heavily on ideology and a concern over the ideological leanings of the Zambian 
government.  
China, on the other hand, played a much more important role in Zambia in terms 
of economic development, in part because it also focused on trade relations, as well as 
grants of aid and assistance. Chinese trade agreements, while obviously biased towards 
ensuring Chinese goals were met, focused more on the political, rather than the 
economic, objectives of the Chinese government. Yet, while trade delegations and 
agreements were important, the most important negotiations for Zambian leaders were for 
the creation of the TAZARA railway. 
Chapter 5, “Negotiating TAZARA,” describes the negotiations undertaken by the 
Zambian government to create a transport route to serve as an alternative to Rhodesia 
Railways. From independence, a major concern for the government of landlocked 
Zambia was the creation of transportation routes. With the declaration of U.D.I., it 
became even more imperative as Zambia lost its route out via Southern Rhodesia. The 
most obvious alternative was to take goods through Tanzania, as any routes through 
Portuguese controlled areas were out of the question. President Kaunda began 
negotiations with Nyerere, who had much different ideas about where to find the finances 
and support to build a Tanzania-Zambia railway line. 
Nyerere, an openly socialist leader, approached the Chinese immediately, but 
Kaunda kept his previous negotiations with China quiet. However, after the completion 
of the Maxwell Stamp Report, created from a survey of the proposed line, it became clear 
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that any hope of receiving the aid from the West was finished. Initial negotiations with 
the Chinese, still behind closed doors with Zambian leaders, led to an outcry in the 
western press. However, despite the reaction, a deal was signed between Zambia, 
Tanzania, and China in Peking in September 1967.  
The reaction in the West, as well as in China, demonstrated a new stage of the 
Cold War in Africa. Rather than focusing on violence and political liberation in 
decolonizing African nations, which were anything but cold, this was a true example of a 
cold war. Although the ultimate goals for Zambia were economic, it was forced to use 
politics to achieve its objective. Likewise, for the Chinese the goals were largely political, 
but economic aid and technical assistance were the necessary means to achieve its aim. 
Both nations, however, were successful, and the Zambian government, always committed 




CHAPTER ONE: A DELIBERATE INDEPENDENCE 
 
“For a long time I have led my people in their shouts of kwacha [the dawn]. We have 
been shouting it in the darkness; now there is the grey light of dawn on the horizon and I 
know that Zambia will be free.” 
— Kenneth Kaunda1 
 
At independence, the new Zambian government was faced with many important 
decisions. The most important of these decisions, and the decision that would influence 
all others, was the political ideology that the United National Independence Party, and, in 
turn, Zambia, would adopt. In the Cold War, political ideology was paramount to how 
countries negotiated not only their foreign relations, but also how they managed internal 
politics and economic development. Both the western and communist nations had ideas 
on how to run their own countries, as well as how the countries of the newly decolonized, 
developing world should develop.  
First, however, Northern Rhodesia had to reach independence, a long process that 
contained the undertones of the regional and international conflicts and development 
struggles to come. While colonialism can be blamed on development issues in all African 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free (London: Heinemann, 1962).  
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nations,2 in Zambia in particular much of the blame can be placed on the creation, 
administration, and demise of the Central African Federation. More so than in any other 
British colonies, the white settler population had a profound control on government, 
disrupting politics, economics, and social life in Northern Rhodesian, and hinting to the 
future of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Rhodesia. 
 
 
The Influence of the Federation 
 
The creation of the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia, particularly in the early 
years of the 20
th
 century, looks much like its other British African colonial counterparts. 
However, there was also a unique nature to its administration that did not just represent 
British policy.3 Specifically, in early years, Northern Rhodesia was more influenced by 
Cape Town and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) than it was by the Colonial 
Office of Great Britain. Like the rest of British southern Africa, there was considerably 
more white settlement, and consequently, more white influence over political affairs. 
However, after the Colonial Office took control of Northern Rhodesian affairs in the late 
1940s, there was a shift in emphasis, seen notably in the shift from the capital at 
Livingstone to the new capital of Lusaka. In addition, after World War II, the historical 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, 
D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981); and A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on 
Colonialism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
3 See Richard Hall, Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period (London: Longman, 1976), 
vi-vii. 
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relationship between the two Rhodesias found new emphasis, and the Central African 
Federation was created in 1953.4 
The purpose of the Central African Federation was to create a “partnership” not 
only between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, but also to create a 
partnership between whites and blacks.5 The first petitions for federation were made by 
white civil servants in 1949, particularly from Southern Rhodesia. The overwhelming 
support was only from the white minority, however, with much African opposition, led 
by Henry Nkumbula, leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in Northern 
Rhodesia. This was understandably so, as one of the nominated members for “African 
Interests,” (intended to be used to represent the African “vote” in the Northern Rhodesian 
cabinet), John Moffat, claimed, “This is the time, above all others, for us as Europeans to 
justify our claims to the right of leadership, and to prove our belief in British principles of 
justice and fair dealing by declaring in the clearest terms our intentions regarding the 
                                                 
4 For more on Zambia during the colonial period, see B. J. Phiri, A Political History of 
Zambia: From Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001 (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press, 2006); Richard Hall, Zambia (New York: Praeger, 1966); Eugenia W. 
Herbert, Twilight on the Zambezi: Late Colonialism in Central Africa (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002); and Martin Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social 
Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
5 The concept of “partnership” was very much engrained in the rhetoric surrounding the 
Federation. T. R. M. Creighton explores it at greater length, in particular concerning 
Southern Rhodesia, in The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central 
African Federation (London: Faber and Faber, 1960). 
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Africans among whom we live.”6 Nkumbula encouraged the chiefs to adopt a policy of 
non-cooperation, but the plans became known and the Northern Rhodesian government 
was quick to take counter-measures. All black civil servants and employees of many 
large companies had their jobs threatened if they rebelled. Consequently, the “national 
prayer” rebellion, as it was called by Nkumbula, was not a success in immediate terms, 
but did pave the way for a greater autonomy for the Northern Rhodesian state in the 
Federation, as well as the path for independence.7 
While the political and social situation remained tenuous, the economic situation 
was strong, with the domestic output of the Federation rising from £265 million in 1953 
to £369 million in 1956. This was largely due to copper prices, which, while on the 
decline, had not yet negatively affected the Federation. Whites especially felt the benefit 
of this early economic boom, and settlement increased steadily during this period. The 
federal government was divided into central and territorial governments, with some 
powers, such as those for education and agriculture, divided between European and 
African. Federal control also extended to defense, taxation, the postal services, and 
immigration.  
The influence of Southern Rhodesia over the CAF cannot be overemphasized. 
Salisbury acted as the Federation’s capital and served as a mini metropole for which the 
                                                 
6 Hall, Zambia 1890-1964, 104.  
7 An excellent biography of Nkumbula, and a good contextualization of the period, is 
Giacomo Macola's Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry 
Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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entire Federation existed to support. Consequently, Salisbury grew industrially and 
commercially at a breakneck pace during the CAF years, and many companies, including 
those from Northern Rhodesia, moved their headquarters there. Furthermore, Southern 
Rhodesia also received a disproportionate amount of the federal revenue. Tensions ran 
high, especially concerning the controversial Kariba Dam project, which served as more 
of a piece de resistance for the Federation rather than the most sound economic and 
engineering plan.8 By 1995, even the politically neutral Governor of Northern Rhodesia, 
Sir Arthur Benson, began to complain about Federal control and the closed door, secret 
politics of the Federal government. Controversies also abounded between Great Britain 
and the Central African Federation, as the Federation petitioned for greater autonomy and 
a higher status within the Commonwealth.  
Within Northern Rhodesia domestic tensions also continued to increase, with the 
ANC increasingly upping their protests against white minority rule. Led by Nkumbula, 
insisting in 1955 that “the fight against Federation is still on,”9 these protests, while not 
                                                 
8 The Kariba Dam, built from 1955 to 1959, was a major feat of engineering and is still 
one of the largest dams in the world. However, everything, from the economics, to the 
engineering, to the displacement of large numbers of people, caused great controversy, 
historically and today. For more on the dam, see David Armine Howarth, The Shadow of 
the Dam (New York: Macmillan, 1961); and Elizabeth Colson, The Social Consequences 
of Resettlement; The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga 
(Manchester: Published on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of 
Zambia by Manchester University Press, 1971). 
9 Hall, Zambia 1890-1964, 124.  
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always outwardly political, as in the case of labor strikes on the Copperbelt,10 leading to a 
state of emergency in September 1956, they did have the undertones of political 
dissidence. Kenneth Kaunda, the future president of independent Zambia, first came to 
the spotlight as the ANC was protesting the creation of the Central African Federation.  
Kenneth Kaunda was born on April 28, 1924 in the Northern Province of Zambia. 
The eighth child of schoolteachers, he began his education in a Mission School in Lubwe 
(where he met his friend and future vice president, Simon Kapwepwe) and completed his 
secondary education at Munali Secondary School. After completing a teacher training 
course in Munali, Kaunda returned to Lubwe as a teacher, also serving as an athletic 
coach and eventual headmaster of the school. In 1946 he married Betty Banda, with 
whom he raised nine children. After serving briefly as a teacher in Tanganyika 
(Tanzania), Kaunda returned to the Zambian Copperbelt to teach and serve as a welfare 
assistant at the Nchanga mine.  
Kaunda and Kapwepwe, along with John Sokoni, began a farm in Lubwe in 1949. 
During this period they became active in the Chinsali African Welfare Association, the 
local branch of the Northern Rhodesia Africa Congress. Kaunda was elected secretary of 
the organization in 1950, thus beginning his political career. He served as the district 
organizer as the Congress became the African National Congress and was eventually 
elected Organizing Secretary of the whole of Northern Province. Kaunda’s political 
                                                 
10 The Copperbelt region of Zambia is located in the northern part of the country, along 
the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many mines, including copper but 
also nickel, cobalt, gold, and other minerals, are located in this resource rich region.  
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career quickly developed, and he became the Secretary-General of the ANC in August 
1953, second only in command to its President, Henry Nkumbula. Two months after his 
election Kaunda began editing the Congress News, for which he was arrested in 
November 1953. While Kaunda was not imprisoned in 1953, his possession of banned 
literature in 1955 led to a two month incarceration.11  
The failure to stop the creation of Federation and the national prayer rebellion led 
to a cleaning house of the ANC in Northern Rhodesia. With only Nkumbula remaining, 
Kenneth Kaunda was elected as a senior official by an overwhelming majority. 
Nkumbula and Kaunda increased their political control over the ANC and their presence 
internationally, attending a Commonwealth conference by invitation of the Labour Party 
in 1957. This journey to London represented a huge landmark for Kaunda personally, 
being his first time out of Africa, and for Northern Rhodesian independence generally, as 
Nkumbula began to fall out of favor with both African and those in London, being 
replaced by the young and charismatic Kaunda.12 
Kaunda and Nkumbula officially split with the creation of the Zambian African 
National Congress (ZANC) on October 26, 1958, at Broken Hill. Immediately after its 
                                                 
11 It was during his imprisonment that he began his strict lifestyle of no meat, alcohol, or 
tobacco, for which he was later famous 
12 A good biography of Kaunda during these early years is Fergus Macpherson's Kenneth 
Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1974). On 
Kaunda personally and as a political figure, see also, Richard Hall, Kaunda, Founder of 
Zambia (London: Longmans, 1965); John Charles Hatch, Two African Statesmen: 
Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania (Chicago: Regnery, 1976); and Kenneth D. 
Kaunda and Colin Morris, A Humanist in Africa; Letters to Colin M. Morris from 
Kenneth D. Kaunda (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966). 
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creation, more than 1,000 ANC members traded in their cards to join ZANC and 
unanimously elected Kaunda their president. Not having any funding, the leaders of the 
newly formed ZANC, including Simon Kapwepwe as treasurer-general and Munu Sipalo 
as secretary-general, still managed to gain widespread support throughout the northern 
and eastern regions, while the European press doubted Kaunda’s potential. From 1959, 
amid the increasing boycotts and protests of the ANC and ZANC, it became clear that the 
Federation was in its decline. Continual states of emergency kept the Federalists on the 
defensive, and the dissolution became a matter of timing. Kaunda’s appeals for non-
violent protest turned into two months of violence following the government dissolution 
of ZANC, and four Africans were shot dead after wounding the district commissioner and 
his assistant on Chilbui Island. In the aftermath of the incident, the British government 
responded by banning UNIP and arresting Kaunda, on March 12, 1959. He was sentenced 
to nine months in prison in Kabompo, in a remote portion of northwestern Zambia.  
With Kaunda in prison in the aftermath of the riots and increasing confusion 
within ZANC, it was apparent changes had to be made. In June 1959, two new parties 
were created, the African National Independence Party and the United National Freedom 
Party, which soon merged into the United National Independence Party (UNIP). 
Originally, UNIP was led by former ZANC vice president, Paul Kalichini, but Kaunda 
replaced him after he was released from prison in January 1960. January 1960 also 
brought greater changes in Africa as Harold Macmillan made his “winds of change” 
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speech in Capetown at the end of his Africa tour. The process of independence was about 
to begin. 
 
A Deliberate Independence 
 
After the first national conference of UNIP at the end of 1960, there were a 
number of issues Kaunda and his party had to address before becoming the majority 
holder of power in Northern Rhodesia. While UNIP possessed great influence and control 
in Northern and Luapula provinces, and in particular on the Copperbelt, the ANC still 
reigned in Southern and Central provinces, and loyalties were divided in Eastern 
province. Concurrently, while UNIP held the loyalty of the educated elite throughout 
Northern Rhodesia, they still had to win the support of the chiefs, who were concerned 
that African nationalism would circumvent their power.  
Yet building up support was just one of UNIP’s major problems following its 
creation. The string of violent protests which created it produced an air of tension that 
Kaunda immediately sought to dissipate. Despite Kaunda’s repeated calls for non-
violence, the violent attacks continued to escalate. The confusion was exacerbated by the 
fact that much of the UNIP leadership continued to travel internationally to gain support 
for the African nationalist cause. However, the combined issues of increasing violence 
and greater international support led to the announcement that constitutional changes 
were to take place in Northern Rhodesia. This was a huge victory not just for Africans in 
Northern Rhodesia, but also for all African nationalist movements. As Kaunda 
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proclaimed in his autobiography, “For a long time I have led my people in their shots of 
kwacha [the dawn]. We have been shouting it in the darkness; now there is the grey light 
of dawn on the horizon and I know that Zambia will be free.”13 The African majority had 
stood up not just to colonial rule, but also to a deeply engrained white settler population. 
Kaunda’a leadership was strengthened, and calls for “independence by October” began to 
have real meaning.14  
Independence would in fact come in an October, but not that October, as the 
constitutional conference in London made slow headway. Outrage from the white 
community in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as well as European mine workers on the 
Copperbelt, led to increasing tensions within the colonial office and Federation 
government. In addition Africans held protests around the country. By early 1961 
military mobilization was initiated by Federation Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, who 
later argued that it was not to fight the British, but rather to ensure security should 
Congolese president Patrice Lumumba cross the border. Five years before Southern 
Rhodesia did in fact declare a Unilateral Declaration of Independence it seemed possible 
that the Central African Federation could as well. However, Welensky was not prepared 
militarily for such a conflict and tensions died down. 
                                                 
13 Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free (London: Heinemann, 1962).  
14 See Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, Living the End of 
Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2011); and Robert I. 
Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa; The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 
1873-1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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For UNIP and the ANC, it seemed things were going their way, and they began to 
focus on the new constitution. The primary concern was the balance of seats, which in a 
parliamentary system, as was adopted in the Federation, could make a huge difference in 
all aspects of politics. What came out of the Colonial Office in London was complicated 
and disheartening. The percentages necessary for Africans to have an influence were all 
but impossible. Welensky whole heartedly agreed with the new constitution, but Africans 
from both UNIP and the ANC turned to violence, despite Kaunda’s continued calls for 
non-violent protest. Yet violence was again the pressure that the British government 
needed to give in: on September 13 they issued a statement against the vehement protests 
of Welensky that it would be willing to compromise on the constitution. African 
opposition had won yet again. 
In turn, UNIP had won again, as more and more Africans saw it as an inevitability 
that UNIP was to be an integral part of the future of Northern Rhodesia. The party, 
despite having hundreds of its members in prison from the recent violent protests, 
boosted a high level of organization and sophistication with a central committee, 24 
regional branches (with many local branches), youth’s and women’s brigades, and 
numerous international representatives. The party also worked hard to earn the respect 
and vote of not just Africans, but also Europeans and Asians. Yet the white community 
remained essentially loyal to the United Federation Party and Welensky, as the UFP 
campaigned hard to portray UNIP as something to be feared. The party was also running 
out of money. 
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UNIP was further challenged when the ANC, under the recently released from 
prison Nkumbula, teamed up with the UFP. However, after the election, no party won a 
clear majority and the country was strongly divided geographically. The final counts on 
November 3rd had UNIP gaining 14 seats, with the UFP gaining 15 and the ANC 5. 
What was particularly unclear was if the alliance would remain intact between the UFP 
and the ANC, giving them a majority in the government. However, fundamentally, the 
two parties had nothing in common.15 It made much more sense to Nkumbula, and both 
parties’ members, for an alliance to be formed between UNIP and the ANC against their 
common enemy of the Federation. Nkumbula waited until after the by-elections on 
December 10, in a hope to gain more seats and therefore a greater majority, before 
beginning negotiations with Kaunda over the division of power within the new coalition 
government. 
In the new government the ministries were divided between UNIP and the ANC, 
with a constitutionally dictated two Europeans to serve as ministers. Yet this division of 
responsibility did not make it any easier for the two parties to get along. Phiri argues that 
“Nkumbula’s continued flirtations with UFP gave UNIP ammunition to declare him a 
sell-out to the African cause.”16 Nkumbula also fought dissension within his own ANC 
ranks, and the people fought amongst themselves throughout Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda 
pushed for new elections by the end of 1963, as the Federation collapsed and the British 
                                                 
15 See Hall, Zambia 1890-1964, 167. 
16 Phiri, A Political History of Zambia, 114. 
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seemed increasingly inclined to move Northern Rhodesia towards independence.17 The 
collapse of the Central African Federation had very important consequences for UNIP 
power, as many businessmen saw the need to align themselves with the inevitable 
majority. It also highlighted the important connections from a business and economic 
perspective between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which was to have profound 
consequences after the declaration of Rhodesian U.D.I.  
By the elections of January 1964, these convergent factors ensured the ushering in 
of Zambia’s (as it was quickly becoming commonly called) first all-African cabinet, and 
Kenneth Kaunda, at the young age of 39, its first premier, on January 23, 1964. 
Independence was planned for October 24 of that year, and London hosted an 




With an eye on independence and a clear majority in government, the time had 
come for the United National Independence Party to assert its political ideology. Yet, like 
many other nationalist movements in Africa, the focus had only been on the ideology of 
anti-colonialism and majority rule, with little attention paid to the development of the 
political and economic policies to be instituted after independence had been won. For 
each new Africa leader, very important decisions had to be made about economic and 
                                                 
17 For more on the collapse of the Central Africa Federation, see Henry Franklin, Unholy 
Wedlock; The Failure of the Central African Federation (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 
1963). 
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political policy, including not just domestic policy but also international relations. And 
for almost all African nations, this occurred within the climate of the Cold War.  
Therefore, at independence, UNIP, like the other parties throughout Africa, 
essentially had two distinct ideological tracts to choose from. While this is true at the 
most basic level, in reality the choices were much more complex, with divisions within 
both the western and communist ideological camps. Yet to choose one of these ideologies 
was to choose a foreign policy, an alignment, and a very distinct place in international 
affairs. What UNIP choose was to have lasting effects on the political development of 
Zambia, but also in turn the economic development, as will be demonstrated throughout 
the rest of this work.  
No other political institution has had such a profound effect on Zambia as the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP). From independence in 1964 until the first 
multi-party democratic elections in 1991, UNIP essentially remained the sole power 
holder in Zambian politics.18 And the sole power holder of UNIP was Kenneth Kaunda. 
Therefore, what was adopted was Kenneth Kaunda’s personal philosophy of Humanism. 
Humanism was influenced by the control of the colonial past, as well as competition 
amongst the various -isms of the Cold War era. It was, for Kaunda and UNIP, a “guiding 
                                                 
18 It was not until Zambia's Second Republic, in 1972, that all political parties except 
UNIP were banned. However, from 1962 onwards, and especially after independence in 
1964, UNIP had a vast majority of seats and essentially all political power. 
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ideology in our revolutionary task of nation-building” and a “standard against which we 
measure our work, institutions and attitudes.”19  
This humanism was not the humanism the West was familiar with, although there 
were some common elements. Humanism, in the Renaissance sense of the term, placed 
value on human beings, much like Kaunda’s version, but also on rational thought above 
faith. In two books, A Humanist in Africa (1966) and Humanism in Zambia and Its 
Implementation (1967), and numerous speeches, Kaunda laid out his philosophy. 
Kaunda’s Humanism did not the existence or importance of a Christian God, and in fact 
the Christian religion remained enormously important to him and many Zambian citizens, 
but rather focused on “man.”  
The roots of this philosophy of humanism developed over an extended period, and 
they truly represented the non-violent, man-centered world view of Kaunda above all 
else. In 1963, Kaunda was elected President of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of 
East, Central and Southern Africa. His concern for liberation, both in Southern Africa and 
internationally, is reflected in his political ideology. However, in this he emphasized a 
non-violent approach to liberation, in keeping with the focus on man as the central 
element in society. In a 1963 speech, Kaunda argued for non-violence, saying, “It is 
political, economic, social and spiritual. It brings man, as an individual living in society, 
back into the centre of things. Nothing is more necessary, for we are now in danger of 
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Discussion Programmes,” The Nation and Humanism, July 21, 1972.  
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getting so wrapped up in machines, organizations and plans that man who is the purpose 
of it all is treated like an instrument. Man must realize his own importance, both as an 
individual and as a member of society.”20  
Also central to the ideology of Humanism is the government’s responsibility to 
ensure economic development, and therefore government’s control over key economic 
industries. While not totally socialist, and rather rooted in Kaunda’s fundamentalist 
Christian beliefs and indigenous African traditions, it did contain many socialist 
elements. However, much like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, whose philosophy of Ujamaa 
dictated Tanzanian political and economic ideology in the immediate postcolonial period, 
Kaunda’s Humanism critiqued both capitalism and communism.21 He also adopted 
elements of capitalism and communism in the First National Development Plan, as will 
be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
The full fruition of Humanism would not come until several years after Zambian 
independence, particularly after the creation of the one-party state and Zambia’s Second 
Republic. It was then that Kaunda’s approach to the Zambian economy took on a more 
leftist-nationalist stance that was not readily apparent during the early years. However, 
Humanism, even in its early form, encompassed the whole of political, economic, and 
social policy for Zambia, and influenced both Zambia’s domestic development agenda, as 
                                                 
20 Macpherson, Kenneth Kaunda, 163.  
21 For a further discussion of Humanism, see Timothy Kandeke, Fundamentals of 
Zambian Humanism (Lusaka: NECZAM, 1977). 
 42 
well as its foreign policy. The Principles of Zambian Humanism were listed by Kaunda 
as: 
(i) Recognition of Man as central in all that we think, say and do; as being 
above institutions and all human activities therefore to centre around Man; 
(ii) Promotion of hard-work, self-reliance and co-operative spirit and 
provision of equal opportunity for all people in all walks of life; 
(iii) Promotion of efficient production and equitable distribution of the 
wealth of the country, in the best interest of the people; 
(iv). Working for the eradication of all forms of exploitation of one Man 
by another; 
(v). Maintenance of fundamental freedoms and human rights; 
(vi). Promotion of worthy Zambian customs and cultures; 
(vii). Abolition of all forms of discrimination and segregation and fight 
against individualism, tribalism and provincialism; 
(viii). Installing a high spirit of patriotism and the awareness of Zambian 
nationhood; 
(ix). Eradication of all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, 
racialism and fight for African unity; 
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(x). Recognition of the Party as the main institution in the service of the 
people.22 
The Zambian government also sought to make it clear that the political ideology 
governing its foreign policy was that of “Eradication of all forms of colonialism, neo-
colonialism, imperialism, racialism,” or, in the terms of the Cold War, non-alignment.23 
This clarity was sought not only in official diplomatic negotiations and in the press, but 
also in its correspondence with the international public. 
An example that exemplifies and elucidates on this ideological link between 
Humanism and non-alignment is a story from February 1967. Thomas R. Lippert, a high 
school senior in New Ulm, Minnesota, wrote to Kenneth Kaunda requesting information 
on Zambia, and in particular its relations with the United States. The Foreign Minister at 
the time, M. C. Chona, replied, explaining that in Zambia’s short history the United 
States had supplied experts in various fields to assist in national development, and 
provided scholarships for students to study in America. However, regarding the Four 
Year Development Plan that had been recently launched, Chona stated that they had not 
received any of the support from the United States they had hoped for but that it was too 
soon to give Lippert a summary of United States aid towards Zambia. Regarding 
Zambian foreign policy and its international relations, Chona described Zambian policy 
                                                 




as being one of “positive non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other independent countries.”24 He also emphasized that Zambia was an active member 
of the international community through their participation in the United Nations, the 
Commonwealth, and the Organization for African Unity.  
Non-alignment did not just apply to political policy, however, but economic 
policy as well. During a seminar on Humanism in the copper belt town of Kitwe, Kaunda 
replied to a question on how the ideology of Humanism related to Zambia’s “mixed” 
political economy. Borrowing from Chapter 5 of his book on Humanism, Kaunda 
explained that Zambia was “going to borrow good things from both the capitalists and the 
communists.”25 The President pointed out that in the United States there was state-owned 
enterprise, and private enterprise in China, as well as a Fiat factory being opened in 
Russia. To him, “all this showed that although big powers did at times take a strong stand 
on certain issues they were in fact doing exactly what Zambia was doing by borrowing 
what is good from east and west.”26  
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Although peaceful and deliberate in comparison to the independence process in 
many other African nations, the decolonization of Zambia still contained the foundations 
for its postcolonial development, as well as the undertones of the problems to come. The 
rise of Kenneth Kaunda to power was humble; however, it was also absolute. 
Consequently, from the inception of the United National Independence Party until 
Kaunda was voted out of office in 1991, his ideas and philosophies became synonymous 
with that of the nation. Specifically, the ideology of Humanism was the guiding force 
behind the Zambian government’s approach to economic development, as well as its 
foreign policy. 
The period prior to 1964 also hinted to the problems that were to come. Zambia’s 
unique colonial legacy, particularly its inclusion in the Central African Federation, 
greatly influenced its postcolonial development. Rather than existing to benefit the 
colonial metropole in Whitehall, Zambia existed to benefit the regional metropole of 
Salisbury. This in and of itself had economic implications after the dissolution of the 
CAF. However, after the declaration of Rhodesian U.D.I., these implications were to 
become critical for the Zambian state, especially its economic development. It was 
through foreign policy and specifically its relations with China, where we now turn, that 
the Zambian government was able to mitigate damage from U.D.I. and ensure its 
economic development.  
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CHAPTER TWO: ESTABLISHING DIPLOMACY 
 
“There is no doubt that this mutual aid and economic co-operation will continuously 
expand in scope and increase in quantity” 
 
- Zhou En-Lai1 
 
 
Concurrently with the development of an economic and political ideological 
basis, Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party also sought to 
develop international relations. Too often in the study of decolonizing Africa and post-
independence African nations the focus is on domestic issues, rather than those related to 
foreign policy. And, when the focus is on international actors, agency is always given to 
the colonial power, or the neo-colonial aggressor. What Kaunda and UNIP proved, 
however, is that diplomatic relations could be established on more balanced terms, and 
that the political parties instigating for nationalism, also focused on the future of 
international relations for the new nation. 
For the Zambian government, the obvious first place to determine a policy for 
diplomacy was with the West, specifically Great Britain, the United States, and the 
United Nations. What is more surprising though was the attention paid to the 
                                                 
1 Zhou En-Lai, China and the Asian-African Conference: Documents (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1979). 
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development of relations with the controversial nation of the People’s Republic of China. 
Rather than being economic, as in contemporary relations, China’s interest in African 
nations in the 1960s was largely political. As a communist nation, China also had to 
determine its own foreign policy in relation to its ideological basis. What developed was 
a form of strategic self-depreciation, in which China sought to place itself at the level of 
the third world, so as to negotiate for its international legitimacy, specifically at the 
United Nations.  
 
 
The Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa 
 
On October 1, 1949, the new People’s Republic of China was faced with a huge 
domestic agenda. The need for political and economic stability at home did not mean that 
China could ignore foreign policy, however, with geopolitical concerns immediately 
becoming a priority. China’s foreign policy in its early years, namely from 1949 to 1954, 
focused on the its neighbors and was a much different type of foreign policy than would 
develop in subsequent years towards Africa. The first major foreign policy concern of 
China was Korea, with the war in Korea breaking out on June 25, 1950, less than a year 
after the Communist Party won control of the government.  
In his book Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chen Jian discusses China’s role in 
the Korean War. Chen explains that the impetus for the war lay solely on the shoulders of 
Kim Il-sung, with the Soviet Union reluctantly providing assistance as Stalin feared a 
direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean 
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peninsula. Stalin encouraged Kim to request assistance from Beijing so as to share the 
responsibility, but Mao and the CCP were hesitant. In the end, however, Chen explains 
that Mao came to Kim’s assistance “because Mao and his comrades were eager to revive 
China’s central position on the international scene through supporting revolutionary 
movements in other countries (especially in East Asia).”2 
China’s involvement in the Korean War was directly hinged on support from the 
Soviet Union. However, after the United States became involved, as Stalin had feared 
they would, Soviet support quickly dwindled. This was the first major test of the Sino-
Soviet alliance, a relationship that would continually be tried until the eventual split. In 
the end though, China’s decision to assist Kim gave Stalin a more favorable opinion of 
Mao’s CCP and he “became more willing to commit Soviet financial and technological 
resources to China’s economic reconstruction.”3 It is clear that immediate foreign policy 
concerns for China were directly related to domestic concerns, including fostering its 
relationship with the Soviet Union for strategic and economic motivations, as well as 
regional concerns over the stability and support for revolution in East Asia. However, 
China’s early foreign policy did not directly translate into its foreign policy towards the 
developing world and Africa in particular, although some motivations remained the same. 
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The complex geopolitical situation of the Cold War is a poignant example of the 
importance of self-identification, as for the first time nation-states were categorized into 
worlds. In 1952, economist and demographer Alfred Sauvy published an article in the 
French magazine L’Observateur coining the term “third world.” Sauvy used the term to 
refer to those countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that, as they achieved political 
independence from colonial powers, had not yet determined a political alignment with the 
“first world” of the United States and Western Europe or the “second world” of the 
Soviet Union. This indirect reference to the third estate of the French Revolution implied 
that the third world was taken advantage of much like the peasantry was in eighteenth 
century France. 
The images that the United States and Soviet Union portrayed to the rest of the 
world during this time were paramount. Perhaps the best example of this image game can 
be seen in the “Kitchen Debate” at the opening of the 1959 American National Exhibition 
in Moscow. Here, the United States strove to be viewed as more progressive than the 
Soviet Union in an example of the great debate between capitalism versus socialism. No 
matter what was happening internally in each of these countries, each sought to appear to 
be more economically viable and politically stable than the other. However, China chose 
a much different approach in the image game of the Cold War. The situation in the late 
1950s and early 1960s was one of newfound importance, which focused on the United 
States and the west as the enemy, while maintaining a precarious, yet at this point still 
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largely positive relationship with the Soviet Union. Therefore, in a form of strategic self-
depreciation, separate from its desire to once again be a leader in East Asia, China sought 
to align itself with the developing nations of the third world.  
 
The Bandung Conference of 1955 
 
The new members of the third world did not necessarily want to align themselves 
politically with the United States or the Soviet Union. The third world self-identified as 
non-aligned nations, and in April of 1954, Indonesia proposed that a conference of Asian 
and African nations convene to discuss issues concerning these nations. The Bandung 
Conference, which took place from the April 18 to April 24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, 
was the first large scale meeting of Africa and Asian nations, many of which were newly 
independent and some still under colonial rule. In total, twenty-nine countries sent 
delegates, many of which represented newly independent nations, such as India and 
Pakistan, but some of which also represented nations that had not yet gained full 
independence, such as the Gold Coast, soon to be the independent nation of Ghana. 
The agenda of the conference was part of a greater movement culminated in the 
conference and the subsequent formation of the Non-Alignment Movement. In his 
description of the proceedings of the conference, Secretary General of the Indian Council 
for World Affairs A. Appadorai stated the conferences aims as: 
(1) Economic Co-operation- It was understood that this would include a 
discussion on the peaceful uses of atomic energy;  
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(2) Cultural Co-operation;  
(3) Human Rights and Self-Determination- Under this item, the questions 
of Palestine and racialism would be discussed;  
(4) Problems of Dependent Peoples- This would include a discussion on 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; and  
(5) Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation- The question of weapons 
of mass destruction and disarmament would be discussed under this item.4 
More broadly, the conference had the implicit goals of creating a coalition against 
imperialism. With the creation of the United Nations charter and the establishment of the 
principle of “national self-determination,” it seemed inevitable that the colonies of 
Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean would eventually be granted sovereignty. However, the 
political realities of the Cold War left many of the newly independent nations wary of the 
role that the United States or the Soviet Union hoped to play in their independence.  
 Therefore, while the Bandung Conference was deemed a success and a “milestone 
on the road to peace and progress”5 in its achievements of its stated aims, its legacy was 
the birth of the ideas that eventually formed the Non-Alignment Movement. The idea for 
the movement came out of speech given by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi, 
in which he laid out the “Pancha Shila,” or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for 
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Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955), 6. 
5 Ibid., 32. 
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Sino-Indian relations.6 Yet, while the Non-Alignment movement, which today has 118 
members, was born out of a discussion of the relationship between India and China, it 
was never signed by the Chinese, and today they still only hold observer status. This 
sideline participation made China the most curious participant at the conference. 
Although China was not yet the world power that it would become in the twenty-first 
century, the Communist Revolution of 1949 meant that much of the world, particularly 
the West, viewed China as more of a member of the second world, rather than a member 
of the third world, and of a level of concern similar to that of the Soviet Union. Yet 
China, with the full backing of Nehru under the auspices of the Pancha Shila, and as an 
Asian nation not a communist nation, was a key player at the conference.  
 China’s delegate to the conference, Zhou En-Lai,7 played a very visible, and at 
times controversial, role at Bandung. China’s attempts to establish a distinct foreign 
policy are first evidenced in their participation in the 1954 Geneva conference. The 
conference sought to establish peace in French Indo-China and in Vietnam and was 
where Zhou En-Lai, as the Chinese delegate, first established himself as “a tough but 
reasonable negotiator.”8 During the recess of the conference, he and Nehru established 
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Pancha Shila. This also was where China’s foreign policy towards the third world nations 
first began to form. 
Regarding China’s foreign policy towards Africa, there was one issue in particular 
that the Chinese government felt it could not ignore when considering diplomatic 
relations: the issue of Taiwan. This issue was first discussed at the Asian Nations 
Conference, held just prior to Bandung from the April 6 to the April 10, 1955. While the 
conference was more unofficial and less influential than Bandung, it had the participation 
of both the Soviet Union and China, and “there can be little doubt that the meetings in 
India and Indonesia were linked in the sense that the organizers of the New Delhi 
meeting hoped that its deliberations would influence the forthcoming discussions in 
Bandung.”9 Later at Bandung, Zhou showed his diplomatic skill in two speeches that laid 
the foundation of China’s foreign policy towards the third world.  
The first speech was originally intended as his keynote speech for the conference 
but was scrapped for a new speech with the first one handed out in mimeographed form 
to all of the delegates. This first speech focused on China’s commonalities with the other 
nations of Asia and Africa, particularly in terms of subjection to colonial rule. Zhou’s 
speech stated passionately, “Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, 
and our destiny placed in the hands of others…Suffering from the same cause and 
struggling for the same aim.”10 The speech went on to emphasize, “The majority of our 
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Asian and African countries, including China, are still very backward economically 
owing to the long period of colonial domination.”11 China’s reference to itself as a post-
colonial nation was controversial, as many felt that China had not been subject to the 
same level of colonial domination as many of the other nations present. This was 
particularly significant since China’s only true colonial holdings were Hong Kong and 
Macau. Yet, more importantly, this was a crucial example of China’s strategy of self-
depreciation as the cornerstone of its third world foreign policy.  
The skepticism of other delegates about Zhou En-Lai’s first speech and his 
references to China as a “semi-colonial society”12 led Zhou to draft a supplementary 
speech that he gave orally as the first was distributed. This speech took a more definitive 
stance on China’s role in the Cold War geopolitical situation. Here, Zhou stated: 
The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel. 
We Communists do not hide the fact that we believe in communism and 
that we consider socialist system a good system. There is no need at this 
Conference to publicize one’s ideology and the political system of one’s 
country.13 
His first speech never mentioned the political ideology of the Chinese government, yet 
the second speech emphasized the point from the outset. The political realities of the 
Cold War made China’s unique interpretation of Marxism impossible to ignore. 
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Additionally, the first speech did not mention the controversy surround Taipei. 
However, Zhou’s less rehearsed second speech makes it obvious that others had pressed 
him to address the issue. Regarding Taipei, he stated: 
As for the tension created solely by the United States in the area of 
Taiwan, we could have submitted for deliberation by the Conference an 
item such as the proposal made by the Soviet Union for seeking a 
settlement through an international conference. The will of the Chinese 
people to liberate their own territory Taiwan and the coastal islands is a 
just one. It is entirely a matter of our internal affairs and the exercise of 
our sovereignty…But we did not do all this, because otherwise our 
Conference would be dragged into disputes about all of these problems 
without any solution.14 
This was an important departure from the emphasis that Zhou had placed on Taiwan at 
the preceding conference. The issue had not even made the agenda of Bandung, as Zhou 
pointed out, yet he felt pressured to bring it up in his supplementary speech. Despite 
China’s desire to keep the matter an internal issue, Zhou’s references at Bandung 
foreshadow the important role that diplomatic recognition, especially in the United 
Nations, would play in relations between China and the third world, particularly Africa. 
Despite the importance of these two now seemingly unavoidable issues of 
political ideology and the recognition of Taipei, the original strategy of self-depreciation 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 22. 
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remained deeply embedded in the rhetoric of the second speech. Here, Zhou continued to 
emphasize China’s equality with other developing, newly independent nations. He asked 
of his audience after explaining China’s definitive communist stance: “Is there any basis 
for seeking common ground among us?” His answer went back to the intentions of his 
first speech. He stated: 
Yes, there is. The overwhelming majority of the Asian and African 
countries and peoples have suffered and are still suffering from the 
calamities of colonialism. This is acknowledged by all of us. If we seek 
common ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under 
colonialism, it will be very easy for us to have mutual understanding and 
respect, mutual sympathy and support, instead of mutual suspicion and 
fear, mutual exclusion and antagonism.15 
This declaration was coupled with an emphasis that China fully backed the aims and 
proposals of the conference, and Zhou gave an enthusiastic speech on the successes of the 
conference at its conclusion.  
 On the one-year anniversary of Bandung, enthusiasm was still strong among 
many nations, including China, about the joint project that had begun. In a telegraph from 
Zhou to the prime minister of Indonesia in April of 1956, Zhou explained: 
 The Spirit of the Bandung Conference of peaceful coexistence and anti-
colonialism has deeply impressed people from all around the world, 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
 57 
especially those from Asian and African countries. The resolutions passed 
in the conference have reflected the common desire of the Asian and 
African people to strive for and maintain independence and liberty, uphold 
world peace and promote friendly cooperation. The influence of these 
resolutions are now expanding by the joint efforts of the people from 
Asian and African countries.16 
In honor of the anniversary, nations such as China and Indonesia held a brief ceremony 
commemorating the previous year’s events and foreshadowing the new organization 
about to be born. 
Establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization 
 
The Bandung Conference laid the ground for the future of China’s relations with 
the third world. However, this diplomatic strategy based heavily on the self-identification 
of its participants was constantly adapting and evolving according to the current political 
realities of the Cold War and decolonization. The first evidence of this evolution was the 
1957 establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.), in 
which China, in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union and with continued distrust 
towards the United States, began to take a more revolutionary stance in its foreign 
relations. This growing pressure is evidenced both in the shift internally towards more 
                                                 
16 FMAPRC: 105-00311-02, “Zhou zong lizhi Yin nizong lihan,” (“Premier Zhou En-
Lai's Letter to the Prime Minister of Indonesia,”) April 14, 1956, p. 4-5.  
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leftist policies in China, which encouraged a more militant stance against the United 
States, as well as in concern over new Soviet technology. The Soviet Union’s first 
successful earth satellite, Sputnik I, was launched in October of 1957 and its first 
successful intercontinental ballistic missile was launched in November 1957 and “was 
regarded by the Chinese as a mark of decisive international change in the balance of 
forces between ‘Socialism’ and ‘imperialism.’”17  
The A.A.P.S.O. was founded at a conference held in Cairo on December 26, 
1957. This gathering of 500 delegates from 43 different entities from various Asian and 
African nations was the largest gathering of its kind. Unlike Bandung, however, the 
delegates to the conference in Cairo were not representatives of their country, but rather 
of specific organizations, which “generally reflected the Communist orientation” of the 
groups they represented. Despite this orientation, the meeting “while strongly anti-
imperialist and anticolonialist as well as generally anti-Western in tone, was not, strictly 
speaking, a Communist propaganda forum.”18 For while both the Soviet Union and China 
both had delegations at the conference, the Egyptians also played a prominent role in the 
meetings.19 
                                                 
17 Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71 (London; New York: Cambridge 
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19 The Philippines, Turkey, and Pakistan boycotted the conference due to their close 
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To continue the work of the conference and to continue to promote its objectives, 
the convening delegates founded the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization. The 
A.A.P.S.O. was not made of countries, but rather individual national organizations, 
giving countries not yet independent a place to voice their concerns in the international 
community. The make-up of the A.A.P.S.O. was particularly important for the African 
organizations that joined as they were often still considered illegal in their country of 
origin. This also served to downplay the communist nature of the organization, as the 
main goals of these participants were to promote anticolonial issues, rather than pro-
communist ones.20 
 This change in emphasis highlighted the development of relations between China 
and African nations. As John Cooley explains, “The main advantage that the Chinese 
derived was a series of new footholds and new bases for exchanges with Africa…This 
gave the Chinese an opportunity to catch up with the Soviets, who had maintained regular 
                                                 
20 Much like its concerns with the alignment of the United Nations, Zambia was also 
concerned with the alignment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. One of 
the primary diplomatic instruments of China in developing its relations with developing 
nations, the A.A.P.S.O. was not always viewed favorably by some Zambian policy 
makers. This is particular was related to the fight for supremacy between China and the 
Soviet Union in their bid to become the de facto leader of the Third World. The most 
blatant representation of the power struggle happening within the A.A.P.S.O. in the mid-
1960s was undoubtedly the 1965 Afro-Asian Conference, held in Algeria. Despite its 
concerns, Zambia continued to participate in the A.A.P.S.O., still seeing it as one of the 
better options to boost political leverage and economic development. As one of the more 
peaceful and stable member states of the organization, Zambia agreed to host the 1970 
summit. However, not everyone agreed with hosting the A.A.P.S.O.. Zambia spent a lot 
of money to run the conference and it became a debate about national priorities in terms 
of spending. 
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diplomatic, consular or commercial contacts in some African countries since the 
1920s.”21 Beyond the A.A.P.S.O., China sought to promote its own form of militant 
agricultural Marxism, which its promoters believed to be more relevant to the countries 
of Africa than the urban proletariat uprisings of the Marxism of the Soviet Union. It was 
through the A.A.P.S.O. that China first began to promote national liberation movements, 
particularly in nations where it seemed possible for a communist revolution of the 
agricultural peasantry.  
In this promotion of national liberations struggles in Africa, the first state in 
which China became involved was Egypt. In October of 1956, Britain, France, and Israel 
attacked the Suez Canal following the July decision of the Egyptian government to 
nationalize the Canal when the United States and Great Britain decided not to fund the 
building of the Aswan Dam. The Suez Crisis represented for many African nations the 
neo-imperialist ambitions of the countries of the first world. Claiming support for Egypt 
during this time was synonymous with issuing support for the anticolonialist coalition 
that was gaining prominence through the Non-Alignment Movement. Therefore, China’s 
open support in the matter was crucial. China’s support of Egypt during the Suez crisis of 
1956 also laid the ground for similar instances of support around the continent. This 
support was not only in rhetoric, however, but also in more tangible assistance. These 
goods, which included steel as well as monetary support, were the first instances of 
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economic aid that would become the trademark of Chinese foreign policy in Africa in the 
coming years.  
Following on the heels of China’s support of Egypt was their support of Algeria. 
The Algerian War of Independence was one of Africa’s most important decolonization 
struggles. Lasting from November 1954 to March of 1962, it was certainly the longest 
and the bloodiest, with upwards of one million Algerians killed in the fighting. The 
national liberation struggle in Algeria not only affected the Algerians and their French 
colonizers, but also had profound implications for decolonization throughout Africa. It 
served as both an inspiration for other independence movements throughout Africa, as 
well as a great source of concern for British colonial officials. Because of the Algerian 
War, the process of decolonization was rushed in many colonies where independence was 
in the short-term plans of the colonizers, and was even begun without any prior plan for 
the allowance of sovereignty and self-governance in the Belgian Congo—a process that 
proved detrimental to their stability following independence.  
Like in its support of Cairo in the Suez Crisis, even prior to the establishment of 
the A.A.P.S.O. China had showed unwavering support for the liberation struggle in 
Algeria. Zhou, in his first speech handed out at the Bandung Conference, stated China’s 
support: 
we cannot help being aware that the peoples of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria 
and other dependent peoples who have been fighting for independence 
have never ceased to be suppressed with violence…One should say that 
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now the common desire of the awakened countries and peoples of Asia 
and Africa is to oppose racial discrimination and to demand fundamental 
human rights, to oppose colonialism and to demand for national 
independence, to firmly defend their own territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.22 
China continued to be supportive throughout the Algerians’ struggle, and was rewarded 
with their goal of Algeria’s recognition of the government in Peking immediately 
following their declaration of independence. 
The liberation struggle in Algeria inspired a number of similar movements around 
Africa and had created a sense of fear among colonizers of a similar situation erupting in 
their colonies. In 1957, the British colony of the Gold Coast became the first sub-Saharan 
African nation to gain independence in the post-War era. The new nation of Ghana, under 
the radical leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who had attended the Bandung Conference 
even prior to independence, was the first of many decolonization movements across the 
continent.23 In 1960, the year referred to as the “year of African independence,” 
seventeen nations achieved sovereignty and the right to self-governance. Therefore, while 
                                                 
22 Zhou, China and the Asian-African Conference, 14-15. 
23 Ogunsawo explains in his book China’s Policy in Africa that on the first anniversary of 
Ghana’s independence in 1958, Zhou En Lai sent a message to Kwame Nkrumah stating 
that the “Chinese people are very glad to see that new successes have continuously been 
gained by the people of Ghana during the past year in consolidating national 
independence and safeguarding state sovereignty” (28). However, while Ghana did not 
establish diplomatic relations with China until July 5, 1960, it was one of the nations that 
supported Peking in the United Nations as early as 1957. 
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Chinese support in the late 1950s tended to focus on North Africa, by the early 1960s 
China quickly made its presence known in sub-Saharan Africa as well. 
This support of independence movements was an important issue in the rhetoric 
surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations far past Bandung. In editorials in 
the nationalist newspapers People’s Daily and Red Flag, the editorial departments 
published “Apologists of Neo-Colonialism” on October 25, 1963. In the editorial, they 
stated their support of the newly independent nations of Asian, Africa, and Latin 
America, emphasizing that “The primary and most urgent task facing these countries is 
still the further development of the struggle against imperialism, old and new 
colonialism, and their lackeys.”24 The editorials also described the political nature of the 
struggle, emphasizing the need for an “armed struggle,” the hallmark of Maoist Marxism. 
Additionally, foreshadowing the importance of the economic relationship that was 
developing between China and many African nations, the editorials stated, “It is 
important for the newly independent countries to develop their independent economy. 
But this task must never be separated from the struggle against imperialism, old and new 
colonialism, and their lackeys.”25 
However, in reality the relations between China and the third world were 
becoming increasingly focused on economics. Diplomacy was to go hand in hand with 
economic aid and investment, first evidenced at the 1958 meeting of the Asian-African 
                                                 
24 Alan Lawrence, China's Foreign Relations since 1949 (London; Boston: Routledge 
and K. Paul, 1975), 168. 
25 Ibid. 
 64 
Chamber of Commerce. An off-shoot of the A.A.P.S.O., the Chamber of Commerce was 
designed to facilitate economic relationships in a mandate by the previous year’s 
conference. The first meeting of the Chamber was held on December 8, 1958 in Karol by 
the United Arab Chamber of Commerce and other similar bodies from A.A.P.S.O. 
member countries. In a Chinese Foreign Ministry description of the conference, the major 
goals were described as: 
(1) To search for a means for the cooperation of Asian-African 
countries in economics, technology, and finance, and to find ways to avoid 
vicious competitions in markets; 
(2) To create a solution for the defrayal of difficulties facing the 
Asian-African countries;  
(3) To discuss the influence of the European markets on Asian 
countries; 
(4) To issue the permanent joint body of the Asian-African Chamber 
of Commerce Meeting.26 
Although not all members of the A.A.P.S.O. participated in the Chamber, China noted 
that “the main Asian and African countries like India, Indonesia, Japan, Iraq, Sudan, and 
Ghana” participated, “as well as countries from the communist camp like the Soviet 
                                                 
26 FMAPRC: 108-00122-05, Nan Hanchen, “Guanyu canjia ya-fei shanghui huiyi 
huodong fangan de qingshi” (“Request for instructions on the program for participating in 
the Asian-African Chamber of Commerce meetings,” November 4, 1958. 
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Union, Mongolia, Vietnam, North Korea and China.”27 China was free to note in this 
internal document that it was in fact in the “communist camp,” despite the public rhetoric 
of being firmly in the third world establishment.28 
The separate goals of the Chinese government were clear. In the same 
instructional briefing, they explained that while the majority of nations would attend 
based on their desire to increase international trade and improve their economies, “We 
think it is of considerate political significance to offer positive support to this purpose so 
as to get the majority of participant on our side.” The plan was to reveal the weaknesses 
in “imperial” aid from sources such as the United States and Japan, and then provide an 
alternative in the form of “selfless aid” that the Chinese government provided “under the 
principle of equity and mutual benefit.” In language that was becoming familiar and more 
fine-tuned, they explained, “We will strive for the promotion of economic development 
of Asian and African countries in the consistent spirit of equity and mutual benefit and 
friendly cooperation.”29  
The memo goes to outline the plan in further detail, explaining that the top 
priority “will be the establishment of trade amongst Asian and African nations.”30 The 
trade policy to be adopted was to be one that would be relevant to China’s economic 
development and the improvement of the Chinese people’s standard of living, but it 






would also be one that “shows full respect to the needs and will of our partners” and that 
“will never impose anything on them.”31 In contrast to this policy, China sought to 
emphasize in the Chamber that the “imperialistic exchange” of “plundering,” which 
included “exporting far more than importing” and “lowering people’s standard of living” 
in developing countries.32 Although China allowed that there would inevitably be natural 
competition in markets, it emphasized that uneven competition could be solved “by 
strengthening economic cooperation and mutual consulting.”33 
Payment terms and conditions were also identified as potential problems for the 
developing countries of Asia and Africa. The “root cause” of the “paying capacity” of 
these countries was again the “plundering and exploitation of imperialism.” In response 
to this problem, China proposed that developing countries be allowed to “gain economic 
independence first” and then establish an “equal and mutually beneficial economic 
relationship.” With this mind, China was to adopt a “flexible” payment system for its 
trading partners.34 China also sought its proposal on the issue of a common market. China 
rejected the idea of an Asian-African Common Market, because they feared it would 
“pave the way for Japan to dump its goods.” “Economically backward countries” were 
also to be assisted in the common market, so as to assist them in “developing their 
national economies” as well as helping “economically nondependent countries in gaining 






absolute economic as well as political independence.” The memo argued, “Only when 
this is realized and Asian and African countries have been economically independent and 
developed can we consider establishing a common market under the principle of equity 
and mutual benefit.”35 
The Issue of Taiwan 
 
The Chinese government also planned to use its time in Karol to “do some after-
meeting activities.” The major goal of these meetings was to “emphatically publicize” 
China’s position on Taiwan. China’s message on this issue was that “American 
imperialism” had “invaded” Taiwan, interfering in China’s “internal affairs” and 
“attempting to make ‘Two Chinas’.”36 The A.A.P.S.O., heavily influenced by the 
participation of the communist powers China and the Soviet Union, discussed issues 
similar to those advanced at Bandung, but China placed particular emphasis on UN 
recognition of the government in Peking over the government in Taipei. The diplomatic 
recognition of one capital over another would prove to be a crucial culmination of 
Chinese-African relations in 1971, as African nations played the deciding role in the 
People’s Republic of China’s establishment as the internationally recognized government 
of China.37 
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Zhou En-Lai in Africa, 1963-1964 
 
Before economic objectives could implemented and the issue of Taiwan finally 
settled, the Chinese first had to establish the foundation of diplomatic relations. While 
China’s support of the nationalization of Suez, the national liberation struggle in Algeria, 
and the conflict in the Congo gathered the most international attention, what was truly 
important to the Chinese at this time was the African nations’ recognition of the 
government in Peking rather than the government in Taipei. Therefore, while the most 
influential and important event in the first ten years of China’s diplomatic relations with 
the third world was the increasingly economic emphasis through the A.A.P.S.O., the most 
symbolic was Zhou En-Lai’s trip to Africa in 1963.  
The face of China’s foreign policy, along with the foreign minister Chen Yi and 
forty other officials, made the three-month long trip from December of 1963 to February 
of 1964, visiting nine countries, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, 
Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The purpose of this trip was to establish 
diplomatic relations with the nations of Africa, as well as to explain China’s recent 
opposition to the nuclear test ban treaty, to encourage the meeting of another Bandung, 
and to emphasize China’s stance on giving economic aid to those countries with which it 
had strong diplomatic ties. China had already demonstrated that it was in fact a “power 
                                                                                                                                                 
noted, however, that the book was published by The Asia and World Institute of Taiwan, 
and has a very clear objective and obvious bias in its interpretation. There has not been a 
non-partisan account of the role of Africa in the recognition of Peking.  
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relevant to Africa”38 through its participation in the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Organization, and through its support of Egypt, Algeria, and the Congo. In fact, prior to 
Zhou En Lai’s trip, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia had 
already established diplomatic relations with Peking. Therefore, much of the trip was 
largely symbolic, and little was actually accomplished in the countries the delegation 
visited. 
It is also important to note that these were not the first Chinese delegations to 
African nations following the Bandung Conference. The period immediately following 
Bandung “was followed by Chinese efforts to increase diplomatic, economic and cultural 
contacts.”39 In 1956 alone, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ethiopia were all 
recipients of cultural missions from the Chinese government. Additionally, China began 
to forge economic ties with African nations, beginning with Egypt, purchasing cotton and 
increasing its economic ties with the nation beyond that of the economic aid given during 
the Suez crisis. Egypt also represents the first African nation to establish diplomatic 
relations with China, and in 1956 the first Chinese embassy in Africa was established in 
Cairo.  
However, the trip had “doctrinal importance,” observed in the large amount of 
rhetoric produced. Speeches were given at every capital visited, often under the title 
“Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism,” and Peking’s Foreign Language Press 
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produced a collection of them. Many of them were also reprinted in newspapers in China. 
The major objectives of the delegation were summarized in a February 6, 1964, editorial 
in the People’s Daily. The seven objectives were described as: 
1) In order to prevent world war, it is necessary to wage an unremitting 
struggle against imperialist policies of aggression and war;  
2) The contemporary national liberation movement is an important force 
in defense of world peace;  
3) Imperialism and old and new colonialism must be completely liquidated 
in Africa;  
4) Asian-African solidarity must be strengthened with the utmost effort;  
5) …active preparations should be made for a Second Asian-African 
Conference;  
6) Disputes among Asian-African countries should be settled through 
peaceful negotiations on the basis of Asian-African solidarity;  
7) National economies should be developed by mainly relying on one’s 
own strength supplemented by foreign assistance.40 
While these principles were largely reflective of China’s aims for the delegation, they did 
not mention some of the more implicit goals that are easily evidenced from the rhetoric of 
the speeches given throughout the trip. 
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Perhaps the best example of rhetoric is a speech given by Zhou at a rally in 
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, on February 3, 1964, which was reprinted in the 
Peking Review on February 14. In this speech, known as the “Revolutionary Prospects in 
Africa Excellent” speech, Zhou returned to the rhetoric of Bandung. He stated, “In each 
of the African countries we visited, we have deeply felt the African people’s strong desire 
to promote the unity and solidarity of African countries in order to remove the obstacles 
caused by the colonialists’ artificial division of Africa.”41 This return to the cause of 
anticolonialism re-emphasized its importance as the keystone of China’s foreign policy 
towards Africa. Zhou also used the opportunity to implicitly implicate the United States 
in acting as a neo-imperialist in Africa, while criticizing former imperial powers: 
The imperialists will of course never be reconciled to their defeat in 
Africa. They do not like to see the African people standing up and 
becoming masters of their own house. Nor do they like to see the 
independent development and prosperity of the African countries. Some 
old colonialists are continuing their bloody suppression of the African 
peoples fighting for independence and freedom; others have resorted to 
neocolonialist tactics in an attempt to maintain their colonial rule; still 
others have again revealed their ferocious features as old colonialists after 
their neo-colonialist tactics were seen through by the masses. They are 
now stepping up their infiltration and expansion in the political, military, 
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economic and cultural fields by hypocritical means, trying hard to step 
into the shoes of the old colonialists and place the new emerging African 
countries under their control.42 
While Zhou never outright mentioned the United States, it is obvious that it was his 
intention to incriminate them along with the former formal colonial powers. 
What is most important about his speech, however, and was the part of the trip 
that held the most importance for future relations between China and African countries, 
was his promise of economic assistance to those nations with positive diplomatic ties. 
This meant that not only was China standing with African nations in their criticism of 
colonialism and neo-imperialism, but also providing them an alternative when it came to 
economic aid and assistance. In the same speech, Zhou laid out the eight principles of 
economic aid practiced by the Chinese government. These principles included the 
importance of “equality and mutual benefit in providing aid,” China’s respect for “the 
sovereignty and independence” of the nation receiving the aid, that in giving aid, “the 
purpose of the Chinese government is not the make the recipient countries dependent on 
China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent 
economic development,” and that the when giving any technical assistance, they would 
not leave until citizens of the country receiving the assistance could “fully master the 
technique.”43 
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These principles were obviously developed with the problems of colonialism in 
mind. In them, China sought to alleviate many of the major economic critiques of 
colonial rule, as well as the new critiques of neo-colonialism. The promotion of economic 
self-sufficiency had never now included the United States, were anxious to keep them 
economically dependent. Therefore, while there was little economic interaction between 
China and the African nations when Zhou gave his speech in Mogadishu, he was correct 
in stating, “there is no doubt that this mutual aid and economic co-operation will 
continuously expand in scope and increase in quantity.”44 
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Table 2.1 African Nations Establishment of Relations with the PRC 






Egypt 28 February 1922 Yes 30 May 1956 
 Morocco 2 March 1956 Yes 1 November 1958 
Algeria 21 September 1958 Yes 20 December 1958 
Sudan 1 January 1956  No 4 February 1959 
Guinea 2 October 1958 Yes 4 October 1959 
Ghana 6 March 1957 Yes 5 July 1960 
Mali 22 September 1960 No 27 October 1960 
Somalia 1 July 1960 Yes 14 December 1960 
Congo (K) 30 June 1960 Yes 20 February 1961 
Tanzania 9 December 1961 Yes December 1961 
Uganda 9 October 1962 No 18 October 1962 
Zanzibar 10 December 1963 No 11 December 1963 
Kenya 12 December 1963 Yes 14 December 1963 
Burundi 1 July 1962 No 23 December 1963 
Tunisia 20 March 1956 Yes 10 January 1964 




Table 2.1 Continued 
Central African 
Republic 
13 August 1960 No 29 September 1964 
Zambia 24 October 1964 Yes 31 October 1964 
Benin 1 August 1960 No 12 November 1964 
Mauritania 28 November 1960 No 19 July 1965 
Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968 No 15 October 1970 
Ethiopia   No  24 November 1970 
 
 
The Beginnings of Friendship 
 
The goal for China was to begin mutual aid and economic cooperation as soon as 
a former colony received its independence, assuring diplomatic relations and in turn 
diplomatic recognition. In order to ensure a smooth turn-over, Chinese government 
officials began their trips to African countries prior to independence. Although several 
years away from formal independence, Kaunda received one of these visits on August 24, 
1962, from He Ying, a member of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the 
“informal dinner” between He and Kaunda, described by He in a memo to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in China, Kaunda was friendly and thanked China for “the support 
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offered to the Northern Rhodesian national independence campaign by the Chinese 
people and government.”45  
Kaunda also explained to He that the colonists were working to “destroy the 
struggle of the Northern Rhodesian people” but that they were becoming more “united” 
in their fight for independence. He explained, “Although faced with great difficulties for 
the time being, they are optimistic that a promising future is not far away.” It seemed 
independence was drawing increasingly near, and Kaunda expressed to He that he hoped 
he could visit China after Northern Rhodesia gained its independence and also looked 
forward to a future visit from He at that time so that they could have a “deep 
discussion.”46 
In April of 1964, He Ying traveled again to Northern Rhodesia to meet with the 
new members of the soon to be Zambian cabinet. Of the thirteen members of the cabinet, 
He met with ten, including Kenneth Kaunda. In his telegram report back to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, He described his reception by the North Rhodesian government as 
being full of “warmth, grandeur and friendliness.” There was “great importance” for the 
soon to be independent Zambian government, and He was received by future President 
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Kaunda, as well as ministers from the Department of Transportation, Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, among others.47  
On the evening of April 10, Kaunda held a banquet in He’s honor. In attendance 
were the ten ministers, as well as vice-chairmen and other high ranking officials of the 
government. Kaunda gave a speech during the banquet expressing “appreciation for 
[China’s] support of [the] struggle for national independence” and “emphasizing the 
friendship between the people of the two countries.” Kaunda expressed his desire to 
“further develop the friendly cooperative relationship with China” after independence. He 
also gave a speech offering his “pre-congratulations” on Northern Rhodesian 
independence and reminded them that China and Northern Rhodesia had faced “similar 
tribulations” and that the two countries’ “profound friendship” had been developed “in 
the process of struggle.”48 He also sought to emphasize that “After the independence of 
Northern Rhodesia, the Chinese government is willing to develop a friendly cooperative 
relationship under the Bandung Spirit and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
and would agree to dispatch representatives to participate in their independence 
ceremony and establish diplomatic relationship with them”49 He’s memo also explained, 
“During the discussion I fully expressed our firm position on the issue of ‘Two Chinas.’” 
The rhetoric was predictable, as were the negotiations that followed. The plan was 
the same as it was with any other country the Chinese sought diplomatic relations with in 
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the 1960s: “In the UN, the Northern Rhodesian representative would support the recovery 
of the lawful seat of China, and there would be no such problem of ‘Two Chinas’ within 
the boundary of North Rhodesia.” Kaunda explained that the Northern Rhodesian 
government had made the decision to accept China previously and assured He that only 
the PRC would invited to participate in Zambia’s independence ceremony in October, 
and that “they would not invite representatives of the Chiang group.”50 
Despite this promise, He spent much of his visit warning the members of the 
Northern Rhodesian government about the Chiang Kai Shek government. He noted that 
“during all my conversations with ministers” he spoke out against “Two Chinas.” He 
learned during his trip that Yang Xikun of the “Chiang group” would be visiting Africa 
during June of that year. In a meeting the same day with the Minister of Domestic 
Affairs, soon to be Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe, and the Minister of Justice, He 
explained that “the aim of Yang’s visit was to destroy the friendly relationship between 
China and North Rhodesia, and hoped that they would be careful lest Yang succeeded.” 
The two ministers replied to He that “although the British government issued entry visa 
to Yang Xikun, the Chiang group would get nothing from the North Rhodesian 
government, and would in no case be invited to the independence ceremony.”51  
In return for international recognition, He explained that “The North Rhodesian 
government hopes that Chinese government would offer aid to the economic construction 




after its independence.” (Specifically, Kapwepwe asked for an early gift of £20,000 for 
the “support of local agencies.”) Kaunda also expressed the need for assistance in the 
“African Liberation Campaign,” because although Northern Rhodesia was set to gain its 
independence, UNIP was still deeply committed to assisting its neighbors in Southern 
Africa still under imperial control, including Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, 
and South-West Africa. Kaunda regretted that at the moment they were too busy to send a 
delegation to China, but assured He one would be sent “right after the independence 
ceremony,” and that Kaunda himself also planned to visit China. He expressed China’s 
“willingness to offer aid to Northern Rhodesian national economic development,” as long 
as it was “within our capacity in accordance with the eight principles we hold in terms of 
foreign aiding.”52 A mutually beneficial relationship had seemingly begun.  
He reported back to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that, based on his trip, “Given 
the friendliness of the Northern Rhodesia government to us, its support to our position 
against ‘Two Chinas’” and, strategically, “its important position (adjoining Angola, 
Congo and South-West Africa),” Northern Rhodesia would be suitable to be the “base” 
for China’s work in central and southern Africa. Therefore, He suggested that China 
participate in Northern Rhodesia’s independence ceremony, begin to send representatives 
to establish an embassy in Lusaka, arrange for the Xinhua News Agency to send a 
permanent correspondent, and offer the requested £20,000 to “win the support of the 
leaders of Northern Rhodesia.” Finally, he noted, regarding the small gift, it would be 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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advantageous if “we can give them a reply before Yang Xikun reaches Northern 
Rhodesia.”53 
Although there is no record of the £20,000 ever being received by Kaunda and 
UNIP, China kept the rest of its promises. In a letter to the new President Kaunda on 
October 26, 1964, two days after Northern Rhodesia had been given formal independence 
as the Republic of Zambia, He Ying expressed his congratulations. However, the letter 
also expressed “that the Chinese government is ready immediately to establish diplomatic 
relations and exchange diplomatic representative on ambassadorial level with Republic of 
Zambia.” This was of course contingent that “the Zambian government has the same 
desire and does not have anything to do with the Chiang Kai-Shek clique.”54 Diplomatic 
relations were quickly established, and in fact China was the first nation to start building 




Such an early start to bilateral relations between Zambia and China has never 
been previously discussed in the literature. However, this early period was critical as it 
built a strong foundation for the future of relations in the years to come. The Chinese 
often began correspondence with the leaders of decolonizing nations prior to the actual 
declaration of independence. In fact, for the both the Soviet Union and China, support of 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 FMAPRC: 108-01381-03, He Ying, “He dashi yu qiao na de tanhua jiyi jian” 
(“Ambassador He’s Conversation and Comments,”) October 26, 1964. 
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liberation movements was an important part of foreign policy towards the third world. 
The Chinese government developed its foreign policy to achieve specific aims, including 
the support of decolonization and liberation movements, but more critically its need for 
international diplomatic recognition. The two Chinas question found its way into every 
public discourse as well as every private engagement.  
Although Zambia did not require the monetary and military support of other 
liberation movements, China still sought out the leaders of UNIP. In these private 
engagements, which have been lost within the Zambian archives, the conversation always 
turned to Taiwan and diplomatic recognition of the PRC. Future Zambian leaders, 
including Kaunda and Kapwepwe, were ready to provide this diplomatic recognition, but 
not without compensation. Already, Zambian leaders had their eyes turned towards 
economic development, as well as using a policy of non-alignment to achieve those 
goals. Yet while international diplomacy provided possibilities for development 
assistance, it was the regional situation in Southern Africa which created the greatest 
hurdle for the new Zambian government to overcome. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RHODESIAN SITUATION 
 
“This problem is a very delicate one and it should be handled with care and in such a way 
that Zambia always appears and is on the defensive. Nothing should be done which could 
be interpreted as provocation against Mr. Smith.” 
 
- M. Mainza China, National Secretary, UNIP1 
 
 
Landlocked and peaceful, Zambia represented an important stronghold in a 
conflicted Southern Africa. Although not all the countries of the region had a violent 
independence process, it was still certainly no easy position to be in for any nation, 
whether newly independent or established. Bordered by eight countries and colonies, the 
Zambian government and its people were forced to contend with the overflow of violent 
decolonization struggles, civil wars, and instability. The problems this caused newly 
independent Zambia cannot be overestimated. The simple threat of violence in Zambian 
border towns, and even in the interior, severely disrupted Zambian life. On a macro scale 
the blockages of transport links was a major issue for the developing Zambian economy. 
In order to provide regional context, this chapter first explores the myriad of regional 
issues Zambian leaders were forced to contend with in the 1960s and into the 1970s. 
                                                 
1 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, M. Mainza China, “United National Independence Party, To: All 
Ministers, Junior Ministers and Members of Parliament,” Rhodesia Political Activities, 
May 13, 1965. 
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However, while the combined problems of the bordering nations all contributed to 
the troubles within the Zambian economy, by far the most disruptive external situation 
was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. By far, Rhodesian U.D.I. 
created the greatest set of issues Zambia faced in the immediate postcolonial period. 
Politically, economically, and socially, Zambia was intricately intertwined with 
Rhodesia. The Central African Federation had ensured that a problem for Rhodesia was 
to be a problem for Zambia.  Consequently, by first understanding the regional context of 




The Regional Context of Development 
 
Not every country surrounding Zambia erupted into violence in the years after 
1964. However, each country provided a unique challenge to the Zambian government. 
The decolonization process, whether messy or relatively clean, caused many problems, 
particularly related to trade and transport. 
Botswana 
 
The most peaceful of Zambia’s neighbors, historically and today, is undoubtedly 
Botswana. Endowed with a rich mineral wealth and a small population, it was and still is 
an anomaly amongst African nations. Botswana is located to the southwest of Zambia in 
a narrow border where Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe meet along the banks 
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of the Zambezi River. At the time of Zambian independence, Botswana was still 
Bechuanaland, a British protectorate originally intended to be a part of the Union of 
South Africa, a British dominion formed after the Second Boer War.2 While by June of 
1964 the path to independence was already laid, for the first two years of Zambian 
independence, including directly after Rhodesian U.D.I., dealing with Botswana meant 
essentially dealing with Great Britain.3 Rather than negotiating with a neighbor and a 
potential ally, Zambia simply shared a narrow border with the British. 
Malawi 
 
Malawi and Zambia share much of a common colonial history, as Nyasaland was 
colonized in 1891 by the British, and was one of the three members of the Central 
African Federation. Located to the east of Zambia, the two countries share a substantial 
border as well as a common colonial history. During the break-up of the Central African 
Federation, Malawi was also on the path to independence, gaining autonomy a few 
                                                 
2 For more on the history of the Union of South Africa, see Roger B. Beck, The History of 
South Africa (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000). For more on the Boer Wars, see 
Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979). 
3 Although the historical literature on Botswana is scarce compared with other Southern 
African nations, there is a new book by Ørnulf Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social: 
State Formation in Botswana and Its Pre-Colonial and Colonial Genealogies (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2012), which is by far the best place to go for a historical 
overview. 
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months before Zambia, on July 6, 1964.4 Formerly elected Prime Minister of Nyasaland 
in 1963, the new President, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, faced similar conditions as 
Zambia being economically underdeveloped and land-locked. However, Malawi was also 
resource poor, rather than resource rich, and heavily populated. Although political issues 
would not erupt for several years, there were already hints of what was to come. Malawi 
was immediately a one-party state, unlike Zambia, which remained multi-party during the 
First Republic, and Dr. Banda would declare himself “President for Life” in 1970 but 
began fighting off all political opposition immediately.5 Therefore, while relations 
between Zambia and Malawi remained strong, there was little Malawi could do to off-set 
the economic needs of Zambia. 
DRC 
 
Sharing the greatest stretch of border with Zambia, as well as the longest history 
of violent conflict, is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Notorious for its colonial 
history, as a personal mandate of King Leopold II of Belgium, it is most often associated 
                                                 
4 For more on the colonial history of Malawi and its independence process, see Martin 
Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and 
Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
5 Although there are no recent books on Malawian history, the best of the post-
independence era is Bridglal Pachai, Malawi; the History of the Nation (London: 
Longman, 1973). 
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with pictures of amputations amongst rubber trees.6 However, the independence process 
for the Congo, and its aftermath, is almost equally notorious. Granted a fast independence 
by Belgium on June 30, 1960, the Congo was unprepared, politically, economically, and 
socially, to handle the administration of such a large, resource rich country. With only 13 
university graduates at the time of independence, there was simply not a large enough 
population of educated individuals to ensure any sustainable level of development in any 
area. 
One of the few leaders capable of taking on such a challenge was the first Prime 
Minister, Patrice Lumumba. As an ardent nationalist and ideological socialist, Lumumba 
was not in favor with the West. Therefore, when General Joseph Mubutu of the 
Congolese army instituted a coup against President Kasavubu and Prime Minister 
Lumumba, the West was not only complicit, but also aided in Lumumba’s removal from 
power and subsequent assassination.7 The situation in the Congo proved unstable not 
                                                 
6 Undoubtedly the best written book on this topic is Adam Hochschild's King Leopold's 
Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1998). 
7 There are a number of books on the crisis in the Congo and on the assassination of 
Lumumba, which is increasing as documents are declassified. Not all documents have 
been declassified by the U.S. Government, however, which has led even more interest to 
such publications as former CIA Chief of Station Larry Devlin's memoir, which describes 
his being given poison toothpaste to assassinate Lumumba, Chief of Station, Congo: A 
Memoir of 1960-67 (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). On the history, see, for instance, 
Ludo de Witt, The Assassination of Lumumba (London: Verso, 2001); Thomas R. 
Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo (Boston: G.K. Hall, 
1979); Ch. Didier Gondola, The History of Congo (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2002); Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-64 (New 
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only to the Congo, but also to the Congo’s neighbors, including Zambia. Sharing a border 
with the Copperbelt region of Zambia, the most mineral rich in both countries, the 
Congo’s militants from the seceded region of Katanga and refugees from throughout the 
country flowed over into northern Zambia. From 1960 until today, the border region’s 
inhabitants have lived with violence and a scarcity of resources from the conflicts in the 
Congo. 
Angola / Mozambique 
 
The history of the decolonization of Portuguese African colonies is the primary 
example of how the Cold War became hot in Africa. Unlike the French and the British, 
the Portuguese were reluctant to put their colonies on the path to independence. The first 
to establish an Empire, Portugal was, especially after the devastation following the 
Second World War, not keen to give it up. The two Portuguese colonies sharing a border 
with Zambia were Angola to the West and Mozambique to the Southeast, both of which 
had violent paths to independence. Throughout the 1960s, the agitations for independence 
escalated in both countries, and were supported by the Zambia government. 
In Angola, the first calls for independent rule came in the 1950s, with the 
beginnings of the Non-Alignment Movement. As Portugal had at that point been in 
Angola for over 500 years, it would not consider giving up this directly ruled territory, 
                                                                                                                                                 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The 
Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982). 
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known as the “Overseas Province of Angola.” The first opposition political party, the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola, or MPLA), was founded in 1956, and was followed by the establishment of the 
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola, or FNLA) in 1961 and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA) in 1966. 
Together, these parties fought together in a long guerilla war against Portugal, from 1961 
until independence was granted in 1975, after a coup overthrew the Estado Novo (Second 
Republic) in April 1974. Were it not for the coup, it cannot be known how long the war 
would have dragged on.  
Immediately following independence, a civil war broke out between the MPLA 
and UNITA, not ending entirely until 2002. Both wars were heavily influenced by 
foreign powers, including the United States and Soviet Union, as well as the apartheid 
government of South Africa.8 As such, the war in Angola meant not just violent 
spillovers and refugees for the Western and Northwestern Provinces of Zambia, but also 
increased tension in all aspects of foreign relations.9 As a decidedly anti-colonialist and 
                                                 
8 See, William Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola 
and Mozambique (BookSurge Pub, 2008); Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, Angola: The 
Hidden History of Washington's War (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976); and the edited 
volume Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, Sue Onslow, ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2009). 
9 For an excellent treatment of the local effects of the “Global Cold War,” see Jeffrey A. 
Engle, Local Consequences of the Global Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2007).  
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non-aligned nation, but a landlocked nation in need of alternate transport routes, Zambian 
leaders’ dealings with the Portuguese, rebel groups, and other foreign powers were 
directly related to both the Cold War and domestic economic development. 
South Africa / Namibia 
 
Similarly international at the same time it was regional was the decolonization of 
South-West Africa, now known as Namibia. Namibia was first colonized by Germany in 
1884, but its hold on the colony was tenuous, as there were several indigenous uprisings. 
In addition, the British had already annexed two of the most important assets of the 
colony, Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, for the Cape Colony in 1878, which became 
a part of the Union of South Africa after its independence in 1910. After World War I, 
the colony was taken from the Germans at the Treaty of Versailles and made a League of 
Nations mandate territory. As South Africa already held Walvis Bay, it was granted the 
full administration of the territory of the then South-West Africa. 
The issues with this transfer of power were enormous. While technically a UN 
mandate, South-West Africa was treated by South Africa as a colonial territory. The 
actions by South Africa led to international outcry, including several cases within the 
International Criminal Court. The controversy continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
escalating after the creation of the South West Africa People’s Organisaiton (SWAPO) in 
1960. The Zambian government supported the independence of South West Africa, and 
harbored many SWAPO leaders during this critical period. In 1966, United Nations 
 90 
Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminated the mandate held by South Africa. However, South 
Africa remained until the United Nations forced its removal from the then Namibia in 
1971. 
For Zambian officials, sharing a border with Namibia, and assisting SWAPO in 
its liberation struggle, was one issue. Yet another was with the nation of South Africa 
itself. Although Zambia and South Africa do not share a border, South Africa’s links with 
the sea provide potential transport routes for Zambian imports and exports. Yet the 
apartheid, colonist regime in South Africa was not on the list of nations with which 
Zambia wanted to do business. Frustrations over South Africa were also apparent as 
Zambians fought the British and Americans over U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, as there 




Of all the regional conflicts and situations with which Zambia was forced to 
contend, the most significant was undeniably the situation in Southern Rhodesia. As one 
of the most unique independence processes, the Southern Rhodesian case was that of a 
white minority, rather than a black majority, declaring autonomy and independence from 
British rule. The origin of the name Rhodesia comes from Cecil Rhodes, the owner of the 
British South Africa Company (BSAC) and one of the primary figures of British colonial 
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expansion in the late nineteenth century.10 The origins of Rhodesia are in fact those of the 
BSAC, which essentially had control over the territory until 1924.  
Rather than using the method of colonial control seen in British colonies such as 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana),11 the BSAC used a version of the South African 
Cape Colony system, giving voting rights to literate individuals who owned a certain 
amount of property. Like the voting laws in the United States during the Civil Rights era, 
this ensured that those empowered with the right to vote were almost exclusively white. 
Created out of this was a white minority ruled government, racist and strongly 
independent. Settlers saw themselves as Rhodesian, rather than British, and they 
concentrated on gaining autonomy for themselves within Rhodesia. 
A Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
 
By early 1965, it seemed that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 
Southern Rhodesia from Great Britain was inevitable. Rhodesia, since the demise of the 
Central African Federation, had been agitating for independent rule. As Douglas Anglin 
explains, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence was a “popular political slogan” for 
                                                 
10 For more on Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company, see John Galbraith, 
Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974). 
11 On British rule in Nigeria see Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria (Westport, Conn: 
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the white minority settlers in Rhodesia. However, it took the “palace coup” of Ian Smith 
in 1964 to elevate the threat to a point of seriousness for the international community, 
including the Zambian government.12 After the establishment of Smith in power, “Over 
the next year and a half, a series of carefully orchestrated events occurred with tiresome 
regularity, creating fears of an imminent U.D.I. The rebellion, when it finally transpired, 
ended the long suspense.”13 Zambian leaders knew that U.D.I. was inevitable; they just 
did not know how events would transpire once the inevitable occurred.  
The law stated that minority ruled Rhodesia could change its constitution with an 
Act of Parliament, but that “the question of independence rested within the responsibility 
of the British Government.”14 However, at a meeting between Zambian Commonwealth 
Relations Minister, D. C. Mwiinga, and the British High Commissioner, Mwiinga 
enquired why Great Britain had not convened a constitutional conference on the matter. 
The High Commissioner replied, “Mr. Smith’s Government had refused to co-operate on 
the matter.”15 Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, visited 
Rhodesia in March of 1965. During his ten day visit, he met with all former prime 
ministers, as well as “trade unionists, farmers, [and] representatives of the Asian and 
                                                 
12 Douglas Anglin, “Zambian Crisis Behaviour: Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of 
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14 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, D. C. Mwiinga, “ Notes of the Meeting held between the Minister of 
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coloured communities.”16 Bottomley reported that 90 percent of the European population 
favored independence “by unconstitutional means if necessary.” On the other hand, 
African political leaders, as well as the Asian community, simply wanted “One man, one 
vote.” The coloured population, however, “seemed to be sitting tight on the fence.”17 
Although Europeans were the minority population in Rhodesia they held the majority of 
the Parliamentary seats and almost all of the power. Historically, minority rule had been 
encouraged by the British throughout Eastern and Southern Africa, but Great Britain was 
finding it increasingly difficult to control the white settler population in Rhodesia.  
It is also questionable whether or not British officals believed that a majority 
could rule Rhodesia, as expressed by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in an August 
1965 press conference. In a response to a comment by Bottomley that “the country would 
perish if the white settlers had to leave it,” Kaunda “sharply criticised” the 
Commonwealth Secretary and emphasized, “Should I learn that the British Government 
subscribed to this viewpoint...I should have completely to change my attitude.”18 The 
international community immediately took sides on the issue. The Chinese Government, 
in a November 1965 statement, condemned U.D.I. and pledged “support for the just 
struggle of the Zimbabwe people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism 
                                                 
16 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katilunga, “ Visit of Secretary for Commonwealth Relations to 
Rhodesia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, 1965, 1. 
17 Ibid., 1-2. 
18 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, Kenneth Kaunda, “Kaunda's Press Conference,” Rhodesia Political 
Activities, 1965. 
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and for national independence.”19 The declaration of U.D.I. was also condemned by the 
Soviet Union, as well as Israel, Tanzania, Malawi, Hungary, Belgium, and many other 
countries.20 
 
Zambia and Rhodesia 
 
The Zambian government’s stance towards Rhodesia was a much more complex 
decision, in light of Zambia’s close ties with Rhodesia.21 Regarding Zambia’s stand on 
U.D.I., M. Mainza China, the National Secretary of the United National Independence 
Party, wrote to all ministers and members of parliament, “He [Kaunda] has said that as 
little as possible should be said about U.D.I.…there is no need for us to throw further 
rockets at Mr. Smith at this time.” He further emphasized, “This problem is a very 
delicate one and it should be handled with care and in such a way that Zambia always 
appears and is on the defensive. Nothing should be done which could be interpreted as 
provocation against Mr. Smith.”22 
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As neighboring countries sharing not only a border, but ethnic groups, families, 
and a long history of trading, Zambia and Rhodesia were not easily separated. In an 
interview, the Under Secretary of External Affairs for the Rhodesian government, 
Andrew Parker Bowles, assured officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “that 
Southern Rhodesia wished in spite of the ideological differences between the two 
countries to maintain peace between them with no interference in internal affairs.” 
Therefore, due to the close social and cultural ties between the two countries there was 
the “necessity for some form of diplomatic or consular relationship between the two 
countries,”23 particularly after the border was closed in 1966. 
Immigration issues, particularly medical issues, topped the list for early concerns 
between the two countries. For example, in March of 1966, Rhodesia sent Zambia back 
23 mentally ill criminals from Chainama Hills Hospital.24 Non-criminal patients were 
also an issue, as the lack of adequate medical facilities on both sides had previously 
created considerable traffic. After U.D.I., patients still often had to be transported, 
although each separate situation now became a major diplomatic issue. A child with a 
brain tumor was allowed to travel from Zambia to Rhodesia for treatment and an 
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American tourist mauled by a lion was allowed to enter Zambia after some delay to 
receive treatment at Batoka Hospital in Livingstone. However, a Rhodesian Farmer was 
forbidden to enter Zambia and was instead flown to Bulawayo for treatment. In response 
to this particular issue, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health, M. M. 
Nalumango, argued to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs,” I am sure 




Bilaterally, relations between Zambia and Rhodesia remained peaceful and 
relatively open during the period of uncertainty in 1965. However, these relations were 
contingent upon Zambian support of Rhodesia, and therefore it guaranteed strained 
relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth. In a private message from Ian 
Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, to Kaunda, Smith explained that Rhodesia had no 
desire to harm Zambia via the two countries’ joint enterprises or in terms of Zambia’s 
copper exports: “I would like to assure you again that my Government remains willing 
and anxious to honour its obligations towards Zambia and to maintain existing trade 
relations and will do everything possible towards this end in all circumstances.” 
However, these promises came with conditions, as Smith went on to state, “on the 
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understanding, of course, that Zambia itself does not initiate measure calculated to cause 
positive harm and damage for political purposes to the economy and stability of 
Rhodesia.”26 
In addition to having political relations and ties to the minority-ruled Rhodesian 
government, the Zambian government also had ties to the majority opposition parties: the 
Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe Africa National Union 
(ZANU). Originally, ZAPU and ZANU were the same organization, splitting in 1963 to 
form two separate parties. Although both parties had the same basic goal in mind—
freedom from white minority rule—and the same militant approach to achieving this 
goal, their approaches were different. In particular, the Zambian government hosted a 
wing of the largely expatriate ZANU in Lusaka, and freedom fighters from both groups 
found both forced and invited exile within Zambia. These ties increasingly became an 
issue for the Zambian government, but were initially more socially trying, rather than 
politically so.  
Speaking before the Organization for African Unity Conference, the Minister of 
State for Commonwealth Affairs, D. C. Mwiinga, explained that “Zambia did everything 
possible to try and prevent” the split of ZAPU and ZANU. For Zambia, the issue was one 
of security as much as it was one of politics, as “their fights in Rhodesia affected Zambia 
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very badly because just as they fought in Rhodesia between themselves, they fought in 
Zambia between themselves.” Furthermore, Mwiinga added,  
I must add my Party and country’s disappointment at the way these two 
Parties are playing with our country. We have not banned ZANU in 
Zambia but they are stupid enough, and I repeat stupid enough, to attack 
my Government and people – in other words biting the hand that feeds 
them…Are you going to blame us if we ban these blokes? We have a right 
to preserve our own dignity and sovereignty against anyone who abuses 
our kindness.27 
Zambian leaders did not believe that ZANU was illegitimate; however, it did believe that 
any group endangering security was not to be supported, whether from the majority or the 
minority. 
The Zambian government also believed that the fighting between ZAPU and 
ZANU only made it easier for the British government to delay action against Smith. In a 
letter to Kapwepwe, I. C. Mumpansha, the High Commission in Lagos, Nigeria, 
described his position explaining the Rhodesian situation to the Nigerian government. 
Mumpansha believed that “Zambia should be in a position to give a clear understanding 
of the Rhodesian situation to the rest of the African States and to the world.” Specifically, 
he sought to make clear that Britain was using disunity between ZAPU and ZANU “as an 
                                                 
27 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, “ Brief Summary on the ZAPU/ZANU Situation and Zambia’s Part 
Statement at the Organisation for African Unity Conference by Hon. Minister of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs,” Rhodesia Political Activities, August 1965. 
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excuse for her failure to convince Mr. Ian Smith that Africans have the right to claim for 
full participation in the government of their country.”28  
In reality, ZAPU and ZANU had been banned in Rhodesia since 1963, and 
politically, a declaration of U.D.I. meant Zambia must review the harboring of banned 
parties because “any subversive activities which would be carried out by Rhodesians 
should at least never originate from Zambia or else our country will be strained with fear 
and uncertainty of life.”29 He was right to be concerned, for in December 1965, just one 
month after the declaration of U.D.I., Smith wrote a letter to Kaunda regarding concerns 
that ZAPU and ZANU were being allowed to broadcast over Zambian Broadcasting 
Corporation Programs. Smith warned, “Such incitement to violence does, I feel, represent 
the only threat to our common services and I feel sure that you will wish to co-operate in 
eliminating this unnecessary source of embarrassment to both our Governments.”30 
Economically 
 
While there were many social, political, and security concerns for Zambia to deal 
with regarding Rhodesian U.D.I., the most important issues for Zambia were quickly 
trade and transport. In 1964, the total domestic exports of Rhodesia totaled £119 million, 
                                                 
28 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, I. C. Mumpansha, “Memorandum ZL/02/65,” Rhodesia Political 
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29 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, I. C. Mumpansha, “Memorandum ZL/02/65,” Rhodesia Political 
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30 NAZ, FA 1-1-47, I. D. Smith, “Message to H. E. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda,” Rhodesia-
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of which £76 million went to Commonwealth countries (See Table 4.1).31 Non-
Commonwealth nations, inclU.D.I.ng South Africa and the United States, accounted for 
£35.4 million in trade (See Figure 4.2).32 Rhodesia was the trading hub of Central Africa, 
as recognized by the British government as a “leave-over” from the colonial days of the 
Central African Federation.33 The leading importer of Rhodesian goods was Zambia at 
£30.8m, with Great Britain importing £30.6m. However, out of the £30,606,000 in total 
imports into Great Britain from Rhodesia, £20,672,000 was in tobacco.  
  
                                                 
31 NAZ FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth 
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32 NAZ FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth 
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Table 3.1 Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries over £1 million  











Source: National Archives of Zambia, FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian 
Trade with Commonwealth Countries,” December 2, 1965. 
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Table 3.2 Rhodesian Trade with Non-Commonwealth Countries over £1 million  
Country Trade with Rhodesia (1964, in million £) 
South Africa 8.9 
German Federal Republic 7.9 
Japan 5.6 
United States 4.0 
Belgium 2.6 
Netherlands 2.3 





Source: National Archives of Zambia, FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian 
Trade with Commonwealth Countries,” December 2, 1965. 
 
For Zambia, however, economic ties with Rhodesia represented much more than a 
single commodity. In 1965, Rhodesia was the largest supplier of Zambian imports at 48.8 
percent. In addition, over 90 percent of Zambia’s £65.1 million total imports were 
transported via Rhodesia, and an even greater percentage of Zambian exports travelled 
out the same way. Rhodesian imports focused on were “heavy and diverse” with the 
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greatest percentage of imports in the categories of fuel, manufactures, and capital 
durables. However, the “most vital element in the trade relations between Zambia and 
Southern Rhodesia,” was energy, and not just the transport of oil, but coal and 
hydroelectric power as well.  
In the long term, it was better for Zambia to reduce its reliance on Rhodesian 
exports. However, it was a difficult proposal for the short-term as “Economic 
independence should always be the main objective after political independence and 
stability are achieved, but the former invariably involves a long and arduous struggle, and 
is hardly ever realizable in the absolute.”34 The trade between Zambia and Rhodesia 
represented an “economic imbalance” between the two countries, with only 3.3 percent of 
Zambian exports entering Rhodesia (seventh on the list of Zambia’s customers). 
However, the route through Rhodesia also served as the route for exports to the United 
Kingdom, German Federal Republic, Japan, Italy, and France, Zambia’s main customers, 
as well as South Africa, which received 7.1 percent of Zambian exports.35 
Zambia and Rhodesia jointly ran and operated the Central Africa Power Board, 
Central African Airways (with Malawi), and, most importantly, Rhodesia Railways. 
Rhodesia Railways, in particular, caused a number of problems for Zambia, including the 
                                                 
34 NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible 
Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Zambia to the United Nations),” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966. 
35 NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible 
Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
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loss of property and the blockage of imports and exports. Furthermore, as described in a 
1965 Zambian government report, “Apart from these obvious trade and transport 
connection, there are innumerable points of ‘invisible’ contact as well. These take the 
form of dividends, profits or other remittances most of which tend to flow from Zambia 
towards Rhodesia.”36  
Newly independent Zambia was far more intricately intertwined with Rhodesia 
than any other nation, and was bound to be the most impacted by Rhodesian U.D.I. 
However, economic independence for Zambia would require a number of important 
changes and improvements to the current system, including: the development of 
comprehensive infrastructure; human resource development; the availability of abundant 
and inexpensive capital and technology; dissolving of the vast subsistence sector; and the 
development of a sound financial structure.37 All of these development issues were to be 




As early as late 1964, Great Britain was insisting that all members of the 
Commonwealth participate in sanctions against Rhodesia in order to quell the rising 
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rebellion. Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s plan was to bring the Smith regime down 
quickly, within a matter of weeks, through economic sanctions that depended on the 
cooperation of Zambia. However, Rhodesia did not believe that Great Britain, nor the rest 
of the international community, would follow through with its threat. Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, in a British Information Services Statement on Rhodesia, responded to 
Rhodesia calling Great Britain’s “bluff” by stating: 
Her Majesty’s Government adhere to the statement issued on 27
th
 October, 
1964. It expressed the view that the economic effects of a unilateral 
declaration would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the 
people of Rhodesia and that Rhodesia’s external trade would be disrupted. 
Nothing that has happened in the last six months has afforded reasons for 
modifying this judgment in any way.38 
Wilson explained that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers approved sanctions and would 
not recognize the illegal Rhodesian government. However, this did not take into account 
the situation that Zambia would be placed in as such sanctions became mandatory.39 
Specifically, sanctions for Rhodesia were intended by Great Britain to have three 
stages of effects. In the first stage, there would be a shortage of consumer goods, which 
would affect retail shops, and, in particular, the European community. The second stage 
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39 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, “British Information Services, London Press Service: Mr. Harold 
Wilson’s Statement on Rhodesia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, April 30, 1965. 
 106 
would have a great effect on the industrial and agricultural sectors, including a lack of 
raw materials, oil, and spare parts. In the third and final stage, according to British High 
Commissioner to Zambia, W. L. B. Monson, in an aid memoire to D. C. Mwiinga, the 
Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, “If the illegal regime hangs on to the bitter 
end the third stage will be a rapid inflation brought on by grave shortages of consumer 
goods…This, together with the decline in commercial and industrial activity, will lead to 
a complete collapse of business confidence and the regime’s economy will cease to be 
viable.”40 
The Zambian government paid close attention to the unfolding situation, 
particularly in terms of economic sanctions. By April 1965, it seemed only a matter of 
time before Rhodesia declared U.D.I., but no one knew exactly when. Zambian High 
Commissioner to Great Britain, S. C. Katinlunga, in a meeting with Bottomley, expressed 
that he believed Smith would not declare U.D.I. until after Rhodesia had sold its tobacco 
crop (usually sometime between July and September). As Rhodesia’s largest and most 
important export, Katinlunga argued, Smith would want to ensure that Rhodesia was able 
to export its tobacco before economic sanctions made it impossible. Bottomley, however, 
argued that “economic sanctions were economic and would not be confined to 
tobacco.”41 While of course Bottomley was correct in stating that economic sanctions 
                                                 
40 NAZ, FA 1-1-46, W. L. B. Monson, “Aide Memoire: Economic Sanctions against 
Rhodesia,” Rhodesia-Political, February 23, 1966. 
41 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katinlunga, “Letter to S. M. Kapwepwe,” Rhodesia Political 
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would not be limited to tobacco, it was obviously Rhodesia’s most significant commodity 
and had bearing on Smith’s decision making regarding U.D.I. Katinlunga argued, “From 
this account it would be seen that the British approach to the Rhodesia situation is 
negative, defensive, and full of wishful thinking…My view is that the longer the situation 
is left as it is, the more organised and consolidated the white Rhodesians become.”42 
As Terence Ranger argues, Great Britain “under the direction of Dr. David Owen 
as Foreign Minister, had been keen to devolve the task to a large extent upon third 
parties, mainly the United States and the United Nations.”43 This had its intended effects: 
The United States, in a memo to the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the 
U.S. would, as of February 1966, stop all exports to Rhodesia, per the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965 on Southern Rhodesia, which were 
valued at US$21 million in 1964.44 Specifically, Resolution 216 of November 12, 1965 
had condemned U.D.I. and called upon “all States not to recognize this illegal racist 
minority regime...and to refrain from rendering any assistance.”45  
                                                 
42 NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katinlunga, “Letter to S. M. Kapwepwe,” Rhodesia Political 
Activities, April 7, 1965. 
43 Xan Smiley, “Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 5 (Summer, 1980):1066. 
44 NAZ, FA 1-1-46, Embassy of the United States of America, “No. 55,” Rhodesia-
Political, February 24, 1966. 
45 United Nations, UN Security Council Resolutions, “Resolution 216: Question 
concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia,” November 12, 1965, 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1965/scres65.htm.  
 108 
Great Britain was serious about the enforcement of UN sanctions and wrote 
several memos to Zambia regarding “Evasion of Sanctions.” In November 1967, the First 
Secretary of the British High Commission, D. F. B. LeBreton, presented the Zambian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with information from “reliable commercial sources” that 
aircraft spares were sent from Zambia to Rhodesia via Chirundu around September 7 and 
helicopter spares around September 22.46 LeBreton noted that such trade was a violation 
of the United Nations Security Council “Mandatory Sanctions” Resolution Number 232 
of December 1966, and that Zambia “will doubtless wish to make enquiries from the 
Customs or other appropriate authorities with a view to ascertaining the trust or otherwise 
of these reports.”47 Great Britain’s hard line on sanctions was not only for Zambia, 
however, and extended to the economic community. In a January 1968 memo, Great 
Britain listed the Netherlands, Bahrain, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and 
Zambia as having countries that had evaded sanctions, with a stern warning even to 
companies from within the UK.48 
The actual reality of sanctions was that their effectiveness was questionable. As 
Anglin explains, “the crunch never came. Britain did little to mobilize the necessary 
resources and, instead, allowed Wilson’s target data of February 15, 1966 for initiation of 
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the cataclysmic confrontation to pass uneventful.”49 Every two weeks the British 
government produced an Intelligence Report for Rhodesia, outlining the effects of 
economic sanctions. In the report for the period of June 2-15, 1966, the British reported 
what they believe to be success. It was believed that Rhodesia would not earn more than 
£5-10 million from tobacco sales and that the cost of living had increased from £107.1 in 
November 1965 to £109.5 in May 1966. Furthermore, the report noted, from January to 
March of 1966, there had only been 402 emigrants to Rhodesia, in comparison with the 
1343 emigrants out of Rhodesia.50 Zambia, however, disagreed with these positive 
reports, saying that the most important aspects, like the British oil embargo, were not 
successful. Zambia argued that the effectiveness of the oil embargo was severely limited 
by not blocking South African ports, since South Africa and Portugal seemed keen to 
continue supplying Rhodesia.51 
Zambia’s explanation for Great Britain’s lax attitude towards South Africa was 
evidenced by their “special relationship.” UK investments in South Africa totaled nearly 
£1,000,000,000, or over half the foreign capital. Out of all the countries in which Great 
Britain held direct foreign investments, the largest returns came from South Africa and 
South Africa is Britain’s third largest export market. Furthermore, in 1964, Great 
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Britain’s exports to South Africa had totaled £225,000,000, leaving Great Britain with a 
very favorable trade balance.52 Therefore, despite the fact South Africa had a racist 
apartheid regime and was still participating in trade with Rhodesia despite economic 





Zambia, therefore, in an attempt to protect its vital economic interests, only 
agreed to participate in sanctions if Great Britain shouldered the financial costs to Zambia 
associated with U.D.I. The actual declaration of U.D.I., after so much build-up, was so 
that “Rhodesia’s illegal declaration of independence translated a hypothetical situation 
into a concrete challenge and injected a sense of urgency and realism into the discussions 
on contingency planning.”53 In a report on the “Financial Cost of Action Arising from the 
Rhodesian Rebellion,” the Zambian government made it clear it believed that “Rhodesia 
is a British responsibility” and therefore the costs to Zambia were also a British 
responsibility.54 The document further explains that Zambia is willing to comply with a 
resolution of the United Nations Security Council even if that means hardship for 
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Zambian citizens. However, in return, Zambia does “expect such a plan to be integrated 
with a plan of action to mitigate this damage.”55 
Great Britain did begin contingency planning for Zambia, but Kaunda and other 
Zambian government officials were not an easy sell on any front. In a report from A. W. 
Shelling, a British official reporting on a November 1965 ministerial mission to Zambia, 
he described “President Kaunda’s present frame of mind” as being closed and even 
hostile to the British plan.56 This was partly to do with the fact that contingency planning 
for Zambia seemed less focused on Zambia and more focused on Great Britain, as 
evidenced by a report from the United Kingdom Board of Trade. Sir Norman Kipping, 
after a mission to Zambia, explained, “As emerges from the report, there was no question 
of our being able to boost British exports. The Zambians were in no mood to talk about 
this, and some were suspicious that export promotion was one of our main aims.”57  
Zambia not only disagreed with the British plans to mitigate economic damage, 
but fundamentally with the idea of economic sanctions as a policy. Specifically, Rhodesia 
refused to grant the transport of arms and ammunition to Zambia. In a statement to 
Zambia regarding the refusal, the Rhodesian government explained that “while 
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recognising its obligation” under the Convention Relative to the Port of Beira and 
Connected Railways, it would still deny the passage of these goods to Zambia.58 More 
importantly, however, was the threat to Zambia’s energy supply. Zambia depended on 
Rhodesia, either directly or indirectly through transport, for oil, coal, and hydro-electric 
power from the shared power station at Kariba Dam. In a November 1965 Press Release, 
the Zambian government blamed Great Britain for Rhodesia’s breaching of the Beira 
Convention, as “It is a matter of record that the British government is ultimately 
responsible for the external affairs of Rhodesia.”59  
Using the United Nations as a platform, F. M. Mulikita, Zambian Ambassador to 
the UN, argued that “economic measures have failed to produce the desired political 
results,” and that the only means of quelling the rebellion would have to be force. He 
maintained that he did not believe Great Britain “was justified in coming to the Security 
Council to ask for an endorsement of measure which do not go far enough to meet the 
situation” and that, if sanctions were to be adopted, “ Zambia would be more hurt than 
Southern Rhodesia.”60 For it was true, despite not actively participating in sanctions, the 
Zambian economy was already feeling the effects of sanctions against Rhodesia. By 
December of 1965, Zambia went so far as to entertain discussions in the OAU of severing 
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diplomatic relations with Great Britain in response to safeguarding the Kariba Power 
Dam.61 
British officials vehemently denied causing damage to the Zambian economy. In a 
May 10, 1966 letter from British official Harold Wilson to President Kaunda, Wilson 
stated, “Some remarks which your Foreign Minister...has been making here have, 
frankly, suggested mistrust of our intentions. The fact is, of course, that at least half our 
energies over the past six months have been devoted to ensuring that, in the process of 
bringing the rebellion in Rhodesia to heel, we did not at the same time stifle the economy 
of Zambia.”62 Yet that is exactly what British policy did, putting Zambia in a “precarious 
position,” both politically and economically.63 
  
The Outcome in Rhodesia 
 
By mid-1969, the negotiations between Great Britain and Rhodesia, as well as 
those negotiations in the international community, had not yet produced a decision. At 
the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference earlier that year, discussions on 
Rhodesia led to a call by leaders for Great Britain to withdraw the “Fearless” proposals. 
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However, Great Britain wanted to leave the proposals on the table to give Rhodesia an 
opportunity to make a decision.64 In February, Smith published a summary of new 
constitutional proposals to make the racial division of Rhodesia permanent.65  
By May, Smith determined that “hopes of a negotiated settlement with Her 
Majesty’s Government had ended,” and he believed that, through the negotiations, Great 
Britain had been too “obsessed” with the issue of majority rule.66 In a white paper on 
Rhodesia from the British government regarding talks aboard the HMS “Fearless,” it 
explained that a “‘Disagreement on fundamental issues’ still remained, and recorded 
recognition by both sides that ‘a very wide gulf’ still remained between them on certain 
issues.”67 There had been nine full scale meetings between Thomson and Ian Smith and 
his staff, but still no agreement.  
The international community had also not reached a consensus on the continuance 
of sanctions, with a June 1969 Security Council vote falling one vote short of passing 
“Afro-Asian demands for more stringent punitive measures.”68 Voting in favor of the 
measures included Algeria, China, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, the Soviet Union, 
                                                 




68 NAZ, FA 1-1-310, “Inward Telegram from Zambian New York to Foreign Lusaka,” 
Rhodesia-Political, June 25, 1969. 
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and Zambia.69 Abstaining from this vote included Great Britain, the United States, 
France, Paraguay, Colombia, Finland, and Spain.70 Finland was “too close” to Great 
Britain to be able to take a line, and although Zambia believed it had the support of 
Spain, because Spain needed the Afro-Asian vote on Gibraltar, they also abstained due to 
their “neighbourly ties with Portugal.”71 Regarding the countries of Latin America, the 
Deputy Permanent Minister to the United Nations, L. S. Muuka, explained, “despite the 
common sentiments of the so-called third world that we share with them, are extremely 
unhelpful on African questions. They merely tow the line of the United States.”72 The 
question, however, was whether the Security Council Resolution even mattered. Great 
Britain had said that it would not use force against Rhodesia, and the opinion of the 
international community seemed more symbolic than realistic. 
At the end of June, 1969, Rhodesia declared itself a republic. In the first 
republican elections in April 1970, Africans, with a population of 5,000,000, gained a 
total of 16 seats in parliament. The Europeans, with a population of 250,000, were 
granted 50 seats.73 However, while the Rhodesians had succeeded in removing the 
influence of the British government, they were not successful in gaining international 
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recognition. Fighting also escalated throughout the 1970s between the Rhodesian 
government and revolutionary forces ZAPU and ZANU. Finally, in 1978, an agreement 
was signed by the Rhodesian government and two nationalist parties, a portion of the 
resident ZANU party and the United African Nation Council (UANC). However, exiled 
parties, including a large portion of ZANU and ZAPU, and therefore went unrecognized 
internationally. It was not until December 1979 that Rhodesia had fully participatory, 
internationally observed and regulated elections. For four months, Rhodesia came back 




Mitigating the damage caused by Rhodesian U.D.I. was a top priority and a huge 
pre-occupation for the Zambian government after 1965. While it was clear from the 
outset that an independent Zambia needed to work towards economic independence from 
Rhodesia, the situation in Rhodesia simply escalated too quickly. The obvious first place 
to turn for help in mitigating the damage caused by instability in Rhodesia was Great 
Britain. However, rather than providing real support for Zambia, British officials 
pressured the Zambian government to participate in international sanctions against the 
Smith regime. However, Rhodesia was Zambia’s largest trading partner and the route 
through which most of its exports and imports travelled, making it literally impossible for 
Zambia to simply cut all economic ties. This caused great strain in relations between 
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Zambia and Great Britain, providing a greater impetus to turn towards other sources of 
aid and assistance.  
How much had the regional situation harmed the economic development of 
Zambia? There are many ways to answer this question, one of the most basic being a 
comparison of gold and foreign reserves of the Northern Rhodesian Central Bank and the 
Bank of Zambia. In July 1964, just a few months prior to independence, the Total Gold 
Reserve was £5,320,429 and the Foreign Assets held at £48,973,528.74 However, two 
years later, and after the declaration of U.D.I., the Total Gold Reserve was £1,272,734 
and the Foreign Assets held at £27,528,500.75 Yet, with both political and economic 
policies and negotiations to ensure development, these numbers rose by September 1957 
to £2,071,300 and £31,918,793, respectively.76 What caused it to rise rather than fall? 
The Zambian economic development agenda was primarily motivated by regional issues 
particularly in Rhodesia. Yet in the First National Development Plan, discussed in the 
next chapter, Zambian leaders sought to create an agenda that would ensure economic 
development.
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CHAPTER FOUR: TRADE, AID, AND NON-ALIGNMENT 
 
“‘If our advice is not followed God knows we make mistakes.’” 
- George Woods, President of the World Bank1 
 
 
Zambian economic policy was heavily influenced by both the goals of the 
Transitional and First National Development Plans and the policy of non-alignment. 
According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1966, the general principle of 
Zambian trade was to be one of “multilateralism and non-discriminatory treatment.”2 For 
Zambia, the priority was not which countries it would trade with, but rather it would 
“deal with all countries to the extent to which it suits Zambia to do so,” so long as 
Zambia was receiving the “maximum advantage.”3 Zambia was not concerned with a 
bilateral balance with each individual trading partner and it adopted a policy of a single 
column non-preferential customs tariff.  
 Specifically, through the policy of its First National Development Plan, Zambia 
was concerned with implementing a general import and export control to deal with the 
escalating situation in Rhodesia. The three main goals of this policy were to: (i) prevent 
stress on transport facilities; (ii) restrict and prohibit Rhodesian goods (at the time only 
                                                 
1 NAZ, FA 1-1-167, “Notes of the Zambia Delegation to Washington Led by the Hon. R. 
C. Kamanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mid-January, 1968,” World Bank, January 
1968. 
2 NAZ, FA 1-1-199, “Ministry of Commerce and Industry: Trade Policy,” Zambia Trade 
Policy, January 6, 1966. 
3 Ibid. 
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non-essential items); and (iii) divert imports and exports to alternative routes. However, it 
was crucial to Zambia that these goals be realized only with respect to the principles of 
non-preferential, and non-aligned, trading. As a leave-over from the colonial government, 
Zambia possessed preferential agreements with Portugal and South Africa, which, by 
1966, had already been terminated. It was also in the process of cancelling preferential 
agreements with Bechuanaland (Botswana), Canada, and Australia. In exchange for these 
preferential agreements, Zambia was considering joining several economic communities, 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the East African 
Common Market. All of these factors were considered as Zambia developed an economic 
policy that would take into account its own political and economic ideals, as well as the 
international context in which the new nation found itself. 
   
Zambia’s First National Development Plan 
 
Zambian economic development was based on a combination of both western and 
communist development ideologies, in its unique ideology of humanism. The desire for 
economic development was reflected in the tagline to the Zambian government owned 
newspaper, the Times of Zambia. Every paper, every day, read “Forward with the 
Nation.” The question, however, was how to best go about this forward movement. The 
most nuanced insight into Zambia’s economic development ideology specifically in the 
1960s is the First National Development Plan, published and implemented in 1966. 
Although Zambia had produced a Transitional Development Plan immediately after 
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independence, the First National Development Plan was much more comprehensive and 
less influenced by Great Britain and the process of decolonization.  
The purpose of the First National Development Plan was to “mobilise available 
resources and favourable factors, in order to eliminate the obstacles to economic and 
social development in Zambia and thus establish the conditions for a dynamic and 
sustained growth of the economy.”4 The favorable factors were identified as: 
A stable Government; 
A substantial source of revenue and of foreign exchange derived from 
copper mining; 
A population desirous for self-improvement and hard work; 
A considerable agriculture potential due to abundant soil and water 
resources and favourable climatic factors; 
A large hydro-electric potential; 
A basic transport network covering much of the country, though 
incompletely; 
Stable industrial and labour relations.5 
The unfavorable factors included the geographical position of Zambia and its 
colonial history, as well as others “which are common to other developing countries.” 
The Plan points to the economic, political, and social make-up of the Central African 
                                                 
4 NAZ, Office of National Development and Planning, “First National Development 
Plan,” 1966, 1. 
5 Ibid. 
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Federation as being the main reason for an “unfavourable environment” in Zambia after 
independence. The loss of revenue from the Federation was estimated at £60-70 million, 
and the concentration of industrial development in Southern Rhodesia ensured further 
losses, particularly in light of Rhodesian U.D.I. Therefore, it was necessary that Zambia, 
in its First National Development Plan, lay out a way to guarantee “the utilisation of local 
materials, the training of local people, and the orientation of industrial production to 
specifically Zambian needs,” which “has all to be established from scratch.”6  
With these problems and goals in mind, Zambia laid out the eight objectives of 
the Plan: 
(i) To diversify the economy so that the copper industry is not the only 
main employer...and so that a greater proportion of domestic demand is 
satisfied by domestic production from a large industrial base; 
(ii) To increase employment by at least 100,000 jobs during the course of 
the plan; 
(iii) To increase average monetary output per head from £61 per annum in 
1964 to about £100 per annum in 1970; 
                                                 
6 Ibid. An outcome of the transition from the Central African Federation to an 
independent Zambia also made the availability of pre-1964 difficult to come by for the 
Office of National Development and Planning. In the section describing “Planning 
Procedures” it explain, “Resource data is generally inadequate in a developing country 
and Zambia is no exception. The statistical procedure has been further complicated by the 
break-up of the Federation so that much basic data is only available after 1st January 
1964, on the basis of the former Federal territory” (9). However, the data described in this 
document is the best that Zambia had, and what Zambia used to determine its economic 
planning and strategy and is therefore a relevant inclusion in this study. 
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(iv) To maintain reasonable price stability; 
(v) To minimise the inherited economic imbalance between the urban and 
rural sectors with a view to raising the capacity of the latter sector for 
transforming resources into social and economic growth; 
(vi) To raise rapidly the general levels of education, as well as develop a 
wide range of specific technical, administrative, executive, professional 
and management skills in the population; 
(vii) To provide more and better living accommodation as a requisite 
ingredient of a better standard of living, and to raise the general level of 
social welfare; 
(viii) To develop new communications, sources of energy, transport and 
other economic infrastructure for a new economic order.7 
 These changes to the domestic economy would take place against a background of 
“rapid” population increase (estimated to grow from 3,712,000 in 1965 to 4,364,000 in 
1970).8 With the increase in population in mind, in real numbers Zambia sought to raise 
its gross domestic product to approximately £400 million (in 1964 prices), or a real 
growth rate of 11 percent per annum.9 
  
                                                 




Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product (£m. - 1964 prices) 
Industrial Origin 1964 1970 % Increase 
Agriculture 9.1 15.6 71 
Mining 118.8 193.1 63 
Manufacturing 13.1 32.2 146 
Construction 10.2 30.3 198 
Commerce 22.5 48.8 117 
Transport 10.3 19.6 90 
Services 34.5 85.1 147 
Total 218.5 424.7 94 
Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, 
“First National Development Plan. 
 
An increase in GDP was also expected to be coupled with an increase in per 
capita GDP, and therefore also in the level of consumption. Consequently, the new levels 
of consumption implied “substantial increases in imports” to satisfy domestic demand. 
The projected outcome of this demand was that “The effect of the rapid import-
substitution which will take place as a result of the expected increase in manufacturing 
output can be seen better in the composition of imports which are more heavily weighted 
in favour of investment goods, rather than in the absolute level of imports.”10 The level of 
exports, on the other hand, depended “almost entirely on the price and output of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 6. 
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copper.”11 Although the first objective of the Plan was “To diversify the economy so that 
the copper industry is not the only main employer...and so that a greater proportion of 
domestic demand is satisfied by domestic production from a large industrial base,” in 
reality, the focus of the economy was still largely on copper. The reduction in copper 
dependency was seen as a “longer-term objective,” and the 1964 level of copper exports 
of 92.2 percent was even raised to 92.6 percent of GDP at a rate of increase of real 
exports of 45 percent (See Table 5.2).12 While this seems to go against all development 
ideologies, Zambia believed that “In such a financial position it is important neither to 
hoard nor to squander the nation’s resources but to use them for productive 
investment.”13 However, Zambia also recognized that “If copper prices fells development 
would have to be increasingly financed by external borrowing,” which is exactly what 
was to happen in the 1970s.14 
  
                                                 
11 Ibid., 7. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Ibid. 
 125 
Table 4.2 Exports (£m. - 1964 prices) 
Export 1964 1970 + % (1966-1970) 
Agriculture 3.5 4.6 31 
Minerals 162.1 235.7 45 
Tourism 1.9 3.0 58 
Others 8.3 11.6 40 
Total Foreign Exchange 175.8 254.5 45 
 
Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, 
“First National Development Plan.” 
 
  
A “major aim” of the First National Development Plan, was to “substantially” 
increase the amount of this GDP that was allocated to capital investment. Under the 
Transitional Development Plan, the proportion of GDP dedicated to capital investment 
was 20 percent, in what was described as “a high figure compared with many African 
countries.” However, in 1970, the intention was for the level of capital investment to 
reach £107.9 million (£55.1 million public and £58.5 million private investment) or 
approximately 25 percent of the project gross domestic product.15 Total capital 
investment for 1966-1970 was £429 million, or £282 million from the public sector and 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 6. 
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£147 million from the private sector.16 This rate was a 100 percent increase from 
previous expenditure and was explained as “a very large and ambitious increase but 
justified for two reasons.” The first was that capital investment had fallen since 1957 in 
Zambia, and the second was that public investment was expected to outweigh private 
investment in the short term (See Table 5.3).17 
Table 4.3 Capital Investment (£m. - 1964 prices) 
Savings and Credit (33.0) Public Finance (287.8) Total (620.8) 
Self Financing   3.0 
Internal Loans  30.0 
 External Loans and Foreign 
Aid 
63.0 




Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, 
“First National Development Plan.” 
 
First and foremost, capital investment was to be financed by copper production. 
With this in mind, the Zambian government’s taxation policy was to be guided by two 
main principles. The first was “the broadening of the tax-base in so far as compatible 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 11. The private sector investment was estimated from projections from the 
mining sector.  
17 Ibid. 
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with equity, in order to assure the maximum participation of the population as well as 
contributing to the national treasure.” The second described “examining the existing tax 
rates and opportunities for new taxes.”18 Specifically, this meant that the government was 
considering raising the maximum level of personal income tax (then at 45 percent) and 
increasing excise duties on luxury goods with elastic demand, such as alcohol and 
tobacco, while giving special preference to imports directly related to development.19 
Taxes, from both copper and from smaller revenues such as income taxes and tariffs, 
were seen as “the most immediate instrument of stabilization as many commercial banks 
were controlled externally and still “instinctively respond to the changes in the interest 
rate of the former metropolitan country.”20  
The next largest contributor to capital investment, and of particular concern in the 
Cold War era, was external loans and foreign aid. In 1966, Zambia received what it 
described as “negligible quantities of external capital aid compared with that mobilised 
from domestic resources.” However, it did identify technical and administrative 
personnel assistance as being a crucial “factor in maintaining the efficient functioning of 
essential Government services.” While the focus was on maintaining and improving self-
sufficiency, particularly through the copper industry, Zambia also recognized the need for 
further monetary assistance beyond the role of foreign experts. Specifically, Zambia 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 13. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
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identified “long-term infrastructure” projects, such as the Kafue Hydro-Electric Scheme, 
the University of Zambia, road construction, and the Tanzania-Zambia railway, as 
projects for which its sought to “seek external finance for some major development 
projects.” The finance was defined as being mostly external loans (£58.0 million) and 
much less on foreign aid (£5.0 million).21 
Zambia recognized the danger of inflation and a running down of the Foreign 
Exchange Reserve that such a large injection of capital into a self-described “narrowly 
based economy.” However, the intention was that inflation would be controlled through 
“the adoption and vigorous application of fiscal and financial policies by government to 
relate wages to productivity, to control imports, and to regulate and direct the supply of 
credit.” It was believed that inflation would be “cost-push” inflation, or one related to 
“wage increases not related to productivity, or of restrictive practices, or inadequate 
financial control on Government contracts, or supply-bottlenecks, or shortage of skilled 
personnel.” There was also the potential of “demand-pull” inflation, related to a rising 
income disparity, supply difficulties, and monopolies.22  
Both “cost-push” and “demand-pull” inflation were supply-determined, which 
Zambia determined could only be dealt with by “securing a free flow of raw materials 
and consumer goods against expanding demand.” This, of course, was also the major 
problem that Zambia faced in light of its regional situation. It seemed unlikely that 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 Ibid., 12. 
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Zambia could develop according to its Plan without serious consideration of the situation 
in southern Africa. The Plan identified four distinct areas that were necessary in 
combating supply-determined inflation, and in turn the situation in southern Africa, 
generally and Rhodesia, specifically: 
(i) developing alternative transport routes, especially towards East Africa, 
to facilitate diversification of sources of supply; 
(ii) development of import-substitution industries for products whose 
manufacture is economically or technically feasible; 
(iii) the substitution of locally produced for imported raw materials; 
(iv) the employment of outside consultants to advise on improved 
tendering procedures and practices, as well as the costs of materials in 
order to forestall undue rise in development costs.23 
For land-locked Zambia, even in the absence of external conflict, a fully 
functioning economy relied on routes to and from the sea. The Plan notes that “even 
before the political events of 1965 in Rhodesia, the transport routes to the south were 
already proving inadequate for the greatly increased traffic consequent on Zambia’s rapid 
economic development since Independence.”24 As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, 
the alternative route to Rhodesia Railways, running through Angola and the Congo, had 
its own problems as well, including Central African Federation restrictions on the use of 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 39. 
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railways other than the Rhodesia line, and the reliance of Katanga in the Congo on 
Benguela, leaving very little opportunity for Zambian use. Consequently, routes out 
through Tanzania, both railways and roadways, became a crucial part of the First 
National Development Plan, as it argued, “It is obvious that Zambia cannot freely 
develop her economic potential unless she can import and export goods, without 
restriction from the outside.”25 
As a leave-over from the colonial era, Zambia was faced with an extreme shortage 
of skilled and educated manpower. For Zambia, “as long as this scarcity lasts, 
Independence will be incomplete.”26 Therefore, Zambia set out an ambitious plan to 
ensure self-sufficiency in skilled labor, one of its major long-term goals. However, until 
an adequate level of self-sufficiency could be reached, Zambia recognized that “a good 
deal of recruitment from abroad will be necessary, both in the private sector and in 
Government.”27 Conditions were set in place to ensure that outside technical and 
administrative assistance would be enthusiastic, paid at a competitive rate that did not 
create too large a disparity between the expatriate and local populations, and a “definite 
plan for training a Zambian replacement for every expatriate recruited from abroad.”28 
By the second half of the twentieth century, international organizations were 
playing a very prominent and influential role in global politics. The creation of the United 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 75. 
27 Ibid., 77.  
28 Ibid. 
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Nations after the end of the Second World War ushered in a new age of international 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. These new organizations would play 
the role of creating and sustaining international linkages, replacing the linkages created 
by empires in the period of decolonization. Therefore, as African nations slowly became 
independent nation states in the 1950s, 60s, 70s, they were immediately thrown into the 
increasingly growing international community. Organizations such as the United Nations 
in particular, but also international nongovernmental organizations, such as human rights 
NGOs and continent specific international organizations such as the Organization for 
African Unity (OAU), played an important part in determining African nations’ roles in 
the global community.  
The newly independent nations of Africa were also able to use these organizations 
to leverage their political and economic influence. Zambia, in its attempts to remain non-
aligned in all aspects of its policy, played an active role in a number of international 
organizations. Even more important for Zambia, however, was its regional role in 
Southern and Central Africa. As a landlocked nation, Zambia greatly depended on 
peaceful borders with the free flow of goods in order to ensure political, economic, and 
social prosperity. In the 1960s in decolonizing Africa this was too often an elusive dream. 
Almost all of the eight nations along Zambia’s borders were involved in some form of 
conflict, and this had profound effects on Zambia’s stability. It was in part through 
international organizations that Zambia was able to negotiate these regional conflicts, in 
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gaining both allies and intermediaries as well as negotiating for continued political and 




As discussed above, for Zambia the economy meant one thing: copper. Copper 
represented a huge portion of Zambia’s exported commodities in the years directly 
following independence and therefore required its own dedicated policy and diplomatic 
efforts. Always the willing and able host, Zambia extended this to its relationship with 
the copper producing community by hosting the 1967 Copper Conference on the theme 
of co-operation amongst developing nations. Held from June 1 – 8, 1967, the conference 
convened delegates from Chile, Congo (Kinshasa), Peru, and Zambia, with Botswana, 
Uganda, and several special agencies holding observer status.  
The conference was labeled as a “historic” event, as the international community 
believed that the “developing” copper producing countries were “incapable” of reaching 
their true output potential.29 The participants of the conference denied this belief, 
choosing rather to believe that “In actuality developing nations have far greater 
potentialities than they believe to have.”30 Development was defined as requiring 
                                                 
29 NAZ, FA 1-1-202, “A Public Relations Background to the Copper Conference on the 
Theme of Co-operation among Developing Nations,” Copper Conference Lusaka, 1967, 
3-4. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
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“sustained initiatives and the readiness to co-operate for concerted effort with the 
countries similarly placed,” and that, therefore, is what the conference focused on.31 
The goals of the conference were defined as: (i) to reach a reasonable price level 
for copper exports; (ii) to achieve a level of short-term and long-term planned production; 
(iii) price stability; (iv) minimizing substitutions; (v) the development of a marketing 
machinery that would ensure reasonable prices and stability; and (vi) the development of 
a marketing strategy that would give governments the geographic and economic control 
of the sale of copper.32 In order to achieve these goals, the conference delegates created 
the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), a joint-body 
establishment that was to have its headquarters in Paris. The joint-body was to be made 
up of a Conference of Ministers (for policy making), a Governing Board of government 
representatives, and a Copper Information Bureau (to compile and assess past, current, 
and future marketing trends).33 
The four main delegates of the conference, Zambia, Chile, Peru, and Congo, 
believed the “magnitude of their contribution to world copper production and trade they 
are conscious of their responsibility in providing adequate supplies of copper at fair and 
remunerative prices.”34 This was, in fact, a legitimate assumption and the creation of 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 NAZ, FA 1-1-202, “Copper Conference Zambia Press Release Number 025: Copper 
Exporters Set Up Joint Body,” Copper Conference Lusaka, June 15, 1967. 
34 Ibid. 
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CIPEC was taken seriously by the international community. For instance, immediately 
after CIPEC’s formation, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
requested an “exploratory meeting” with the copper organization.35 CIPEC was to play a 
huge role in the price and marketing of copper globally and it still governs these 





Since the end of the Second World War, certainly the most famous, and infamous, 
international governmental organization has been the United Nations (UN). Founded in 
1945, replacing the defunct League of Nations, the UN was founded to promote peace as 
well as progress, both economically and socially. By the time of the independence 
process in Africa in the 1960s, the UN had already faced several internal and external 
challenges: internal conflict amongst members of the Security Council (including the 
ousting of the People’s Republic of China for the Republic of China in 1946) and 
numerous external conflicts from the increasingly global Cold War. Although another 
great war was avoided, the capabilities of the UN were increasingly tested, including in 
many decolonizing African states. 
While many of the member states of the United Nations were advocates of 
decolonization, and although the overall charter dictated the sovereignty of states, 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
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including those in Africa, there was still the necessity for peacekeeping operations. The 
first UN peacekeeping operation was in 1948, to maintain the ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli 
War. The need for peacekeeping forces continued as the Cold War escalated and 
decolonization continued with forces being sent to India and Pakistan, South Korea, the 
Suez Canal, Cyprus, and, with the culmination of independence movements in Africa, the 
Congo. The longest peacekeeping operation in UN history, as well as the most notorious, 
the mission to the Congo was proof to the world of the decidedly western agenda of the 
United Nations.36  
Yet peacekeeping operations, historically and contemporarily speaking, are not 
the only function of the United Nations. For developing countries, the role is also on 
development, particularly economic development. The United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) was founded in 1965 through the merger of the United Nations Special 
Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance.37 The UNDP, therefore, was 
then focused on both aid as well as specific technical assistance. For Zambia, the United 
Nations had influence not through peacekeeping, but rather through the UNDP, which 
                                                 
36 See Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-64 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978). On United Nations and peacekeeping operations, 
see Paul Kennedy, Parliament of Man: the Past, Present, and Future of the United 
Nations (New York: Random House, 2006); Stephen Ryan, The United Nations and 
International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); and Norrie MacQueen, 
United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Longman, 2002).  
37 See Stanley Meiser, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1995); and Adekeye Adebajo, From Global Apartheid to Global Village: 
Africa and the United Nations (Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal 
Press, 2009); 
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immediately held an important economic role in the development of the country. By 
April of 1964, six months before independence, the United Nations Technical Assistance 
Board began developing a presence.38  
Immediately following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, 
the UN played an important role in contingency planning for Zambia. The main foci for 
the Zambia government, as conveyed to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board 
representative Gilpin, were import substitution, a flight information center, the use of 
local materials, and an import distribution center. For the short term, Zambia needed “an 
expert team who will examine Zambia’s pattern of imports and suggest alternative 
sources of supply, with particular reference to imports that have been coming in the past 
from Rhodesia.”39 In the longer term, Zambia needed to establish a flight information 
center to take over responsibilities from the present one that was located in Salisbury, 
Rhodesia, as well as stockpile imports since they had to be brought through largely 
unused routes.40 
Yet in addition to aid and technical assistance, the Zambian government also used 
the United Nations as a platform and negotiating tool for its greater interests. The greatest 
interest for Zambia during the period, both in terms of its domestic stability and its 
                                                 
38 UNIP, 7/22/5, “UN is Officially Here Now,” April 28, 1964. 
39 NAZ, FA 1-1-9, “Draft Memorandum for Mr. Gilpin, United Nations Technical 




international relations, was the situation in Rhodesia. At the UNO Special Commission 
on Colonialism, which met in Kitwe, Zambia on June 3, 1967, Kaunda spoke of the 
situation in Rhodesia and what he believed were the failure of economic sanctions. He 
argued that “Britain has tricked the world and the United Nations into false strategy; a 
false start in seeking a solution to U.D.I.” and that “We in Zambia have never found an 
alternative to the use of force…only force can solve the Rhodesian question.”41 
Also high on the international agenda for Kaunda and Zambia was the issue of 
decolonization, particularly in Southern Africa. He went on, therefore, to discuss both the 
situation in Portuguese controlled Angola and Mozambique, as well as South-West 
Africa. He claimed, “In this age of enlightenment, it is inconceivable that a foreign 
country should subject other people to a rule in which they have no voice in the 
administration of their affairs.” He was also keen to point out the ideological origins and 
proclamations of the UN itself, stating “One of the strange ironies of history is that the 
same countries which were principally instrumental in the formation of the United 
Nations and in the formulation of its Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights 
should today throw to the wind the very principles upon which their solemn affirmations 
two decades ago rested seems to me most unprincipled.”42 
                                                 
41 NAZ, “Address by His Excellency the President to the U.N. Committee of Twenty-four 
Meeting in Kitwe, 3
rd
 June, 1967,” UNO Special Commission on Colonialism (1965-67), 
3. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
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While the United Nations played an important role in Zambia’s economic 
development, Zambia did not always agree with the political decisions of the member 
states, and particularly the Security Council, of the UN. Most of the issues centered on 
the issue of Rhodesia, but also significantly on the re-establishment of China to the 
United Nation’s Security Council. However, much like with Zambian threats to leave the 
Commonwealth, they always remained threats. Political issues were important to Zambia, 
but economic development was more so. Therefore, rather than alienate themselves, 
Zambia continued relations with all parties, including what it saw as an important 
political platform: the United Nations.  
 
 
Western Trade and Aid 
 
 For any developing country, “the formation of a Development Plan is a statement 
of intention.” However, “the execution of a Development Plan is a far more complex 
operation.”43 For Zambia, the complex operation involved dealing with multiple players, 
from all political ideologies and with all levels of geo-political significance, as well as 
with its own domestic economic difficulties. On paper, the plan, for the most part, 
seemed to make sense. There is the obvious gift of hindsight in understanding the major 
problems the plan had, including the reliance on copper, but it was overall acceptable as 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 17.  
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an economic development agenda. Turning the plan into reality, however, was something 
that required not only an economic development plan, but a foreign relations plan as well. 
Zambia sent out several delegations in the first years after independence, to a 
variety of different markets. Even these trips were planned so as to receive the 
“maximum advantage” at the same time as proving non-alignment in not just the political 
arena, but the economic one as well. For example, in a 1967 “determined ‘shopping 
spree,’” Zambia sent a diverse delegation to Europe and the Far East, visiting and signing 
agreements in Great Britain, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, China, Bulgaria, 
and Yugoslavia.44 There are several examples of such delegations, which always 




In addition to Great Britain, the United States, and western controlled 
international governmental organizations, there were several smaller players involved in 
both trading with, and providing aid to, Zambia. Although not often noted in works on 
the Cold War, in addition to the great powers, smaller first world nations also played 
significant roles in the development of new nations. However, just like the western 
superpowers, and the major international organizations that the superpowers controlled, 
                                                 
44 NAZ, FA 1-1-231, G. H. Mutale, “Letter from G. H. Mutale, Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,” Zambia Trade Missions Abroad, February 13, 1967. 
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these nations gave aid and participated in trade based on a policy of democratic 
alignment. These nations were the allies of the United States and Great Britain, including 
the countries of Europe, particularly Scandinavian countries, as well as Canada and 
Japan. 
A fellow Commonwealth country, Canada was a involved in several aspects of 
the Zambian economy, including providing Zambia with four Caribou aircraft from 
DeHavilland of Canada, necessary for the air lifts of oil after Rhodesian U.D.I. Kaunda, 
in a letter to the Prime Minister of Canada, requested that Canada supply Zambia with 
four more of the Caribou, as well as spares for a year’s operation, due to the situation in 
Rhodesia and the need for further air lifts.45 Providing several aircraft was within the 
capabilities of Canadian aid, but the Canadian government explained that it was only able 
to assist other countries in the areas of surveys and the training of personnel and air 
transportation but not in larger projects such as construction.46 This was in line with the 
“Principles of the Canadian Aid Programme in Commonwealth Africa,” released in 
February 1964.  
The program was to be a “grant aid programme” that was “responsive” to specific 
countries’ requests. Aid had to be related to the economic or social development of the 
country and requests had to have a clear and specific objective. Furthermore, the requests 
                                                 
45 NAZ, FA 1-1-115, Kenneth Kaunda, “Letter to the Prime Minister of Canada,” 
Technical Assistance from Canada, November 19, 1965. 
46 NAZ, FA 1-1-115, “Report on Zambian Delegation to Canada, 29-30 May 1966,” 
Technical Assistance from Canada.  
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“must be within Canadian capabilities” and machines and technical equipment must have 
been manufactured within Canada. The principles, sent to the newly independent nations 
of Africa that were members of the Commonwealth, also reminded countries that Canada 
was itself a “developing country” and could not be counted on for serious investments or 
aid.47 
Some of the most longstanding and established players in Zambian aid have been 
the countries of Scandinavia. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway provided a range 
of assistance in the 1960s, on a variety of small-to-medium scale projects. For Denmark, 
the major areas of assistance were agricultural, as well as providing medical equipment.48 
Sweden was involved in telecommunications, cooperative associations, and the 
hydroelectric project at Sioma Falls.49 Specifically, the Swedish were involved in 
providing technical assistance as a form of aid, sending, for example, volunteers to work 
in agricultural education and “youth activities.”50 The Finnish government was mostly 
interested in forestry, as well as technical assistance and transmission lines.51 Norway 
also participated in similar aid and assistance projects.  
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In addition to aid and technical assistance, smaller western players also played an 
important role in developing and diversifying Zambian trade, such as the nation of Japan. 
Zambia also realized that favorable trade agreements ensured not only increased trade for 
Zambia, but new partners in development. In May of 1965, during a Zambian trade 
delegation to Japan, the Japanese government assured Zambia that the two countries’ 
trade agreement would include full GATT relations once Zambia was accessioned to 
GATT.52 Japan would also encourage private investment in Zambia, particularly in the 
opening of manufacturing factories. However, Zambia desired not only investment, but 
also technical cooperation, particularly in the fields of railway transportation, educational 
television, mass communications, aviation, agriculture, and inland fisheries.53 
The main interest of Japan in Zambia in the mid-1960s was tobacco, because 
Japanese businessmen could no longer purchase tobacco from Rhodesia due to economic 
sanctions. For Japan, the tobacco trade with Great Britain was deemed “unsatisfactory” 
because it was not specific on prices and quantities.54 Trading in tobacco was a great 
opportunity for Zambia to diversify its exports, but they had several hurdles to overcome 
in exporting not only tobacco, but the main export of copper, as well. In a letter from the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, they expressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that “the Government of Zambia is making every effort to ensure its international trade is 
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affected to an absolute minimum by any developments which are likely to occur” 
regarding Rhodesia.55 This, however, was not so easy. Many of Zambia’s trading partners 
were equally concerned, including Japan. Japan, not having an embassy in Zambia in the 
1960s, sent a letter from its embassy in Kenya, expressing that “the government of Japan 
is deeply concerned over the stoppage of the copper imports from Zambia as an indirect 
result of Rhodesia’s reiteration against the international sanction.”56 Zambian copper 
accounted for a quarter of Japanese supply and half of their imports of copper, meaning 
the copper industry in Japan was fully dependent upon copper from Zambia.57  
World Bank 
 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are international financial 
institutions created at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 for the purpose of assisting 
countries with economic development through loans and strictly monitored economic 
progress. For Zambia, the World Bank has played a highly visible role in discussions of 
economic development. However, in the 1960s, World Bank aid and loans to Zambia 
were minimal, and very narrowly focused. In 1966, Zambia received its first World Bank 
loan, for US$17.6 million for improvements of the Great North and Great East Roads, but 
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maintenance costs were more than revenue would allow (over US$1 million more).58 
Therefore, in October 1966, Zambia sent a delegation of government officials to 
Washington D.C. to meet with the Vice President of the Bank, Burke Knapp, and the 
Director of the Africa Department, A. G. El Emary.  
In the meeting with Knapp, the Zambian delegation sought to discuss two main 
projects: Rhodesia Railways and Stage II of the Kariba Power Station. Regarding 
Rhodesia Railways, Knapp reminded Zambia that the World Bank had been involved in 
funding the Railway back when it was half Zambia and half Rhodesia. Therefore, 
Zambia’s concern over the break-up of the Railway, Knapp explained, led the Bank to 
say that they had been involved in keeping it together so they were not sure if they could 
be involved in breaking it apart.59 In a meeting later the same day, Director of the Africa 
Department Emary laid out what the World Bank considered to be its program for 
Zambia. Although they would “consider” the Tanzania Zambia railway project as an 
alternative to Rhodesia Railways, the World Bank was only prepared to commit to 
finance educational projects from the start of the Four Year Development Plan and to 
begin a forestry project in November.60 The priorities of the World Bank, in order of 
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important, were made clear: education, forestry, and roads, and then the Kariba Power 
Station and railways.61  
In mid-January, Zambia sent yet another delegation to Washington D.C., this time 
to meet with the President of the World Bank, George Woods. Hoping for US$40 million 
in loans from the bank, the Zambian delegation, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. 
C. Kamanga, still focused on the same types of assistance as the meeting in 1966. Woods 
stated, “there was a cloud over the Zambia-World Bank relations,” particularly in relation 
to Kariba and Kafue, as the “the basic interest of the Bank was Kariba” while Zambia 
was focused on the Tan-Zam railway project.62 The Bank’s dismissal of the railway 
project was not acceptable to the Zambian delegation, described by Zambian Ambassador 
to the United States, Rupiah Banda, as a “formidable group” who “knew their 
business.”63 However, Woods made it clear that he had nothing to discuss about that 
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project and wished it known that the Bank had no crusade against it. ‘If our advice is not 




By the 1960s, the United States had long developed a policy of diplomacy and 
aid, along, of course, the lines of alignment. In “Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, 
Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968” Zambian historian Andy DeRoche examines how this 
relationship developed specifically with Zambia. DeRoche argues that examining the 
relationship between Zambia and the United States from both sides “provides valuable 
insights into their often very different perspectives in the midst of the Cold War.”65 And 
it is true that the insights that can be gleaned from the Johnson administration and 
Kenneth Kaunda are useful not only in understanding the relationship between Zambia 
and the United States, but also Southern Africa and its relationship to the Cold War more 
generally.  
From DeRoche’s research, it becomes clear that “American officials contended 
that they were dealing with Southern Africa cautiously, but Zambia saw things 
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differently.”66 For Zambia, it believed that the United States was acting in a policy of 
non-alignment towards racial issues in Southern Africa, which was as frustrating to 
Zambia as Zambia’s Cold War non-alignment was to the United States. Zambia’s 
political non-alignment became a big problem as it sought economic aid and assistance 
regardless of the political affiliation of a country. United States officials urged Kaunda 
against dealing with the Chinese in particular, and this “unsolicited advice greatly upset 
the Zambian president.”67 However, despite the differences in opinion, the United States 
did participate in some aid and assistance in Zambia. 
Through USAID, the United States began several small-scale programs in Zambia 
in the first year after independence. In July of 1965, the Ministry of Agriculture reported 
that under the “Young Farmers’ Clubs: United States Self-Help Proposal” the American 
Embassy was proposing a plan to supply 150 farmers’ clubs with gardening tools such as 
shovels, hoes, and fertilizer. This “self-help” campaign would cost the United States 
£3053 (US$8548).68 While the Office of National Development and Planning had “no 
objection” to the offer, it was clear that such aid had little value beyond a very micro 
level.69 American aid was not only insufficiently small-scale, but it was also impractical. 
In August, USAID committed to undertaking a survey of radio facilities requested by the 
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Zambian Office of National Development and Planning. However, USAID officer David 
Alter emphasized, “Washington asked us to make clear that this is a commitment for the 
survey only and does not constitute a commitment to provide any equipment which the 
survey may recommend.”70 Furthermore, the survey focused on FM radio capabilities, 
while the Zambia Broadcasting Corporation was only looking to broadcast short and 
medium wave radio.71 
By the end of 1965 and into 1966, the United States was looking to begin a bit 
larger, more permanent projects in Zambia. A United States Information Services News 
Release from July of 1966 reported renewals of USAID specialists in the Ministries of 
Health, Agriculture, Education, and Information as well as two new grants:  
(i) £82,977 (US$233,000) to Radio-Television International (an American 
corporation) to develop higher education courses in journalism for Evelyn 
Hone College; provide the Ministry of information with two radio 
engineers; and assist in creating public health broadcasts for the Ministry 
of Health. 
(ii) £49,145 (US$138,000) to the University of Connecticut and California 
State Polytechnic College for the provision of a farm management 
specialist, an agricultural extension specialist, and an agricultural engineer 
to the Ministry of Agriculture.  
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USAID was also offering courses for the staff of the National Archives. All of this 
represented now only a renewal, but also an increase, in the amount of aid and assistance 
offered to Zambia. 
Projects also included the founding of several non-profit organizations under the 
umbrella of USAID. Operations Crossroads Africa was an American non-profit that acted 
as a sort of short term Peace Corps. Volunteers provided their own fares and Zambia 
housed them, fed them, and paid for the materials for their projects. In return, USAID 
offered Zambia operational and advisory staff with lots of paperwork. L. S. Muka 
explained the Zambian opinion on the project: “I do not associate these crossroaders with 
any particular skills, they are mainly merry makers, cultural exchange types and their 
contribution in terms of the receiving countries is pretty minimal.”72 Ministries that were 
requested to take volunteers said they had no projects and advised to keep them from 
being cleared to come to Zambia.73 
Although aid was on the increase, trade between the United States and Zambia 
still remained on a very rudimentary level. The United States Trade Missions Program 
was set up to send business people and companies to discuss trade and investment 
opportunities around the world. In December 1966, Zambia was included in one of these 
                                                 
72 NAZ, FA 1-1-88, L. S. Muka, “Operation Crossroads Africa, Inc.” Technical 
Assistance from USA, March 3, 1966. 
73 Ibid. American assistance abroad has often been the source of controversy, particularly 
in the way volunteers handled themselves. See, for instance, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffmann, 
All You Need is Love: the Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998).  
 150 
trips, in which Americans interested in doing business in Africa spent ten days visiting 
government agencies, banks, and local chambers of commerce in Ghana, Congo 
(Kinshasa), and Zambia.74 Zambian Ambassador to the United States, Rupiah Banda, 
encouraged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue to use trade as a method of 
diplomacy. He argued, “I have always maintained that Zambia’s best defence weapon is 
diplomacy” and specifically good relations should be fostered, in order of importance, 
between “all” the major powers, neighboring countries, Africa in general, and, finally, all 
other countries.75 Banda saw that the United States seemed pleased with Zambia thus far, 
particularly in its stand against corruption, and that this relationship should be fostered so 
as to serve as a buffer due to poor relations with Great Britain over Rhodesia. Banda 
believed Zambia should focus on American financial opportunities instead of British 
because the latter was considerably more expensive due to the weak pound, saying he 
could “envisage tremendous possibilities for American capital to Zambia.”76 He 
emphasized, again, that what Zambia really needed, from the international community, in 
general, and America, in particular, was investment and private loans, and not aid.77 
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Great Britain’s financial and technical assistance policy was deemed “an 
important part” of foreign relations.78 For the British, aid and assistance were important 
not just politically and economically, but from a humanitarian sense as well. 
Responsibility within Whitehall concerning foreign aid was to lie with the Ministry of 
Overseas Development, and specifically with those posted overseas. The main form of 
assistance was to be in the form of loans and grants, to assist with development projects 
and programs, supporting a budget or balance of payments, assisting in development in 
the case of natural disasters, loans given in provision with technical assistance 
agreements, as well as making contributions to international organizations and giving 
advances from the Exchequer to the Commonwealth Development Corporation under the 
Overseas Resources Development Act of 1959. The terms of the loan were contingent 
upon, for the most part, an analysis on the per capita GDP of a recipient country (and 
Zambia was deemed in the upper bracket in this category).79 Although the British did not 
say so directly, all policies were directed at members of the Commonwealth, although 
provisions were made for technical assistance agreements outside of the organization.80 
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Banda was correct in saying that relations between Great Britain and Zambia were 
increasingly strained in the years after independence, largely to do with the situation in 
Rhodesia. However, as the former colonial power in Zambia, the British knew that they 
could not simply disappear from Zambia, politically or economically. Directly after 
independence, Great Britain offered Zambia £11 million loan, for defense or in 
development, during the period of 1965 to 1970. The British government called this loan 
“doing the very best we can.”81 The terms of the loan were to interest given at the 
Exchequer rate, maturity in 25 years, a two year grace period or repayment on capital 
with five years of graduated increase, and a waiver of interest for seven years.82 The loan 
was not expected to be disbursed until 1969-1971, due to Britain’s internal financial 
difficulties, but even as of 1969, Great Britain was having trouble making good on its 
promise. It seemed unlikely that the British government would be able to give more than 
£2 million by the end of 1969, which D. F. B. Le Breton recognized as having the 
potential to “have a near disastrous effect on Anglo-Zambian relations.”83 
The remaining £8 million, although the biggest capital injection made by Great 
Britain into Zambia, was overshadowed by contingency planning. Technical assistance 
from the United Kingdom revolved around the “maintenance of the Zambian economy in 
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the circumstances arising from the Rhodesian rebellion.”84 In February of 1967, the 
British government pledged £13.85 million of assistance. The majority of the money was 
to be used for development of alternative routes to the East (incluidng the port and 
airfield at Mtwara), the development of Zambian coal mines at Nkandabwe and 
Siankondobo, and provision of British heavy transport vehicles—all projects related in 
some way to the economic problems caused by the Rhodesian crisis.85 However, despite 
fairly large pledges of assistance, the British made it clear that they did not desire to 
continue support for an indefinite period. In a note from the British High Commission the 
emphasized that “the British authorities fully appreciate that the aim of the Zambian 
government will be to reduce as quickly as possible the extent of the reliance of the 
Zambian forces on British Service Personnel.”86 
Trade was also consistently arranged to be in the favor of Great Britain. One 
example includes an agreement on the trade in cereals. Specifically, the British argued, 
“In framing their proposals the Government of the United Kingdom have had in mind 
their responsibility for maintaining conditions under which a stable and efficient 
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agricultural industry in the United Kingdom can develop its prosperity.”87 A minimum 
price was established through this trade agreement for the price of cereal imports from 
Great Britain to Zambia. Despite the fact Zambia was a newly independent nation, and 
despite the fact it was dealing with the issue of Southern Rhodesia, Great Britain was 
primarily concerned that the balance of trade weighed in their favor. Technical and 
capital assistance aside, trade truly highlighted the attitude the British took towards its 
former colony’s development. 
Eastern African Economic Community 
 
Despite being bordered by eight countries, Zambia’s immediate regional trading 
partners in the 1960s were severely limited. As a central African nation, however, 
Zambia did have the advantage of being able to trade with not only southern Africa, but 
eastern African as well. Therefore, it was a top priority of the Zambian government that 
they encourage trade between Zambia and the Eastern African Economic Community. In 
1964, Zambian imports with the countries of East Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Zanzibar, only totaled £356,631 and exports totaled £408,172 (Figure 
4.1).88 Of the imports, the greatest percentage was in beverages and tobacco (£221,970, 
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or 62%), while the greatest number of domestic exports were in manufactured materials 
(£274,249, or 67%).  
Table 4.4 Zambian Trade with East Africa, 1964 (in 1964 £) 
County Imports Domestic 
Exports 
Re-Exports Total Exports 
Kenya £150,433 £191,962 £17,782 £209,744 
Uganda £5,698 £21,572 £31,598 £53,170 
Tanzania £200,000 £128,127 £9,757 £137,844 
Zanzibar £500 £7,414 -------- £7,414 
 
Source: National Archives of Zambia, NAZ, FA 1-1-118, “Zambia / East Africa / 
Bechuanaland Trade Links Conference,” Expansion of Trade between Zambia and East 
African Territories, April 12-13, 1965. 
 
Zambia hosted a conference in Lusaka for the countries of East Africa, as well as 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) in April of 1965, to discuss the possibilities of increasing 
trade. Proposals included the formation of a free trade area within the region and the 
establishment of a customs union.89 At the meeting, however, Tanzania, in particular, but 
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also Kenya and Uganda, were disappointed by Zambian hesitancy to become involved in 
their trade agreements. The dates for the second conference were postponed due to a lack 
of information availability on the Zambian side, as well as tense internal relations 
amongst the East African states.90 
Kaunda, however, continued to advocate for further inter-African trade for 
Zambia, making trips to promote trade with Tanzania and Kenya, including a trip to 
Nairobi for Kenya’s Agricultural Show in September 1965. He noted that “one of the 
greatest challenges young countries must confront is the wide disparity between the 
developing and the more advanced countries.” He believed that mutual trade agreements, 
like one that could be developed between Zambia and Kenya, would go far to alleviate 
this problem. However, increased trade relations could only be accomplished if increased 
communications and transport came first.91 
 
Communist Trade and Aid 
 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
 
The Soviet Union, involved so deeply in violent Cold War struggles around the 
world, adopted a much different policy towards diplomatic relations with Zambia. 
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Technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. revolved around more cultural programs and 
exchanges, in particular the sharing of experts in a variety of different fields. In 1965, for 
example, cultural exchanges included:  
(i) 25 scholarships for Zambian students to study in the Soviet Union; 
(ii) 20 variety and circus performers to visit from the Soviet Union to raise 
money for UNZA; 
(iii) the donation of a library of scientific books; 
(iv) provisions for scientific teachers and doctors from the Soviet Union to 
work in Zambia; 
(v) the showings of programs about life in the U.S.S.R.92 
While some of this cultural diplomacy can easily be regarded as propaganda, and not of 
use to the Zambian people, the Soviet Union did make a considerable contribution to 
medical care in Zambia in the 1960s. The promised doctors, the first group of many to 
come to Zambia, included two general surgeons, two anesthesiologists, and two 
physicians, divided into two teams to be sent to the rural areas of Kasama and Mongu.93 
The Soviet Union also contributed 2.5 million doses of the small pox vaccine, which Vice 
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President Kapwepwe wrote to Kaunda had contributed a “great deal to the remarkable 
reduction in the incidence of small pox in Zambia.”94  
However, while Kapwepwe and Kaunda were pleased with the technical 
assistance and aid from the Soviet Union, Kapwepwe explained that a completed review 
was necessary because “there are certain Ministries who tend to adopt an obscurantist 
attitude to all offers from the East.”95 Because of this uncertainty of accepting aid from a 
communist country, the teams of doctors had been help up for over a year after they were 
approved before allowing to begin practicing in Zambia.96 Aid from the Soviet Union 
was also complicated by reactions from Moscow to Zambia’s relationships with Western 
nations. V. J. Mwaanga, the Zambian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, cautioned to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet displays of support were put into jeopardy after 
Zambia had asked for British assistance in guarding the Kariba dam.97 Mwaanga 
explained, “It is felt in certain circles here that by inviting British troops ‘you are only 
helping the imperialists in their dirty plot against Africa.’” He described a conversation 
with the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had asked, “Mr. Ambassador do 
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you seriously and confidentially think it is in your interest to invite British troops, who 
after all will defend Smith against you?”98 
In the case of the Soviet Union, political alignment proved to be continual issue 
when considering technical assistance agreements. However, the same rules did not apply 
to the communist nation of Yugoslavia. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Chona, explained to the Office of National Development and Planning 
that “Generally I assume that in view of the fact that Yugoslavia is on the list of those 
countries from whom it is not objectionable to seek assistance or receive aid, requests of 
this nature should automatically be cleared by this Ministry unless there is a greater 
political objection.”99 The previous year Zambia had begun preliminary discussions with 
Yugoslavia to request the assistance of Yugoslavian geological experts to complete 
mapping, explorations, and economic assessments of coal and iron ore deposits.100 A 
Yugoslav team of geologists did come to Zambia in late 1965 to assist with the survey of 
Zambia’s iron ore deposits. In a press release, the Ministry of Mines and Cooperatives 
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explained that the Yugoslav Institute of Geological and Geophysical Research 
(GEOZAVOD) would be undertaking the work at cost.101  
China 
 
Although the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia both played a role in Zambian 
political and economic development in the 1960s, by far the most important communist 
influence in Zambia was that of the People’s Republic of China. China’s trade policy 
towards the developing nations of Asia and Africa was one based on “bilateral 
arrangements” and through “direct” payments. More specifically, “directly” meant “that 
the payment is free of the influence of imperialist countries” and by “bilateral 
arrangement” meant an “agreement on payment protocols reached by two parties.” These 
protocols could be combined with fixed swap orders or contracts, otherwise known as the 
“clearance of equal trade.” However, some arrangements were not fixed and required 
cash payments. There was a “wide range” of payment terms for trading partners, 
including both trade and non-trade items, and currency from the trading partner, as in the 
case of Chinese trade with India, or from a third party. When a third party currency was 
used, such as the U.S. dollar or British pound, “to avoid loss caused by the depreciation 
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of the currency of imperialist countries, some agreements also included warranty clauses 
for the gold content of the currency used.”102 
China made it clear, however, that “no matter what” the trading agreement 
between China and its partner was, it had to be in line with the following principles: 
(i) an equal relationship between the two parties involved in terms of 
payment;  
(ii) a convenient means for the import and export of the two parties, which 
is beneficial to their development; and 
(ii) trade independent and free of the interference and infringement of 
imperialist countries.  
China still invoked the spirit of its foreign policy rhetoric, emphasizing that these 
principles were based on the “spirit of equity and mutual benefit, mutual respect and 
bilateral satisfaction.”103 
In an attempt to realize its political goals, China entered into a number of political 
and economic agreements with African nations, including non-communist nations (see 
Appendix III). The first agreement signed between China and Zambia was a Cultural 
Cooperation Agreement, signed in Peking on August 22, 1966. Soon afterwards, on April 
28, 1967, the two countries signed a Trade Agreement, followed by an Economic and 
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Technical Assistance Agreement on June 23, 1967, both also signed in Peking.104 The 
provisions of the Agreement were as follows: 
...the Chinese Government shall send technical personnel to the Republic 
of Zambia to render technical assistance. Details such as the number of 
technical personnel, time of their dispatch and period of their service in 
Zambia shall be fixed in the contract to be concluded between the 
organizations to be designated by the two Governments respectively.105 
Furthermore, the two countries agree that “The traveling expenses of the Chinese 
technical personnel to and from Zambia shall be borne by the Chinese Government” and 
that “During their service in Zambia the Chinese technical personnel shall observe the 
current laws and decrees as promulgated by the Zambian government and shall keep 
confidential all the documents and date at their command related to their work.” In return, 
the Zambian government would ensure that “During their service in Zambia the Chinese 
technical personnel shall be afforded the same protection as is normally afforded to 
citizens of Zambia.”106 The loan entitled Zambia to £6,000,000, which could be 
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Government of the People's Republic of China and The Government of the Republic of 
Zambia for Implementing the Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation 
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“supplemented or amended at any time by mutual agreement.”107 Soon after the signing 
of the Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement, China agreed to construct a 
broadcasting transmitting station, covered by the loan provided for in the Agreement.108 
In addition to technical and economic cooperation, Zambia had already begun 
trading with China. However, trade was not always so easy between what were 
essentially two very unnatural trading partners. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign Trade expressed that there were problems “being 
encountered in the conduct of trade between Zambia and the People’s Republic of 
China.” Specifically, he complained that the flow of trade with China was not “moving 
normally” due to “considerable delays.” Furthermore, he expressed distaste with the 
Chinese including “unnecessary articles in any deal which the National Wholesale 
Corporation makes.”109 The Zambian public also had complaints, In July of 1968, China 
established a commercial section of its embassy in Zambia, largely to deal with these 
sorts of issues.110 
Difficulties in trading were also expressed in a Zambian trade delegation to 
China, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, led by the Minister of Commerce, Industry, 
and Foreign Trade, M. H. Chimba. In attendance were L. S. Muka, an Official from the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and J. Chileshe, an Official from the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Foreign Trade, as well as representatives from the Zambia National 
Wholesale Corporation and Grain Marketing Board and private businessmen. In China in 
particular, the Zambian delegation was working for the completion of a maize sale 
contract, but “it was extremely difficult for both parties to agree on the terms of the 
contract, a draft of which was provided by the Chinese side who showed no inclination to 
considering the Zambian draft.” After much deliberation, the Zambian group came away 
successful, reporting back that “On the whole the contract ultimately agreed upon was a 
reasonable one” and that they were receiving a higher price for maize than was being 
given on the world market.111 
The Zambian delegation was also pleased with the success of the Buying Mission 
group that was left in Canton to negotiate a “fairly sizable order for the National 
Wholesale Corporation.” In fact, despite the tough negotiations, Zambia left with the 
impression that “Indeed one cannot escape the feeling that rather than sending our 
agricultural extension officers and members of Agricultural Cooperatives to Western 
countries for training China should be the ideal place for them.”112 However, as soon as 
December of 1968, Zambia was unable to meet the obligations of its trade agreement 
with China on providing maize. In a letter to the Embassy of China in Lusaka, from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign 
                                                 
111 NAZ, FA 1-1-64, “Observations on the Zambian Trade and Economic Mission,” 
Communist China - Technical Assistance, April 7, 1967 - May 20, 1967. 
112 Ibid. 
 165 
Trade, Zambia expressed its regret that it was not able to provide the 1.1 million bags of 
maize it was contracted to give China and it was forced to reduce the exported amount by 
10 percent.113 Trade was not just economic, it was political, and bilaterally with China, it 




 The Zambian economic development agenda is commendable in its 
comprehensiveness. There were issues, including a dependency on copper exports, but it 
was undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Implementation, however, was a much 
more complicated process. Regional issues created trade and transport issues, and 
Rhodesian U.D.I. was raised to a level of prominence it would have otherwise not been 
accorded. Also difficult was the promotion of trade over aid. While both were necessary, 
trade is more beneficial for sustainable development, as has become accepted in recent 
years. Yet balanced trade between developed and developing nations was a difficult 
prospect. 
This chapter argues that the Zambian First National Development Plan sought to 
address these issues. It also argues that addressing these issues kept fully in mind the 
policy of non-alignment. Zambia was willing to enter economic arrangements with any 
nation, so long as the outcome was beneficial for development. Trade, aid, and assistance 
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came from both the West, including Great Britain, the United States, and other smaller 
actors such as the Scandinavian nations, as well as from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, 
and China. However, while this was the best plan for economic development, it was not 
always the easiest plan for foreign policy. Western reactions to the Zambian 
government’s willingness to accept aid from and trade with communist nations created a 
balancing act for Zambian leaders. This balancing act was to reach its climax as Kaunda 
and the Zambian government began negotiating for their biggest project yet: the 
TAZARA railway. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: NEGOTIATING TAZARA 
 
“Quite honestly, I do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this...Four trips to the 
West...are not sufficient to make me a capitalist...But only one trip to Peking...will make 
me a communist” 
 
- Kenneth Kaunda1 
 
 
By far the most important negotiations the Zambian government undertook in the 
immediate postcolonial period were for the funding of the TAZARA railway. This 
project was not just important economically, although it was undoubtedly the key to 
Zambia’s economic development and future economic success, but it was, more than any 
other trade or aid negotiations, a political project. However, neither trade nor aid was 
easy with China, not when the maintenance of relations with the West was concerned. 
Yet this is exactly what Zambia sought to do, as it faced the negotiations for its most 
important development project: an alternative transportation route for its imports and 
exports that bypassed Southern Rhodesia.  
The way the Zambian government, and in particular Kaunda, managed reactions 
from the international community showed political skill and expertise. While Kaunda 
maintained a public image of non-alignment, he began to enter into negotiations for the 
building of the railway. The Cold War heavily influenced what was to be constructed, 
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and by whom, and what would be received in return. For both Zambia and China, the 
outcome was successful, as both achieved what they had set out to. 
 
Alternative Trade Routes 
 
Even prior to the declaration of U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, Kaunda had his eye 
on alternative transportation routes out of Zambia. Transport issues were not just a 
Zambian problem, but an African one. In a September 1967 meeting of the OAU 
Transport and Communication Commission, the Council of Ministers reported, “Firstly, 
it can be said that all African countries are concerned with extending the present trend of 
industrial development which is now centred in a few isolated urban islands to new 
regions. Furthermore, the establishment of new industrial centres is faced with serious 
problems when it comes to the question of the means of the transport of the potential 
products,” and “Secondly, that economic development requires effective and adequate 
transportation services is axiomatic and as far as a developing continent like Africa is 
concerned it is the key sector.”2  
The Rhodesian rebellion aside, it was simply not feasible for Zambia to only 
utilize one railway route for all its imports and exports. Studies were already being 
proposed by September of 1965, as G. E. Whitehouse, the Permanent Secretary of 
Transport and Works requested of the Office of National Development and Planning that 
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“We shall be grateful if you will please make application on our behalf to the British 
High Commission for a study to be made on the subject of transport links between 
African countries.”3 The most likely route that took in both political and economic 
concerns was through Tanzania. What was different about the situation, though, was that 
transport had become not just an economic issue, but a political one as well. Even as 
early as April of 1965, Barbara Castle, from the British Ministers of Overseas 
Development, described that “there was now a growing realisation that it was impossible 
to judge the project from a purely economic point of view.”4 
Specifically, Zambia owned 50 percent of Rhodesia Railways, but Rhodesia held 
70 percent of the assets. Copper traffic accounted for one-third of the revenue. Rhodesia 
had, in April 1965, approached the Zambian government to make the Railway two 
completely separate entities. However, the Ministry of Transport and Works believed 
“Any division of the present system would present Zambia with further serious 
difficulties,” particularly with regards to staffing, as the majority of skilled staff were in 
Rhodesia.5 Due to a 1963 Railways Agreement with Rhodesia, the Zambian government 
was prohibited from even speaking favorably about a rail link with Tanzania. In fact, 
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there were numerous legal documents to which Zambia was bound, all of which had been 
signed prior to independence.  
Constitutional documents related to Rhodesia Railways included: 
i) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in Council 
1963; 
ii) Agreement between S. Rhodesia and N. Rhodesia, December 10, 1963 
(General Notice 2462 of 1963 published in the Northern Rhodesia 
Gazette); 
iii) Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council 1961; and 
iv) Zambia Independence Order in Council 1964.6 
All of these documents held Zambia in a variety of ways to the colonial construct of the 
Railway, and overall “The constitution and manner of running Rhodesia Railways 
contain[ed] a bias against new projects.” 
However, while the government had to remain diplomatic about favorable views 
towards alternative transport links, it “was nevertheless committed to the rail link in the 
sense of being convinced that such a link was necessary for the country’s survival in its 
geographical position and because of surrounding political circumstances.”7 At the first 
Zambia/East Africa Rail Link Conference, in April 1965, Zambia argued that such a link 
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would be most beneficial to the southern region of Tanzania and the northern region of 
Zambia and would not just be an economic link, but a communications link as well. The 
railway would be capable of exploiting not only coal deposits, but also iron ore deposits 
at Liganga (indentified as having a minimum of 45 million tons of ore with an average 
iron content of 49 percent but with a high percentage of titanium bearing minerals), as 
well as promoting the development of the Kilombero Valley, providing of an outlet for 
Zambian copper production, and promoting local industry in southern Tanzania using 
local materials.8 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Mineral Production 






Jan. 11,405,834.00 12,772,973.00 16,124,070.00 
 10,602,736.00 13,774,009.00 18,250,607.00 
 12,059,470.00 13,933,159.00 19,262,655.00 
 13,317,636.00 14,333,195.00 11,351,958.00 
 12,941,578.00 15,676,287.00 19,078,632.00 
 12,232,438.00 14,775,231.00 26,168,444.00 
 12,010,118.00 16,492,364.00 26,630,375.00 
 10,705,228.00 16,620,548.00 20,897,251.00 
 13,947,745.00 13,887,628.00 13,252,738.00 
 14,330,553.00 15,576,685.00 19,410,599.00 
 12,187,712.00 16,530,938.00 20,091,991.00 
 13,049,467.00 17,028,991.00 18,111,965.00 
Total 148,790,515.00 181,402,008.00 228,631,285.00 
 
Source: PRO, CO 670/45, “General Summary of Mineral Production, Month of 
December 1965,” Zambia Gazette, February 11, 1966, p. 110. 
 
At a July 1965 meeting, the Zambia Cabinet determined that it was the 
responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ensure that the route through Congo 
and Angola remained open in the event of Rhodesia U.D.I. The Cabinet identified 
relations with Congo, Portugal, and Tanzania as being critical to “economic survival” if 
access was cut off from Rhodesia Railways. However, there were two issues with this 
plan. Firstly, “The road link with Dar-es-Salaam would, of course, be available, but this 
could not be expected to provide anything like adequate transport facilities for heavy 
commodities.” Secondly, was the establishment of relations with Portugal. No matter 
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how cordial relations were in 1965, Zambia could not risk establishing formal relations 
with a colonial power in Africa.9 
Zambia’s relations with Portugal were tricky, especially considering Portugal’s 
good relations with Rhodesia. In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to 
the United Nations, F. M. Mulikita, to Chona, he explained that the Portuguese desired at 
least consular relations with Zambia, despite Zambia’s opposition to their policies in 
Africa. However, Portuguese insistence that there would be no economic effects felt by 
Zambia due to U.D.I. made it difficult to convince Portugal that Zambia should use the 
port at Lobito. Mulikita described,  
I found it difficult to convince the Portuguese Representative here of the 
wisdom of diverting our traffic through Lobito…But I emphasized that 
U.D.I. or no U.D.I., it was my Government’s intention to see that a greater 
volume of our exports and imports were transported on the Benguella 
railway system…since Portugal and Zambia were on ‘talking terms’ it was 
only fair and wise that Zambia’s imports and exports should travel through 
a friendly territory, Angola, without the necessity of going through an 
unfriendly territory like Southern Rhodesia.10 
The following month, Kaunda explained to the Prime Minister of Portugal that due to the 
cutting of oil supplies to Zambia by Rhodesia because of the British oil embargo, Zambia 
                                                 
9 NAZ, FA 1-1-16, “Secret,” Relations with Southern Rhodesia, n.d. 
10 NAZ, FA 1-1-66, F. M. Mulikita, “Letter to M. C. Chona, Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” November 20, 1965. 
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was unable to meet its oil demand. An airlift had been arranged but this did not meet 
Zambia’s full requirements. Therefore, the Zambian government requested the 
Portuguese government to allow them the use of Beira Blantyre land route and port 
facilities at Lobito Bay.  
However, even prior to the publication of the statistics, Kaunda did not seem keen 
on the road alternative. The United States proposed the survey in September 1965, and 
the proposal was accepted, “PROVIDED IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD that by 
accepting what I consider a very kind offer by A.I.D. to make this road survey WE ARE 
NOT IN ANY WAY thinking of it as a substitute for our projected railway link between 
Zambia and East Africa, for we simply cannot accept that.”11 USAID was assisting in the 
construction of the Great North Road, but when it came to the East Africa link, it seemed 
for Kaunda the railway was the only option. 
With the declaration of U.D.I. in November 1965, the Higher Authority for 
Rhodesian Railways became inoperative, as there were no Rhodesian ministers appointed 
to the Authority. Consequently, Zambia was not able to manage administrative issues and 
bring up problems with the railway board. In a letter to the British High Commissioner in 
July of 1966, Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe explained, “In recent months 
the acts of the Rhodesian rebel regime have made it increasingly difficult for the joint 
railway system to operate in Zambia.” The major problems he noted included the 
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blocking of arms and ammunition into Zambia, the blocking of railway car movement 
from Rhodesia to Zambia, the restriction of the free flow of goods between the two 
countries, and Rhodesian debts on goods consigned from or to Zambia.12 
It seemed obvious to Zambian officials that the only way to handle the Rhodesia 
Railways situation was to dissolve the Board and focus on developing an alternative 
route. For the Zambian Cabinet, there were four main points that were crucial for the 
dissolution: 
i) the break-up should be “orderly;” 
ii) assets and liabilities should be divided “in proportion of asset 
disposition in the two countries;” 
iii) the target date for dissolution should be set at June 30, 1967; and 
iv) Great Britain and the World Bank should be invited to attend the 
negotiations for the dissolution.13 
The legal representative parties at the negotiations were identified as Zambia and the 
United Kingdom (because Southern Rhodesia was considered illegal), as well as the 
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International Bank for Construction and Development in its concerns over loans granted 
to the Railway.14 
However, the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued, “The reaction of the 
United Kingdom government to Zambia’s proposals has been one of procrastination and 
reluctance to become involved in the discharge of its due responsibilities.”15 Great Britain 
did not want to participate in the negotiations over the dissolution of Rhodesia Railways 
because it believed that that “the present situation in Rhodesia is likely to continue 
indefinitely.” Therefore, it argued that negotiations should be postponed “until 
constitutional rule has been restored in Rhodesia.”16 Great Britain’s opinion did not, of 
course, change the course of action for Rhodesia, and as Zambia began planning in 
March for a June dissolution, Rhodesia responded by raising its transport costs and 
tariffs.17 
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The first step to undertaking the building of a railway through Tanzania and into 
Zambia was a survey, and so this is where Kaunda and Tanzanian President Julius 
Nyerere first directed their attention. Zambia, however, did not participate in the first 
meeting between Nyerere, Bottomley, and Castle. In this July 1965 meeting, Nyerere 
revealed that the Chinese had offered to survey the Tanzanian part of the line and assist 
with construction. The British government immediately countered this offer, agreeing to 
contribute £75,000, or half the total cost of surveying. It was clear, as reported by 
Zambia, that “there was a danger that this project was becoming involved in East/West 
power politics.”18 
The plan was to execute a three stage project. The first stage was to be an 
engineering and economic survey, necessary for both policy decisions and to procure 
financing. The proposal had to be approved by not only Zambia and Tanzania, but also 
Uganda and Kenya. Once approved, the second stage involved the detailed engineering 
and design of the line, and then finally, the railway would be constructed.19 Financing 
options in 1965 included the United Nations Special Fund, the United States, and the 
Kaiser Engineering Corporation. Other private firms tried to bid on various stages of the 
                                                 
18 Immediately, South African banks also offered loans and Japanese and Ghananian 
consultants also offered their services. NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Railways: Zambia/ Tanzania 
Rail Link: Financial and Economic Aid,” Tanzania Rail Link, April 29, 1965. 
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project, including Le Leon Manufacturing Company from Kansas City, Missouri, which 
tried to obtain a contract with the Zambian government for air freight and a Japanese 
company with offices in Johannesburg that wanted to do the railway survey.20 In the end, 
however, it was Great Britain, through the firm Maxwell Stamp and Associates, and 
Canada who offered the full cost of the first stage, an estimated £150,000, of the 
“preliminary engineering and economic survey of the proposed Tanzania-Zambia 
railway.”21 Zambia was pleased with this development, and profusely thanked the 
Canadians and British for what they termed a “splendid example of co-operation between 
members of the Commonwealth”—no doubt a jab at its threats to leave the 
organization.22 
The Maxwell Stamp Report was completed in 1966, and paved the way for the 
completion of negotiations for the railway. The Report firmly established the technical 
feasibility and “economic viability” of the link and agreed that the estimated cost of 
construction stood at £126 million. By 1971, the Report stated, 2.559 million tons of 
traffic would be able to travel on the railway, rising to 4.281 million tons by 1981. This 
was based on some goods still traveling out through the south, with the majority of 
exports being metals and general goods. The Report estimated that revenues would 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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exceed total and interests costs with a rate of return of 9 percent in 1971, rising to 13 
percent in 1981. Even with the report, however, Zambia wished to emphasize that the 
project should be examined in terms of its financial viability and not with a consideration 
to other southern and western routes that Zambia has deemed unreliable.23 
The Report was released to both the governments and the private sector of several 
countries, and garnered significant attention. Kaiser Engineers, an Oakland, California 
based engineering firm, sent a very positive reply to the Zambian government’s 
submission of the report. Earl G. Peacock, the Vice President of Kaiser, called the Stamp 
Report “a forceful economic and financial justification for the new railway” and that 
“Zambia would not be risking anything but short-run liquidity by financing” its 
construction. Although they advised that there be a second, more detailed study prior to 
construction, Kaiser Engineering was clear in its desire to assist in the building of the 
new railway. Peacock noted, “It is also important to note that while short-run transport 
alternatives are important, it is only the existence of the Tan-Zam Railway which will 
assure the long-run economic growth and viability of Zambia.”24 
Even prior to the survey and the publication of the Maxwell Stamp Report, the 
Inter-Governmental Ministerial Committee of Zambia and Tanzania wasted no time in 
drafting request letters to several governments to cover the cost of the actual building of 
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the rail link. The communication was designed so that the names nations could be 
inserted into blanks: 
The purpose of this communication is to appraise the Government  
of    of what is now taking place, and to enquire whether the 
Government of    would consider participating in the 
provision of finance for the later stages of the project. 
This brief letter was to be sent to the governments of Japan, Canada, France, West 
Germany, and, the only communist nation listed, China.25 
It is unsurprising that China would be included on any potential donor list made 
by Tanzania. As the leader of an openly and ardently socialist nation, President Nyerere 
made no question of his distaste for the West and his close relationship with the Chinese. 
Zambia, however, was a different story. The Chinese government recognized the difficult 
position in which Zambia found itself. In a telegram from the Chinese Embassy in 
Zambia to the Foreign Ministry in China, the ambassador expressed a keen insight into 
the possibilities: 
To avoid pressure from imperialism and colonialism [Kaunda] wants to 
get unconditioned aid from the West, but doesn’t think the western 
countries are reliable. He also wants to accept aid from China, but worries 
about the ensuing imperialistic pressure. The contradiction of his thought 
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is reflected in the discrepancy of his speech. Certainly there is another 
possibility: he wants to urge the western countries to hurry in honoring 
their promise of aid by claiming to consider aid from China.26 
China seemed unsure of what the Zambian government’s next move would be, but it 
certainly realized the political implications of China giving aid to a former British colony 
and member of the Commonwealth. 
The British also believed that the Zambians were using the Chinese as a playing 
card against the West. In a report on Chinese Aid to Zambia, A. G. Gilchrist describes 
what he terms a “reversal” of Zambian policy on relations with China. Gilchrist explains 
that, in 1965, “Kaunda was concerned at the extent to which....Tanzania was falling under 
Chinese influence, and he was particularly disquieted about the Chinese offer of 
assistance to Tanzania for building the Tanzam railway.”27 However, in the press on 
October 21, 1966, Kaunda had admitted to accepting Chinese aid and considering other 
offers. Like the Chinese, Gilchrist believed that Kaunda desired “to show Zambia’s 
disillusionment with Britain by accepting Chinese aid.”28 The question was, really, 
whether or not Britain would cut off aid to Zambia if they left the Commonwealth and 
did not participate in sanctions against Rhodesia.  
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The British considered this as they faced the possibility of aid competition in 
Zambia. Although they believed “the Chinese economy is far from being in a sound 
state,” they also knew that China was “capable of providing financial and material 
assistance abroad if the political gains to be expected are important enough.” Areas of 
assistance identified by Great Britain included transportation infrastructure, including 
roads (but not mentioning rail links), interest-free commercial credits, and cheap 
consumer goods. Overall, the British believed that the total aid the Chinese would be able 
to offer to both Zambia and Tanzania “could be in the order of several million pounds.”29 
British officials did not take Chinese aid seriously in 1966, and therefore thought that 
Zambia would not have the means to leave the Commonwealth if the Rhodesian situation 
continued.  
Zambia also realized the implications of accepting aid from China, for its 
relationship with China, as well as with its relationship with the West. In a treatise on 
Chinese Policy on Zambia, the Zambian Foreign Ministry explained, “Nobody can doubt 
that the Chinese do not like our policy of non-alignment....However, in non-alignment we 
acknowledge the fact that neither communists nor capitalists are innocent of imperialist 
aggression.” However, they also stated that “This is to say that the socialist camp has a 
special place in Chinese foreign policy and any aid from China is aimed at helped nations 
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concerned to be economically independent on the basis of self-reliance.”30 And economic 
independence was not only exactly what Zambian wanted, but what new independent 
African nations needed as well.   
The sensitive political nature of the negotiations ensured that the public version 
was considerably more cautious than the words expressed behind closed doors. In a press 
conference immediately after the British and Canadians had agreed to complete the 
survey, Kaunda hinted that the two nations would also participate in building the new rail 
line, stating that “I am confident that they will do something when the right time 
comes.”31 However, the foreign press was quick to try and catch him out. A journalist 
from the BBC questioned Chinese rail experts in Zambia clashing with the soon to be 
coming British and Canadian team, and the Associated Press questioned the offer of “red 
China, communist China” of building to Tanzania. Kaunda expertly fielded the 
journalists questions, explaining that he would only find out about this offer on an 
upcoming trip to Dar es Salaam and also noted that there was no need for him to “say 
‘red’ China” because communist China was “the only China we know, anyway.”32  
In fact, in an interview with Kenneth Kaunda in the Times of Zambia33 on June 
29, 1967, two years after privately asking the Chinese to fund the project, he stated: 
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“Zambia was not attempting to play off East against West by approaching a number of 
countries for assistance with the project.”34 Yet it is clear from his negotiations with 
China and the Britain that it is exactly what he was doing. And what he was doing quite 
well. This was just a few months before the final railway deal was signed and two years 
after Kaunda had privately requested assistance from the Chinese, but it was beginning to 
become difficult to appease both sides. Two months later, in August, after a July trip to 
Peking, Kaunda was interviewed again by the Times of Zambia, speaking on western 
allegations that he was moving into the communist camps. He stated, “Quite honestly, I 
do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this...Four trips to the West...are not 
sufficient to make me a capitalist...But only one trip to Peking...will make me a 
communist.”35 He went on to state that Zambia was considering all offers and had made 
no decisions regarding who would aid the nation in building the railway. 
China was also keeping a close eye on the press, both Zambian and western, to 
gauge reactions to its proposed aid. On July 1, China noted the Guardian in London 
reported that China was offering Zambia and Tanzania aid. On July 2, it noted the Times 
of Zambia response: publishing individual pictures of Zhou, Nyerere, Kaunda, and 
Kapwepwe, accompanied by editorials. The Chinese offer of aid was quick to cause a 
“great sensation,” and China acknowledged Kaunda’s continuing diplomatic attitude. The 
Chinese Embassy in Zambia reported that Kaunda stated that “‘China offered no aid to 
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Zambia, but it is clear that China has offered aid to Tanzania, and that “that the Zambia-
Tanzania railway would be free from the control of eastern or western political forces.” 
Western reactions, on the other hand, argued that China, because of foreign exchange 
difficulties, would not be capable of offering such a large loan in pounds.36 
However, while it was true that Kaunda was no communist, he was much closer 
to closing the deal on the railway than he let on to the Zambian public and government 
officials from the West. During his June trip he signed an Economic and Technical 
Cooperation Agreement between Zambia and China. In a letter to Chinese Prime Minister 
Zhou En-Lai after he returned from his trip, Kaunda wrote, “The construction of the 
railway line between Tanzania and Zambia is one area under consideration and no doubt 
we shall be in contact at the earliest possible opportunity.”37 Kaunda also took the 
opportunity in the letter to address China’s continuing major concern: United Nations 
recognition. Kaunda, always the careful diplomat in his writing, expressed, “I still 
consider your seat in the United Nations as an imperative necessity if only to ensure the 
participation of each and every independent nation affected directly or indirectly in the 
resolution of world tensions. I admit the United Nations is not in its best frame to cater 
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for all our interests, but it is necessary for all nations to participate in reshaping it for the 
better.”38 
On September 5, 1967, Chinese, Zambian, and Tanzanian government officials 
signed the TAZARA railway deal in Peking. The Zambian delegation included the 
Minister of Finance, A. N. L. Wina, the Governor Delegate of the Bank of Zambia, Dr. J. 
Zulu, the Permanent Secretary of the Office of National Development and Planning, M. 
Lishomwa, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, E. Kasonde, and the 
Assistant Principle of the Ministry of Finance, M. Mulundika. Noticeably absent from the 
delegation was President Kaunda, as well as President Nyerere, although Prime Minister 
Zhou attended the signing. The agreement was signed by the three Ministers of Finance 
Ali Hseun-Nien (China), A. H. Jamal (Tanzania), and A. J. Soko (Zambia) - for an 
interest-free loan for the construction of railway and that the Chinese would complete 
terrain and soil geology hydrology surveys before the technical date of construction was 
set. In an inward telegram from a Tanzanian representative in Peking to the Foreign 
Ministry in Lusaka they reported, “The agreement was concluded in an atmosphere of 
Mutual Friendship and respect and to the complete satisfaction of the three governments. 
It marks the beginning of an important chapter in the Economic History of this region of 
Africa.”39 
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The Cold War in Zambia 
 
Trading with and receiving technical assistance from China was also not easy for 
Zambia when dealing with the West. On the same mission of the Zambian trade 
delegation that produced the maize contract, they visited Japan after leaving China. 
However, the delegation explained, “The visit to Japan produced very little 
results...basically because the Japanese Government, so it would appear, foolishly took 
offence at our having gone to China first.”40  Undoubtedly, however, the most negative 
opinions of China in Africa came from the major western powers, and the United States 
in particular was adamant against allowing key African nations, in terms of geography, 
natural resources, or population, to develop a socialist form of government or establish 
diplomatic or trade relations with communist nations. While the U.S. did not care as 
much about the political alignment of smaller nations such as Cameroon or Burundi, both 
considered more “leftist” states immediately following their independence, it did care 
heavily about the political alignment of nations of geographically strategic nations, such 
as Zambia. The idea of the “domino effect” was central in United States foreign policy 
during this period—for example, one need only look to the counties of Southeast Asia—
and this was a prime example of such a fear. Foreign policy makers assumed that if a 
geographically significant nation like Zambia could maintain democratic stability, it 
would influence its less stable neighbors in a similar direction. 
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Geo-political significance also applied to the central African nation of the Congo, 
and it is a telling example of U.S. fears in African during the Cold War. The communist 
infiltration in the Congo differed from the United States officials’ fear of Soviet influence 
seen in many international examples. The major concern about the Congo by 1964 
actually lay in the fear of Chinese influence. In a research memorandum by Thomas 
Hughes, the United States Director of Research and Intelligence in the State Department, 
from August of 1964, he explained, “given the distance of the Congo from the USSR and 
Soviet reluctance to become involved in direct confrontations with the U.S., we would 
not expect any direct Soviet intervention in such circumstances.”41 However, while the 
Soviet Union remained relatively uninterested in the situation in the Congo, the Chinese 
repeatedly proved their interest.  
In a speech made before the Banquet of the International Congress of French-
speaking Africa of Georgetown University on August 18, 1964, W. Averell Harriman, the 
U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, explained to his audience, “Guerrilla 
handbooks of Chinese origin have been found in the Congo…The tactics used by the 
rebels show unmistakably Chinese Communist inspiration.”42 Numerous memos from the 
State Department and officials in the Congo further reflected the fear of Chinese 
communist influence on the rebel factions in the Congo. Foreign policy makers raised 
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concerns at the time about the “Chicoms” presence in Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, as 
well as concerns that the Chinese were training Congolese rebels, in the Congo and 
possibly even in China.43 While the truth of these statements is still debated, it was clear 
that not only was China an increasingly important presence in Africa, but that it also had 
attracted the attention of the West. The concerns of the U.S. government were also the 
concerns of Great Britain, and the British were especially focused on Zambia’s geo-
political significance for the situation in Rhodesia. 
Therefore, the West immediately jumped into action at the news of the railway 
agreement signing. Zambian Ambassador to the United States, Rupiah Banda, reported of 
the deal signing creating “great interest” in Washington. He explained, “There is even 
talk of possibility of interested American and Japanese firms forming consortium to 
Finance and construct the Railway.”44 The Foreign Ministry in Lusaka was quick to 
respond, warning Banda, “You must look out for usual imperialist delaying tactics. For 
your information Zambia and Tanzania already committed but you should avoid at all 
costs indicating degree of commitment.”45 Immediately, however, the Director of Central 
African Affairs in the United States State Department scheduled a trip to Zambia to see to 
what extent the rumors of Chinese assistance were true.  
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In a letter from the Zambian Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs he observed, 
“It is apparent that the Americans and the West in general are very disturbed about the 
whole railway project.” First, he noted, they put out the World Bank report, then after the 
Maxwell Stamp Report on the feasibility of rail link they tried to counteract with the 
“Middle Africa Road Transport Survey.” However, he continued, “The West has nobody 
else to blame but themselves since offers to build the Tan-Zam Railway were made to all 
potential candidates and only China has responded positively with a definite and 
unmistakable document.”46 Zambians were concerned that on account of “apprehension 
on the part of the West,” western nations would retaliate for Zambia’s new commitment 
to the East, and the Permanent Secretary urged both political and diplomatic initiatives, 
as well as “military preparedness.” The concern was in particular over the reaction of the 
United States, which he believed could do “incalculable harm to Zambia.”47 
Although the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the biggest rival of the United States 
in the 1960s, the Communist government of China also stayed continually with the U.S. 
government’s radar. However, China also joined in on the battle, arguing as late as 1969, 
towards the end of the final railway survey, that “imperialists” and “colonialists” have 
“invariably attempt to sabotage the constructions of the Tanzania/Zambia railway.” China 
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condemned the “rumour-mongering” and “slandering” of the West, yet the Chinese 
government seemed keen to do just that.48 
The Tanzania-Zambia rail link was to be the third largest construction project in 
Africa and the Middle East at the time, after the Aswam Dam in the United Arab 
Emirates and the Volta Dam in Ghana, both projects funded by the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, the TanZam line would link the mineral wealth of both Zambia and the 
Congo with the outside. However, despite what the British had thought about the Chinese 
ability to provide aid, they were funding TAZARA, which had become “perhaps the most 
controversial project in Africa today.”49 However, the project was controversial not only 
for the divide between East and West, but also for the divide between China and the 
Soviet Union. A. M. Chambeshi, the acting High Commissioner to Tanzania, noted that 
the railway signing “has created an unfriendly atmosphere between us and the so called 
socialist camps.”50  
 
Building the Railway 
 
The Chinese offer of economic assistance did not cover all of the technical 
aspects necessary to building the railway. The new Chief Executive Officer of the 
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Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority, H. L. T. Chopeta, requested from the Ministry of 
Foreign affairs outside technical assistance to aid in construction and civil engineering 
matters associated with railway construction and maintenance. When considering which 
countries to request assistance from, Zambia kept in mind China’s controversial position 
in global affairs. Therefore, nations like Pakistan and Ceylon, which were friendly with 
China, were identified as possibilities.51  
While working with the Chinese made identifying additional partners difficult, 
working with the Chinese themselves also sometimes proved to be difficult. P. J. 
Chisanga, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Power, Transport and Works, 
expressed as surveys were being conducted, the Chinese seemed to be already preparing 
for constructing the railway, before the surveys were approved by the three 
governments.52 Chisanga argued, “the Chinese do not seem to practice the Western 
standards of conducting business and it would appear that they are ignoring the 
provisions of an Agreement signed in Peking in 1967.” However, he did note that Zambia 
should “exercise caution” and make sure that “the Chinese are not frustrated in their 
efforts.”53 
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Along the proposed railway line, the Chinese survey team, consisting of early 
career railway men in their 30s and 40s, Chinese doctors, and other “support staff,” 
Zambians had their first chance to interact with the citizens of its diplomatic “friend.” 
And, unsurprisingly, there were immediately concerns that the Chinese were distributing 
Mao badges and literature and “virtually conducting an indoctrination programme 
amongst at least some of the workers and the patients they treat.” Although these were 
just rumors, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that 
“forewarned is forearmed.” He believe that “Any foreign indoctrinations which are not 
subject to the control of institutions in this country, such as the churches and companies 
are, could be fertile ground for the seeds of trouble in the future,” and, furthermore, that 
“If we had a similar situation applying to, say, a group of British or American surveyors 
preaching the Queen or President Nixon and the wonderful works of their respective 
national philosophies, I am sure we would share the concern of any possible 
consequences of this upon the minds of a simply country folk.”54 The Chinese were, as 
always, more political than they claimed to be, but Zambia still held firm to its policy of 
non-alignment. 
According to Jamie Monson, this ideological import was not just for the 
“socialist” railway, but for the “capitalist” highway being built in parallel and tandem by 
the United States. She argues, “there was much more at stake in this confrontation than 
the simple logistics of one rural transportation project accommodating another; the 
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disputed terrain was not just physical but ideological.”55 Furthermore, the railway had 
another ideological dimension, being “anti-apartheid.” Overall, however, the Zambians 
were pleased with the speed and manner in which the survey had taken place. Zambia 
desired that the railway be completed by 1975, in the event that relations with Rhodesia, 
as well as Portugal and South Africa, “may deteriorate to the extent that Zambia cannot 
or does not wish to use their harbours.” After that only the Congo rail/river route and 
Tanzanian road route would remain, which were not only expensive but had limited 
carrying capacity. Zambia sought to offer special incentives for finishing the railway 
quickly, such as limiting the amount of the loan, which also had the reason of a “moral” 
obligation to not “deprive China of developing their own economy during the period.”56 
Zambia believed strongly that the loan should also be paid back as quickly as 
possible, also in the interest of China:  
The £100m. interest free loan from China should be amortised in not too 
long a period in view of the fact that the Chinese Nation, with an income 
of about £50 per head, is denying itself the goods which it supplies to 
Tanzania and Zambia although they could produce instead, goods to 
promote their own development. 
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Presidential aides suggested that the loan be paid back in 15 years time, which meant that 
the railway would not only need to cover its own costs, but the costs of paying back the 
loan in a timely manner as well.57 
The railway survey, released in early 1970, reported that the total length of the 
line would be 1,900 kilometers, and contain 350 bridges with a total length of 15,000 
meters; 36 tunnels with a length of 12,000 meters; and 2,500 curvets. The earthworks for 
the permanent project would require the movement of 70,000,000 cubic meters of earth, 
and the earthworks for provisions projects, such as service sidings and service roads, 
would require the movement of 30,000,000 cubic meters. The railway route was to 
traverse “complicated topographical and geological features.” Although the Chinese 
would be in charge of the construction, it was estimated that 6-7,000 local workers would 
be needed for construction in 1970, with a target of employing 12,000 workers over the 
course of construction. The goal was to attempt to reach a wide range of workers, who 
would be paid K20 per month, plus food and allowances.58 
 
Keeping Promises: China and the United Nations 
 
 Relations between Zambia and China became increasingly close during the survey 
and construction of the railway. The Tanzania Zambia railway also opened doors for 
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better trade relations, including increased staff of the Commercial Office at the Chinese 
Embassy to provide Zambian traders with information (data, catalogues, samples, etc.).59 
More importantly, however, was the strengthening of diplomatic ties. Zambia continued 
to support China’s re-admission to the United Nations Security Council. And, once the 
railway agreement was signed, it supported it in even stronger terms than ever before. 
In a statement by J. B. Mwemba, the Zambian Ambassador to the United Nations, 
he expressed that Zambian “has been and continues to be in favour of the restoration of 
the rights” for China, and that its exclusion “is contrary to the principles embodied in the 
Charter of this Organization.” This petition, as Mwemba noted, was a continuation of 
policy, but the rest of his statement spoke to a change in the strength of Zambia’s stand. 
Mwemba argued that Taiwan’s legal representation of China “is nothing but mere 
fiction.” Zambia specifically attacked the West on this issue, stating that “My delegation 
fails to appreciate the attitude of those Western Powers which oppose the admission of 
China at all costs, and do so on an ideological basis—a basis which is unacceptable in 
this Organization.”60  
The western “attitude” was argued to be racist, and Mwemba used the rhetoric of 
Afro-Asian solidarity to convey his appeal: 
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Western hostility towards China has all the trapping of racism and the 
African peoples must see it in that way for what it is worth...We see it in 
their many reference to the Chinese as ‘wards’ or ‘teeming hordes’, or to 
‘the ant heap’ and ‘the yellow menace.’ We know those terms...are meant 
to project the image of an inferior or a sub-human race. Africans also have 
been given their share of names, and we all know them too well. Those of 
us who give our votes to this racist scheme of isolating China are in fact 
supporting racism, which is the scourge of Africa. 
Furthermore, Mwemba argued, China did not show the same level of aggression as 
western nations. Despite having the largest population in the world, “one hears of no 
Chinese soldiers being outside its borders. One knows of no foreign bases owned by 
China.”61 In 1968, Zambia continued its crusade for China’s restoration, noting its 
concern over the number of African countries that were voting against China’s 
admission. The plan, therefore, was to canvass support at the next OAU meeting, to be 
held in Algiers.62 
By the twentieth session of the United Nations, in 1965, it seemed likely that the 
PRC would be re-sat. However, rather than it being the votes of African nations, a shift in 
United States policy seemed like the most likely reason for the change. African states, 
previously increasing in their support for the PRC re-establishment, had tapered off due 
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to a number of domestic factors. Dahomey and the Central African Republic had severed 
ties with the PRC. Coups in Ghana and Nigeria caused relations to be severed in Nigeria, 
but not Ghana. Basutoland and Bechuanaland were scheduled to gain their own 
independence and were likely to establish relations with the Republic of China. A United 
States policy shift, towards accepting “two Chinas,” was argued to be the most important 
factor. Even more issues abounded in terms of language and procedure. Rather than being 
diplomatic, the issue was becoming bureaucratic.63  
In the 21
st
 session of the general assembly, Draft resolution L.496, for the 
immediate seating of the People’s Republic of China, was rejected by 57, with 46 in 
favor and 17 abstaining. Zambia had voted in favor of the substantive resolution, but 
against the procedural, a bureaucratic decision. Also voting in the same manner was 
Tanzania, in a guaranteed show of support for the PRC. However, by this time, “African 
attitudes by and large hardened against seating the PRC.” Similarly, “with the exception 
of Cuba, Latin American countries were unanimous against seating at present the PRC.”64 
The back and forth, however, continued for the next two years, with little 
profound change by 1969. In the words of the representative from Singapore, it “had 
achieved near immortality status.”65 However, the stance of Zambia in favor of the PRC 
remained strong and continued to grow. As noted in the report, “One of the speeches that 
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reflected most closely the position of the PRC itself was that of the delegation of 
Zambia.”66 The basic points were that the PRC could not be admitted as a new member, 
as it had been existence as a country for two decades. Furthermore, the Zambian 
delegation argued, “The accusation that China was not interested in the cause of peace 
was baseless.” The tensions were created by the argument, rather than being based in 
reality. Specifically, the United States was creating tensions in the United Nations and 
towards the PRC by keeping military bases close to the Chinese border. The only real 
tensions, those of the border dispute between the PRC and Soviet Union, seemed to be 
moving towards resolution. 
The Zambian delegate concluded by stating that “‘We know that the People’s 
Republic of China expects to be accorded and will accept its rightful place in this world 
body on the basis of the principle of equal sovereignty of States. I submit that the 
exclusion of this most populous State in the world has marred the history of this 
Organisation for the past twenty years.”67 Overall, “attitudes softened” towards the issue, 
which “took form either by a change in vote or by an unchanged vote accompanied by a 
speech or explanation making it clear that the representative thought the moment had 
come for a re-thinking of the problem.”68 
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The debates continued for another two years in a similar manner, with the United 
States becoming decreasingly rigid on its hard line stance towards the PRC. This, coupled 
with the increasing votes by both new third world nations and western nations, led to the 
passing of Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971. In the vote, 76 countries supported the 
People’s Republic of China, while 35 opposed, 17, abstained, and three nations did not 
vote. What some argue would have been eventually inevitable, was at the very least 
speeded up by the support of nations such as Zambia. The “mutually beneficial 




The negotiations for the building of the TAZARA railway are not the only 
instance in which the Zambian government used foreign policy for economic 
development. However, these negotiations do represent the most important and the most 
well documented example. The global reaction, particularly from the West, is an 
important indicator broader political and ideological debates within the larger construct 
of the Cold War.  
Yet while the implications were broad, the real impact was local, as Zambia used 
the TAZARA railway to mitigate the damage from U.D.I., ensure economic 
independence, and promote development. Moreover, the positive effects of these 
negotiations were not only for Zambia, but for China as well. Diplomatic recognition was 
paramount for the Chinese government in its international relations, and the primary 
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reason it sought opportunities to provide aid and assistance to newly independent, 
developing economies. The mutually beneficial friendship between Zambia and China is 
an important example of how the Cold War became more global and how decolonizing 






This dissertation has examined the political and economic development of a 
newly independent Zambia in terms of its foreign relations. The development of 
decolonizing nations did not exist in a vacuum—in any period of history. The political 
economy of national development exists within a particular historical context. For the 
many new nations of Africa in the 1960s, the historical context was the Cold War. 
Consequently, the geopolitical situation was of paramount importance never before seen 
in history. The Cold War polarized global politics and, critically, economics.  
In order to explore these competing influences in Zambia—foreign policy and 
domestic economic development—I began this study by looking at the unique colonial 
experience of the nations of the Central African Federation. While Northern Rhodesia 
was technically a British colony, the most important influence in the decade prior to 
independence was not London, but rather, was Salisbury. As the capital of the Central 
African Federation, and of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, through the many white settlers 
of the British South Africa Company, promoted a lopsided development policy that used 
Northern Rhodesia largely for resource extraction.  
Therefore, while, as I explain, the Northern Rhodesian independence process was 
relatively peaceful and, from the British perspective, deliberate, it still placed a great 
economic burden on a decolonized and newly independent Zambia. For the United 
National Independence Party, and its leader, Kenneth Kaunda, this was a primary concern 
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in the development of an ideology that would ensure both political and economic 
development for Zambia. Rather than choosing between the competing influences of 
communism and capitalism, UNIP and Kaunda instead chose a middle-way. The 
philosophy of humanism was rooted both in the global move of many third world nations 
towards non-alignment, as well as the unique history, culture, and needs of an African 
nation.  
Similarly, although already a growing power by the time of Zambia’s 
independence in 1964, the People’s Republic of China was also creating its ideological 
place within the geopolitical sphere. Image and propaganda were dominant in this global 
conversation: the West viewed China as a member of the communist and powerful 
second world, while China sought to define itself as a member, and leader, of the third 
world. This strategic self-depreciation was critical for China, as it sought diplomatic 
recognition, particularly in the United Nations. Through new international initiatives such 
as the Bandung Conference of 1955, the creation of the Non-Alignment Movement, and 
new international organizations such as the Afro Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, 
China attempted to place itself for its political benefit. 
Individual relations with new African nations differed in many aspects. This was 
particularly true in the types of assistance China provided, including military assistance 
in decolonization struggles and economic development assistance. However, the one 
thread that ran through the entirety of relations was the focus on Republic of China, and 
the People’s Republic of China’s re-establishment to the United Nations Security 
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Council. As early as 1962, two years prior to Zambian independence, the Chinese had 
already sought an audience with UNIP, and their delegate did not fail to mention the 
importance of diplomatic recognition. 
Yet for Zambia in particular, the issues were not solely international, but also 
regional. Simply put, regional issues necessitated the need for an advanced foreign 
relations policy. As a landlocked nation, Zambia faced economic difficulties from the 
start. However, the volatile situation in Southern Africa created an increased 
vulnerability, political, economically, and socially. All eight countries bordering Zambia 
presented some form of difficulty, whether it was violence, instability, or negotiations 
with colonial powers. Yet despite inherent difficulties, nothing could have prepared any 
nation, particularly a newly independent one, with the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Southern Rhodesia.  
The lasting legacy of the Central African Federation placed Zambia dependent 
upon its neighbor, Southern Rhodesia. Telecommunications, manufacturing, and, most 
importantly, transport, were centered in companies and institutions within white 
controlled Rhodesia. Therefore, when Ian Smith and his minority controlled government 
declared an independence from Great Britain in 1965, the stakes were particularly great 
for Zambia. Consequently, Zambian reactions were complex, and assuredly not in line 
with the view of Great Britain. The single greatest strain between Zambia and its colonial 
power, both before and after independence, was, undoubtedly, the situation in Rhodesia. 
The British insisted that Zambia participate in international sanctions; yet the 
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contingency planning to offset economic damages were half-hearted at best. So, while 
Zambia still maintained strained but continued relations with the British, it was forced to 
turn its attention elsewhere. 
The widespread attention Zambia placed on its international relations was both a 
reflection of its dedication to the policy of non-alignment, in line with the philosophy of 
humanism, as well as a response to its immediate economic needs. The Transitional and 
First National Development Plans laid out those needs, with the primary concern being 
transport routes for both imports and exports, related in large part to the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia. Mitigating damage was difficult, however, as the nations that could 
provide the most tangible assistance were in fact the most aligned, rather than non-
aligned, nations. The Zambian government also turned to international organizations, 
such as the United Nations and Afro Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, for 
economic development assistance, as well as helping to create new organizations based 
around economic realities, such as the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC). 
The role played by the West, including Great Britain, the United States, Canada, 
Scandinavian countries, and Japan, was largely in the arena of economic aid and 
technical assistance. The most important aspect for Zambian development, however, was 
not aid, but rather, as new literature has emphasized, in trade. An imbalance of trade with 
the West, designed to first benefit the more powerful western nations, led Zambia to 
pursue regional opportunities, including through the Eastern African Economic 
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Community. International opportunities were not ignored, however, and the Zambian 
government did not shy away from developing trade and aid relations with communist 
nations as well. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia both had a particular kind of 
prominence in Zambian political, economic, and social life, in large part because of the 
face-to-face roles that those involved in technical assistance and development project 
played and the importance of ideology in technical assistance projects. Although not as 
important socially, China played a critical role in Zambia economically and politically. 
While the focus was domestically and internationally on the negotiations to build the 
TAZARA railway, the Chinese were in fact involved in Zambian economic development 
in a variety of different capacities, including trade. 
TAZARA, however, is the climax of this story, as it brought to a fruition the 
political and economic negotiations of the Zambian government since prior to 
independence. An alternative route for Zambian exports, namely copper, was critical, as 
was the increasing need for imports that were blocked in transit through Southern 
Rhodesia. Portuguese control of Angola ensured that a western route was not feasible, 
and therefore an eastern route was Zambia’s only option. Alternative transportation 
routes had been discuss by Zambia and China as early as 1962. The first public 
negotiations, however, did not take place until 1965, between Kenneth Kaunda and Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania.  
Openly socialist Nyerere was controversial in the West in his own right, but also 
because of his close relations with communist nations, in particular China. Kaunda, 
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alternatively, remained quiet about his initial approaches to the East. After the completion 
of the Maxwell Stamp Report it became increasingly clear that assistance from the West 
would not be coming. Yet more open negotiations with the Chinese leading into 1967 led 
to the outcry of the western press. Both the public and private reaction to the negotiations 
of TAZARA represented a new level of the Cold War. Rather than be solely political, 
fought out in proxy wars throughout the developing world, the Cold War had become 
decidedly economic as well.  
Ultimately, every country got what it had set out to from the foregoing. A deal 
was signed between Zambia, Tanzania, and China to build the railway, and construction 
was underway by 1970. There are many reasons beyond the purview of this dissertation 
why this economic development did not progress throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the immediate economic goal of Zambia (an alternative transport route) and the 
immediate political goal of China (re-establishment to the United Nations) were 
achieved. 
 
Historical and Historiographical Significance 
 
The significance of this study is both within the history and within the 
historiography. The history of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa is incomplete without 
attention to areas in which there was no violence. The inordinate attention to cases of 
violence and conflict in Africa does have some justification: lives were lost in ideological 
and political struggles and their stories deserve to be told. However, the fascination with 
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instances in which decolonization manifested in violence or democracy failed in Africa 
has created stereotypes both in the literature and in the public view of the continent. A 
macro view of history focusing on governments must also write in the histories of those 
nations that have thus far remained under the radar. 
Zambia is an important example of such a nation, as well as an important example 
of real political skill. The United National Independence Party and Kaunda certainly did 
make mistakes. In particular, the focus on copper as 95 percent of the export industry was 
not sound economic policy. However, in the early years of the Kaunda administration, 
both prior to independence and throughout the First Republic, the deftness of the political 
negotiations undertaken should not go without recognition. Negotiating the Cold War 
was not easy, yet there is an alternative history to violent struggle. Therefore, in addition 
to contributing to the growing historiography on Zambia, and in particular to studies of 
its foreign relations, this dissertation also contributes to the broader historiography of 
post-colonial Africa and the history of the Cold War.  
In recent years there has been a huge wave of scholarship and other writings 
produced on the “phenomenon” that is China in Africa. However, what these studies fail 
to acknowledge is that relations between China and African nations are for the most part 
not new, and that they do in fact have a historical counterpart. Although this study is not 
bilateral, it does explore the historical relations between Zambia and China, filling in a 
gap that exists not just for the historical discipline, but also for the contextualization of 
contemporary studies of Zambia and China, specifically, or China and Africa, in general. 
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Finally, and what I believe is most importantly, this study marries two previously 
disparate fields in Africanist historiography: diplomatic history and economic 
development. While there are several new examples of literature that take into account 
economic issues in the Cold War, the agency in these stories is invariably given to the 
global powers.1 In particular, these new studies focus on the role of the United States in 
economic development, but also the role of the Soviet Union and, increasingly, China. 
One example that attempts to move beyond these paradigms is the chapter by Michael 
Latham in the Cambridge History of the Cold War. The chapter, titled “The Cold War in 
the Third World, 1963-1975,” examines those nations that chose non-alignment over 
association with the Soviet Union or the United States. However, rather than focusing on 
the nations and their leaders, Latham rather focuses on the reaction of the superpowers to 
this movement within the third world. Therefore, while Latham points the way towards 
the future of the study of the global Cold War, but there is still much to be done. The 
agency in these studies must also be given to the individual nations and leaders who 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), as well as 
Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2011); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the 
Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic 
Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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negotiated the Cold War, in turn giving us a broader understanding of international 
history in this period. 
Therefore, understanding Zambian history from a Zambian perspective helps us 
not just understand Zambia. Rather, it sheds light on both the history and contemporary 
issues within Africa and globally. More attention is deserved within all of these 
historiographies as we work to re-construct the history of a critical era. This study pushes 
forward two critical aspects of this historiography. First, it discusses the global Cold War 
from the perspective of non-superpower nations, particularly in Africa. Second, it argues 
that the decolonization and postcolonial history of African nations must be understood in 
the context of the Cold War, even when there was the absence of violent conflict. 
The globalization of historical research and the openness of archives through the 
western and communist worlds make this research feasible. International research 
provides the opportunity for a greater perspective and context for individual study. 
Although this has been a study of the postcolonial development of a particular nation, it is 
intended to become a part of the broader conversation on the Cold War, as well as 
China’s relations with Africa. It is for this research that this study contributes and hopes 






September 23, 2011, 12:00AM 
Three days had passed since the Zambian people had travelled to the polls to elect 
their fifth president. The entire country became increasingly tense as they waited to see if 
Patriotic Front opposition leader Michael Sata beat the incumbent leader of the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, Rupiah Banda. However, it was not until after 
midnight on the 23
rd
 of September that Chief Justice Ernest Sakala announced to the 
nation that Sata had won, with 41.98 percent of the vote. In only the second democratic 
transfer of power in Africa, Zambia had demonstrated to the world that it was ready for 
change. Zambians immediately began to celebrate. All throughout the country, people 
stayed up all night dancing and cheering in the streets, until making a pilgrimage to see 
Sata sworn in later that afternoon.2  
Zambian citizens were anxious to see if Sata could fulfill his many ambitious 
campaign promises, including eliminating corruption and working to close the gap 
between rich and poor. The rest of the world, however, was more interested to see if Sata 
would fulfill a different campaign promise: sticking to his hard line rhetorical stance 
against the Chinese. Long known globally as a radical politician, Sata had for almost a 
decade been a staunch critic of the Chinese in Zambia. However, compared with the anti-
                                                 
2 Portions of this Epilogue are adapted from a 2012 article by the author for ChinAfrica 
magazine. Used with permission.  
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Chinese rhetoric of his 2006 campaign, by 2011, Sata had already begun to loosen his 
stance, and he has only continued to do so since his election.  
In his 2006 campaign, “King Cobra,” as he is popularly known, spoke out 
strongly against Chinese investors, even threatening to deport them and any other 
foreigners found to be violating Zambia’s labor laws. In response, the Chinese 
government threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Zambia if Sata was elected. Yet in his 
2008 and then his 2011 campaign, there was a considerably less hostile slant in his 
references to China, making it appear that his previous tough rhetoric was simply to 
create political and media interest. Rather than threatening to kick the Chinese out, in his 
2011 campaign, Sata was much more pragmatic. Regardless, many global media outlets 
continued to focus on his anti-China stance. In reality, Sata focused his campaign on 
populist economic development and noted that foreign investment would be allowed to 
continue, so long as it promoted Zambian development and followed Zambian laws and 
regulations.  
There have been many calls on President Sata, particularly from the international 
community, to take on the “problem” of Chinese investors. Specifically, human rights 
and media reports focus on the violation of Zambian and international labor laws by 
Chinese companies, most notably mining companies. By far the most notorious example 
of labor violations was the October 2010 shooting of Zambia workers by two Chinese 
managers at the Collum Coal Mine. Eleven Zambian workers on strike were allegedly 
shot by their bosses, but the charges against the men were later dropped and the men 
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returned to China. Notably, most stories such as this come out of smaller, privately 
owned Chinese enterprises, rather than the large state owned operations.  
Yet, despite these issues, Chinese Ambassador Zhou Yuxiao was the first 
diplomat to be entertained by President Sata, on his first day of office. Sata even met in 
early 2012 with Chinese investors. The fourteen person delegation from Beijing was led 
by Luo Tao, the General Manager of the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company, the 
largest Chinese investor in Zambia and a Chinese state owned enterprise. 
 
Great Changes in Zambia and China 
 
The changes in both Zambia and China were so profound from the 1970s to the 
1990s, that it would be impossible for a simple renewal of the relations of the 1960s. For 
Zambia, the promise of the First Republic (1964-1972) was replaced with dissolution of 
multi-party democracy and the nationalization of many key industries, specifically 
mining. There have been considerable discussions on the reasons for Kaunda’s decided 
turn towards the left. In the early 1970s, many believe it was his meetings with the 
Chinese, and in particular, with Mao Zedong. However, Kaunda was always wary of Mao 
and was in fact closer to Nyerere, also socialist in his stance towards the economy. Yet 
the most likely reason was in large part greed on behalf of the government. The mining 
industry was booming, and there was great money to be made. When copper prices fell 
during the global economic crash of the 1970s, the money dried up and the maintenance 
of so many nationalized projects became impossible. 
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Chinese changes were equally profound. After the death of Mao in 1976, Chinese 
leaders began a series of economic reforms, led by Deng Xiaoping. The economic 
reforms carried out by the Chinese government in the 1970s and 1980s created an 
increasingly capitalistic market, while remaining communist in politics, with little 
political freedom given to citizens. The reforms, however, were a huge success, and have 
transformed China into the economic powerhouse it is today. A growing population 
coupled with a global manufacturing industry creates an increasing need for raw 
materials. Cheap credit and questionable currency valuation also give the Chinese 
government and Chinese owned business a unique advantage in the increasingly global 
marketplace. 
Therefore, while during the era of Deng Xiaoping, China limited its foreign 
interactions, the twenty-first century has seen a renewal of close ties between Zambia and 
China. Due to the changes in the Chinese and Zambian economies towards increasing 
private ownership, many of these connections have taken the form of private sector 
investments in Zambia, often in the mining industry, but there are also both large and 
small Chinese aid initiatives. In 2010, for instance, the Chinese government gave the 
struggling Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority a US$39 million interest free loan to help 





The Future of Zambia’s Relations with China 
In his inauguration speech, Sata claimed that “Foreign investment is important to 
Zambia, as it does not only create jobs but equally contributes to the economic 
empowerment of Zambians…It’s our hope that Investors will abide by the labour laws of 
the country ensuring that Zambians are not disadvantaged.” This leaves the potential for 
Zambian foreign investment policy, and foreign relations, relatively open. More than one 
year after Sata’s election, there are still many Chinese companies with thousands of 
Chinese workers, operating successfully and with little interference from the government.  
However, there is also the opinion that all this attention is unjustified. The 
percentage of Chinese investments in Zambia is a fraction compared to those of several 
western back multi-national corporations. The Australian multi-national mine, First 
Quantum, is the largest in Zambia and currently constructing the largest open pit mine in 
Africa. The agricultural company Big Concession has been buying tens of thousands of 
hectares of farmland throughout Zambia, with little known about its plans for the 
employment of the citizens in the areas in which it farms.  
The reality of Zambia’s relations with China is as complex as the conversation 
between the students transcribed in the beginning of this study. There is no easy answer 
to the benevolence or malevolence of the West or China, or any foreign interest for that 
matter. The point of departure, however, is understandable. With knowledge, there is 
power. And understanding both the historical and contemporary influence of foreign 
interests and governments in Zambia is the first step.  
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APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY 
 
 
1 October 1949  Establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
 
14 August 1952  Alfred Sauvy coins the term “third world” 
 
8 May - 21 July 1954  Geneva Conference 
 
June 1954   Establishment of “Pancha Shila,” or the Five Principles of  
    Peaceful Coexistence 
 
1 November 1954  Beginning of the Algerian War for Independence 
 
6-10 April 1955  Asian Nations Conference 
 
18-24 April 1955  Bandung Conference 
 
29 October 1956  Beginning of the Suez Crisis 
 
6 March 1957 The British colony of the Gold Coast declares 
independence and becomes the independent nation of 
Ghana. 
 
26 December 1957  Founding of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity   
    Organization 
 
1960 “Year of African Independence.” Seventeen African 
nations become independent.  
 
December 1963-   Zhou En Lai’s trip to Africa 
February 1964  
 
24 October 1964  The British colony of Northern Rhodesia becomes the  
    Independent nation of Zambia. 
 
16 May 1966   Launching of the Cultural Revolution in China 
 
1970- 1975 Building of the TAZARA Railway by China from Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania to Lusaka, Zambia 
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25 October 1971  Re-establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the 
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